feat(passkey): advance sign_count, reject clone-warned assertions

Both login doors (username-first and discoverable) now run a shared applyAssertionCounter after a verified assertion. A signature-counter regression — go-webauthn's CloneWarning, the possible-cloned-authenticator signal — is refused fail-closed with the same opaque passkey_login_invalid envelope any other finish failure returns (no clone oracle to a prober) and audited distinctly as auth.passkey_clone_rejected under the resolved account. A clean assertion advances the stored sign_count to the asserted value and stamps last_used_at, before any session is minted.

Counter-less/synced authenticators report 0 and never warn, so they pass through and simply re-stamp 0; the check gates only counter-keeping hardware authenticators, where a rollback is the meaningful signal. Email-OTP and username-first passkey remain fallbacks, so a rejected clone is never bricked.

Adds Repo.AdvanceCredentialSignCount (pgrepo UPDATE by credential_id) and surfaces CloneWarning from the internal/passkey adapter's FinishLogin/FinishDiscoverableLogin. Proven by real-crypto adapter tests (a counter regression still verifies but flags CloneWarning), handler tests (advance-and-stamp on success, fail-closed on clone), and a symmetric test on each door so both call sites of the shared helper are covered.

internal/api/api_test.go

@@ -460,6 +460,23 @@ func (f *fakeRepo) DeleteAllPasskeyCredentialsForUser(_ context.Context, userID
 	return nil
 }
 
+// AdvanceCredentialSignCount mirrors PGRepo: find the passkey by its UNIQUE credential_id, set
+// the stored counter to newSignCount, and stamp last_used_at. A credential_id matching no row
+// is a successful no-op (the PG UPDATE touches zero rows), so a test can assert both the
+// advance-on-success and the never-error-on-missing contracts.
+func (f *fakeRepo) AdvanceCredentialSignCount(_ context.Context, credentialID string, newSignCount uint32, usedAt time.Time) error {
+	for id, c := range f.passkeyCreds {
+		if c.CredentialID == credentialID {
+			c.SignCount = newSignCount
+			t := usedAt
+			c.LastUsedAt = &t
+			f.passkeyCreds[id] = c
+			return nil
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // fakePasskeyVerifier is the hermetic PasskeyVerifier: it performs no real attestation
 // or assertion crypto, so it exercises the enrollment AND login STATE MACHINES (challenge
 // persistence, consume, conflict, audit, session mint) without go-webauthn.

internal/api/handlers_passkey.go

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package api
 
 import (
 	"bytes"
+	"context"
 	"crypto/rand"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
@@ -154,21 +155,25 @@ type VerifiedCredential struct {
 }
 
 // VerifiedAssertion is the output of a finished LOGIN (assertion) ceremony: which of the
-// user's bound credentials proved itself and the signature counter the authenticator
-// reported. Like VerifiedCredential it carries no secret. SignCount is the raw ceremony
-// fact, NOT a policy verdict: the handler that eventually consumes this holds the
-// previously-stored counter and decides whether a non-increase is a cloned-authenticator
-// signal — the verifier deliberately does not, so clone policy lives in one place with
-// the stored state. SignCount is legitimately 0 for authenticators that keep no counter.
+// user's bound credentials proved itself, the signature counter the authenticator reported,
+// and whether that counter regressed (a possible clone). Like VerifiedCredential it carries
+// no secret. SignCount is a raw ceremony fact, NOT a policy verdict; CloneWarning IS the
+// verifier's regression verdict, but the refuse-vs-allow decision is the handler's. Clone
+// policy therefore lives in one place with the stored counter (applyAssertionCounter, which
+// both login doors call). SignCount is legitimately 0 for authenticators that keep no counter.
 //
-// The login handler below (handlePasskeyLoginFinish) obtains this from FinishLogin but
-// currently checks only that the assertion verified — the SignCount/UserVerified consumer
-// the note above anticipates is still future. It is the stable seam output the production
-// adapter (internal/passkey) produces and its Oracle test asserts on, so handler and
-// adapter agree on shape without either reshaping the other.
+// applyAssertionCounter is that single consumer: it refuses a CloneWarning fail-closed and,
+// on success, advances the stored counter and stamps last_used_at. This is the stable seam
+// output the production adapter (internal/passkey) produces and its Oracle test asserts on,
+// so handler and adapter agree on shape without either reshaping the other.
 type VerifiedAssertion struct {
 	CredentialID string // base64url(raw credential id) — which bound credential signed
 	SignCount    uint32
+	// CloneWarning is go-webauthn's verdict that the signature counter did not advance past
+	// the stored value (WebAuthn §6.1.1 clone detection). It is meaningful only for
+	// counter-keeping authenticators: synced/counter-less keys report SignCount 0 on every
+	// assertion and structurally never raise it. The login handlers refuse it fail-closed.
+	CloneWarning bool
 	// UserVerified records that a PIN/biometric (not mere presence) was performed
 	// during the assertion ceremony. The verifier enforces UV=required at BeginLogin,
 	// so this is always true for a successful assertion; persisting it makes the
@@ -181,6 +186,28 @@ type VerifiedAssertion struct {
 var errPasskeyUnavailable = newError(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "passkey_unavailable",
 	"passkey subsystem is not configured")
 
+// errPasskeyClonedAuthenticator is the internal signal from applyAssertionCounter that a
+// verified assertion carried a clone warning (its signature counter did not advance past the
+// stored value). It never reaches the client verbatim: the login doors map it to the generic
+// passkey_login_invalid envelope — no clone oracle to a prober — and audit it distinctly.
+var errPasskeyClonedAuthenticator = errors.New("passkey assertion rejected: clone warning")
+
+// applyAssertionCounter is the single consumer of a verified assertion's signature-counter
+// facts, shared by the username-first (handlePasskeyLoginFinish) and discoverable
+// (handlePasskeyLoginDiscoverableFinish) login doors so clone policy lives in one place with
+// the stored counter. A CloneWarning fails closed with errPasskeyClonedAuthenticator;
+// otherwise it advances the stored counter to the asserted value and stamps last_used_at.
+// Counter-less/synced authenticators report 0 and never warn, so they pass through and simply
+// re-stamp 0 — the check gates only counter-keeping authenticators, where a rollback is the
+// meaningful clone signal. It runs BEFORE the session is minted, so a clone or a persist
+// failure denies the login rather than leaving an advanced counter with no session.
+func (a *API) applyAssertionCounter(ctx context.Context, va VerifiedAssertion) error {
+	if va.CloneWarning {
+		return errPasskeyClonedAuthenticator
+	}
+	return a.Repo.AdvanceCredentialSignCount(ctx, va.CredentialID, va.SignCount, a.now())
+}
+
 // newPasskeyID returns an opaque random row id (128 bits, hex) for a passkey row.
 func newPasskeyID() (string, error) {
 	var b [16]byte
@@ -577,12 +604,25 @@ func (a *API) handlePasskeyLoginFinish(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		DisplayName: u.Username,
 		Credentials: creds,
 	}
-	_, err = a.Passkey.FinishLogin(user, sessionData, bytes.NewReader(req.Assertion))
+	va, err := a.Passkey.FinishLogin(user, sessionData, bytes.NewReader(req.Assertion))
 	if err != nil {
 		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "passkey_login_invalid",
 			"passkey login could not be completed; begin again"))
 		return
 	}
+	// Clone policy + counter advance, in one place shared with the discoverable door. A
+	// regressed counter is refused with the same opaque envelope (no clone oracle) but audited
+	// distinctly; a successful assertion advances the stored counter and stamps last_used_at.
+	if err := a.applyAssertionCounter(r.Context(), va); err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, errPasskeyClonedAuthenticator) {
+			a.audit(r, u.Username, "auth.passkey_clone_rejected", va.CredentialID)
+			writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "passkey_login_invalid",
+				"passkey login could not be completed; begin again"))
+			return
+		}
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
 
 	token, err := newSessionToken()
 	if err != nil {

internal/api/handlers_passkey_discoverable.go

@@ -157,7 +157,8 @@ func (a *API) handlePasskeyLoginDiscoverableFinish(w http.ResponseWriter, r *htt
 		// stable username so a nil email never matters.
 		return PasskeyUser{ID: u.ID, Name: u.Username, DisplayName: u.Username, Credentials: creds}, nil
 	}
-	if _, err := a.Passkey.FinishDiscoverableLogin(resolve, sessionData, bytes.NewReader(req.Assertion)); err != nil {
+	va, err := a.Passkey.FinishDiscoverableLogin(resolve, sessionData, bytes.NewReader(req.Assertion))
+	if err != nil {
 		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "passkey_login_invalid",
 			"passkey login could not be completed; begin again"))
 		return
@@ -171,6 +172,19 @@ func (a *API) handlePasskeyLoginDiscoverableFinish(w http.ResponseWriter, r *htt
 			"passkey login could not be completed; begin again"))
 		return
 	}
+	// Same clone policy + counter advance as the username-first door (applyAssertionCounter): a
+	// regressed counter is refused with the identical opaque envelope but audited under the
+	// resolved account; a successful assertion advances the stored counter and stamps last_used_at.
+	if err := a.applyAssertionCounter(r.Context(), va); err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, errPasskeyClonedAuthenticator) {
+			a.audit(r, resolved.Username, "auth.passkey_clone_rejected", va.CredentialID)
+			writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "passkey_login_invalid",
+				"passkey login could not be completed; begin again"))
+			return
+		}
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
 
 	token, err := newSessionToken()
 	if err != nil {

internal/api/handlers_passkey_discoverable_test.go

@@ -317,3 +317,81 @@ func TestPasskeyDiscoverableLoginFaceSeparation(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("finish on internal face: code = %d, want 404", w.Code)
 	}
 }
+
+// beginDiscoverableLogin runs the from-zero begin and returns the stashed login_id, so the
+// counter/clone tests below need not re-inline the begin ceremony each time.
+func beginDiscoverableLogin(t *testing.T, eh http.Handler) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/discoverable/begin", `{}`, jsonHeader)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("begin: code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	loginID, _ := acctBody(t, w)["login_id"].(string)
+	if loginID == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("begin returned empty login_id: %s", w.Body.String())
+	}
+	return loginID
+}
+
+// TestPasskeyDiscoverableLoginAdvancesSignCount proves the success half of task #40 item 5: a
+// verified from-zero assertion advances the stored signature counter to the value the
+// authenticator reported and stamps last_used_at. Without this the stored counter would sit at
+// the enrollment-time 0 forever, leaving the clone check below no moving baseline to judge a
+// later regression against.
+func TestPasskeyDiscoverableLoginAdvancesSignCount(t *testing.T) {
+	api, repo, v := seedDiscoverableLoginAPI(t)
+	// A clean (non-clone) assertion reporting an advanced counter.
+	v.assertion = VerifiedAssertion{CredentialID: "cred-1", UserVerified: true, SignCount: 42}
+	eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+
+	loginID := beginDiscoverableLogin(t, eh)
+	w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/discoverable/finish",
+		`{"login_id":"`+loginID+`","assertion":{"id":"cred-1","type":"public-key"}}`, jsonHeader)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("finish: code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	got := repo.passkeyCreds["row1"]
+	if got.SignCount != 42 {
+		t.Errorf("stored SignCount = %d, want 42 (advanced to the asserted counter)", got.SignCount)
+	}
+	if got.LastUsedAt == nil || !got.LastUsedAt.Equal(frozenNow) {
+		t.Errorf("stored LastUsedAt = %v, want %v (stamped on a successful assertion)", got.LastUsedAt, frozenNow)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestPasskeyDiscoverableLoginCloneRejected proves the fail-closed half of task #40 item 5: a
+// verified assertion carrying a CloneWarning (signature-counter regression — a possible cloned
+// authenticator) is refused. The refusal (1) collapses into the same passkey_login_invalid
+// envelope as any other finish failure so a prober gets no clone oracle, (2) mints NO session,
+// (3) does NOT advance or stamp the stored credential, and (4) is audited distinctly for the
+// operator under the resolved account.
+func TestPasskeyDiscoverableLoginCloneRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	api, repo, v := seedDiscoverableLoginAPI(t)
+	v.assertion = VerifiedAssertion{CredentialID: "cred-1", UserVerified: true, SignCount: 3, CloneWarning: true}
+	eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+
+	loginID := beginDiscoverableLogin(t, eh)
+	w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/discoverable/finish",
+		`{"login_id":"`+loginID+`","assertion":{"id":"cred-1","type":"public-key"}}`, jsonHeader)
+
+	if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "passkey_login_invalid" {
+		t.Fatalf("clone finish: code = %d body %s, want 400 passkey_login_invalid (opaque refusal)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if len(repo.sessions) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("clone refusal must mint no session, got %d", len(repo.sessions))
+	}
+	if len(w.Result().Cookies()) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("clone refusal must set no session cookie, got %v", w.Result().Cookies())
+	}
+	// The stored credential is untouched: still at enrollment-time counter 0, never stamped.
+	if got := repo.passkeyCreds["row1"]; got.SignCount != 0 || got.LastUsedAt != nil {
+		t.Errorf("clone refusal must not advance/stamp the credential, got SignCount=%d LastUsedAt=%v", got.SignCount, got.LastUsedAt)
+	}
+	// Audited distinctly, under the resolved account, so the operator sees the clone signal.
+	if n := len(repo.audits); n != 1 || repo.audits[0].Action != "auth.passkey_clone_rejected" {
+		t.Fatalf("want exactly 1 auth.passkey_clone_rejected audit, got %+v", repo.audits)
+	}
+	if repo.audits[0].Actor != "player" {
+		t.Errorf("clone audit actor = %q, want player (the resolved account)", repo.audits[0].Actor)
+	}
+}

internal/api/handlers_passkey_login_test.go

@@ -458,3 +458,39 @@ func TestPasskeyLoginFaceSeparation(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("finish on internal face: code = %d, want 404", w.Code)
 	}
 }
+
+// TestPasskeyLoginFinishCloneRejected is the username-first mirror of the discoverable door's
+// clone refusal (task #40 item 5). Both doors share applyAssertionCounter, but each WIRES it
+// independently, so this proves the username-first finish also fails closed on a CloneWarning:
+// the same opaque passkey_login_invalid envelope (no clone oracle), no session minted, the stored
+// credential left untouched at its enrollment-time counter, and a distinct auth.passkey_clone_
+// rejected audit under the account. Challenge is planted directly so finish is reachable under
+// the frozen clock without a live begin.
+func TestPasskeyLoginFinishCloneRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	api, repo, v := seedLoginPasskeyAPI(t)
+	v.assertion = VerifiedAssertion{CredentialID: "cred-1", UserVerified: true, SignCount: 3, CloneWarning: true}
+	plantLoginChallenge(repo, "live", frozenNow.Add(passkeyChallengeTTL))
+	eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+
+	w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/finish",
+		`{"email":"[email protected]","assertion":{"id":"cred-1","type":"public-key"}}`, jsonHeader)
+
+	if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "passkey_login_invalid" {
+		t.Fatalf("clone finish: code = %d body %s, want 400 passkey_login_invalid (opaque refusal)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if len(repo.sessions) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("clone refusal must mint no session, got %d", len(repo.sessions))
+	}
+	if len(w.Result().Cookies()) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("clone refusal must set no session cookie, got %v", w.Result().Cookies())
+	}
+	if got := repo.passkeyCreds["row1"]; got.SignCount != 0 || got.LastUsedAt != nil {
+		t.Errorf("clone refusal must not advance/stamp the credential, got SignCount=%d LastUsedAt=%v", got.SignCount, got.LastUsedAt)
+	}
+	if n := len(repo.audits); n != 1 || repo.audits[0].Action != "auth.passkey_clone_rejected" {
+		t.Fatalf("want exactly 1 auth.passkey_clone_rejected audit, got %+v", repo.audits)
+	}
+	if repo.audits[0].Actor != "player" {
+		t.Errorf("clone audit actor = %q, want player (the resolved account)", repo.audits[0].Actor)
+	}
+}

internal/api/pgrepo.go

@@ -1150,6 +1150,18 @@ func (p *PGRepo) PasskeyCredentialsForUser(ctx context.Context, userID string) (
 	return out, rows.Err()
 }
 
+// AdvanceCredentialSignCount records a successful assertion on the passkey identified by
+// credentialID: it advances the stored signature counter to newSignCount and stamps
+// last_used_at. credential_id is UNIQUE so exactly one row is touched; a missing row (the
+// credential was unbound mid-ceremony) affects zero rows and is a successful no-op, never an
+// error — the assertion is already cryptographically complete by the time this runs.
+func (p *PGRepo) AdvanceCredentialSignCount(ctx context.Context, credentialID string, newSignCount uint32, usedAt time.Time) error {
+	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
+		`UPDATE webauthn_credentials SET sign_count = $2, last_used_at = $3 WHERE credential_id = $1`,
+		credentialID, int64(newSignCount), usedAt)
+	return err
+}
+
 // DeletePasskeyCredential removes the passkey row id, scoped to userID so a caller can
 // only unbind their OWN credential. No matching (user, id) row → ErrNotFound via a zero
 // RowsAffected, so a stale or cross-user id cannot silently no-op as success.

internal/api/repo.go

@@ -392,6 +392,13 @@ type Repo interface {
 	// unbinding leaves a re-enrollable credential. Removing zero rows is success, not an
 	// error — an account with no passkeys is the intended post-condition either way.
 	DeleteAllPasskeyCredentialsForUser(ctx context.Context, userID string) error
+	// AdvanceCredentialSignCount records a successful assertion on the passkey identified by
+	// credentialID (base64url): it sets the stored signature counter to newSignCount and stamps
+	// last_used_at. credential_id is UNIQUE, so exactly one row is updated; a missing row (the
+	// credential was unbound mid-ceremony) is a successful no-op, never an error. The login doors
+	// call it only after clone policy allows the assertion, so for a counter-keeping authenticator
+	// the stored counter only ever moves forward — the baseline a later regression is judged against.
+	AdvanceCredentialSignCount(ctx context.Context, credentialID string, newSignCount uint32, usedAt time.Time) error
 
 	// ---- player game-login: username-collision reclaim (spec §B3) ----
 

internal/passkey/verifier.go

@@ -192,10 +192,11 @@ func (v *Verifier) BeginLogin(user api.PasskeyUser) (json.RawMessage, []byte, er
 // reported. go-webauthn checks the challenge, RP id, and origin against server-held values,
 // that the asserted credential id is one the user actually holds (it returns
 // protocol.ErrorUnknownCredential otherwise), and the signature against the stored COSE
-// public key. It does NOT decide clone/regression policy here: the returned SignCount is
-// the raw ceremony fact, and the handler — which holds the previously-stored counter —
-// decides whether a non-increase is a cloned-authenticator signal. The verified credential
-// id is returned base64url so the handler can look up the exact row to update.
+// public key, and runs go-webauthn's UpdateCounter so a signature counter that fails to
+// advance past the stored value raises CloneWarning. It does NOT decide clone policy here:
+// the returned SignCount and CloneWarning are raw ceremony facts, and the handler — the one
+// consumer, holding the stored counter — decides (it refuses, fail-closed). The verified
+// credential id is returned base64url so the handler can look up the exact row to update.
 func (v *Verifier) FinishLogin(user api.PasskeyUser, sessionData []byte, assertion io.Reader) (api.VerifiedAssertion, error) {
 	var session webauthn.SessionData
 	if err := json.Unmarshal(sessionData, &session); err != nil {
@@ -212,6 +213,7 @@ func (v *Verifier) FinishLogin(user api.PasskeyUser, sessionData []byte, asserti
 	return api.VerifiedAssertion{
 		CredentialID: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cred.ID),
 		SignCount:    cred.Authenticator.SignCount,
+		CloneWarning: cred.Authenticator.CloneWarning,
 	}, nil
 }
 
@@ -274,6 +276,7 @@ func (v *Verifier) FinishDiscoverableLogin(resolveUser func(userHandle []byte) (
 	return api.VerifiedAssertion{
 		CredentialID: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cred.ID),
 		SignCount:    cred.Authenticator.SignCount,
+		CloneWarning: cred.Authenticator.CloneWarning,
 	}, nil
 }
 

internal/passkey/verifier_test.go

@@ -480,6 +480,79 @@ func TestDiscoverableLoginUnboundCredentialRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestLoginCloneWarningSurfaced proves the adapter SURFACES go-webauthn's clone verdict (task #40
+// item 5) on the username-first door: when the authenticator presents a signature counter at or
+// below the stored value, go-webauthn raises CloneWarning but does NOT itself reject (the counter
+// is advisory; the RP decides). The adapter must carry that verdict out in VerifiedAssertion so
+// the handler can fail closed — without this the handler would have nothing to key clone policy
+// on. Note the assertion still VERIFIES (err is nil): a regressed counter is a policy signal, not
+// a broken signature.
+func TestLoginCloneWarningSurfaced(t *testing.T) {
+	v := newTestVerifier(t)
+	rp := virtualRP()
+	authenticator := virtualwebauthn.NewAuthenticator()
+	cred := virtualwebauthn.NewCredential(virtualwebauthn.KeyTypeEC2)
+	stored := enrollCredential(t, v, rp, authenticator, cred)
+
+	// The stored counter is AHEAD of what the authenticator will present: a regression, which is
+	// exactly the cloned-authenticator signal go-webauthn's UpdateCounter raises.
+	stored.SignCount = 100
+	cred.Counter = 50
+
+	options, sessionData, err := v.BeginLogin(testUser(stored))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("BeginLogin: %v", err)
+	}
+	assertionOpts, err := virtualwebauthn.ParseAssertionOptions(string(options))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ParseAssertionOptions: %v", err)
+	}
+	assertionResponse := virtualwebauthn.CreateAssertionResponse(rp, authenticator, cred, *assertionOpts)
+	va, err := v.FinishLogin(testUser(stored), sessionData, strings.NewReader(assertionResponse))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("FinishLogin: %v (a counter regression must still VERIFY, only flag CloneWarning)", err)
+	}
+	if !va.CloneWarning {
+		t.Fatal("va.CloneWarning = false, want true (presented counter at/below the stored counter is a clone signal)")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestDiscoverableLoginCloneWarningSurfaced is the same clone-verdict proof for the usernameless
+// door (task #40 item 5): a from-zero assertion whose counter regressed must come back VERIFIED
+// but with CloneWarning set, so the discoverable handler refuses it in the one shared place the
+// username-first door uses. Chained onto a real enrollment so the assertion is genuine crypto.
+func TestDiscoverableLoginCloneWarningSurfaced(t *testing.T) {
+	v := newTestVerifier(t)
+	rp := virtualRP()
+	authenticator := virtualwebauthn.NewAuthenticator()
+	cred := virtualwebauthn.NewCredential(virtualwebauthn.KeyTypeEC2)
+	stored := enrollCredential(t, v, rp, authenticator, cred)
+
+	authenticator.Options.UserHandle = []byte(testUserID)
+	stored.SignCount = 100
+	cred.Counter = 50
+
+	options, sessionData, err := v.BeginDiscoverableLogin()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("BeginDiscoverableLogin: %v", err)
+	}
+	assertionOpts, err := virtualwebauthn.ParseAssertionOptions(string(options))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ParseAssertionOptions: %v (options=%s)", err, options)
+	}
+	assertionResponse := virtualwebauthn.CreateAssertionResponse(rp, authenticator, cred, *assertionOpts)
+	resolve := func(userHandle []byte) (api.PasskeyUser, error) {
+		return testUser(stored), nil
+	}
+	va, err := v.FinishDiscoverableLogin(resolve, sessionData, strings.NewReader(assertionResponse))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("FinishDiscoverableLogin: %v (a counter regression must still VERIFY, only flag CloneWarning)", err)
+	}
+	if !va.CloneWarning {
+		t.Fatal("va.CloneWarning = false, want true (presented counter at/below the stored counter is a clone signal)")
+	}
+}
+
 // TestEnrollmentRequestsResidentKey pins the ONLY server-side half of the from-zero enabler a
 // unit test can prove: that enrollment ASKS the browser for a resident (discoverable) key, i.e.
 // the creation options carry authenticatorSelection.residentKey = "preferred". Whether a real