fix(api): 禁用用户与吊销会话合为一个事务，passkey 签名计数只增不减，引导检查遇到数据库故障返回 503

internal/api/api.go

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ package api
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"log"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"strings"
@@ -776,7 +777,15 @@ func (a *API) requireOnboarded(h http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		p := principalFromContext(r.Context())
 		if p != nil && p.ViaSession && !p.EmailVerified {
-			creds, _ := a.Repo.PasskeyCredentialsForUser(r.Context(), p.UserID)
+			creds, err := a.Repo.PasskeyCredentialsForUser(r.Context(), p.UserID)
+			if err != nil {
+				// A store outage reads as retry-later; setup_required would send
+				// the caller off to enroll a passkey they may already have.
+				log.Printf("api: %s %s: onboarding check (request_id=%s): %v",
+					r.Method, r.URL.Path, requestIDFromContext(r.Context()), err)
+				writeError(w, r, errAuthUnavailable)
+				return
+			}
 			if len(creds) == 0 {
 				writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusForbidden, "setup_required",
 					"passkey enrollment is required before this action is available"))

internal/api/api_test.go

@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ func (f *fakeRepo) DeleteAllPasskeyCredentialsForUser(_ context.Context, userID
 func (f *fakeRepo) AdvanceCredentialSignCount(_ context.Context, credentialID string, newSignCount uint32, usedAt time.Time) error {
 	for id, c := range f.passkeyCreds {
 		if c.CredentialID == credentialID {
-			c.SignCount = newSignCount
+			c.SignCount = max(c.SignCount, newSignCount)
 			t := usedAt
 			c.LastUsedAt = &t
 			f.passkeyCreds[id] = c

internal/api/handlers_setup_lockdown_test.go

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package api
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"errors"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"testing"
@@ -138,3 +139,33 @@ func TestAdvRequireOnboardedPredicate(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+// credsDown is a store whose passkey lookup fails, as during a Postgres outage.
+type credsDown struct{ *fakeRepo }
+
+func (credsDown) PasskeyCredentialsForUser(context.Context, string) ([]PasskeyCredential, error) {
+	return nil, errors.New("connection refused")
+}
+
+// A failed passkey lookup is an outage: the caller gets 503 auth_unavailable to
+// retry, never setup_required, which would send a player with a passkey off to
+// enroll another.
+func TestRequireOnboardedReportsAStoreOutage(t *testing.T) {
+	repo := newFakeRepo()
+	api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
+	api.Repo = credsDown{repo}
+	ran := false
+	h := api.requireOnboarded(func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) { ran = true })
+
+	r := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/v1/servers/demo2/wake", nil)
+	r = r.WithContext(context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxKeyPrincipal,
+		&Principal{UserID: "has-pk", ViaSession: true, EmailVerified: false}))
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	h(w, r)
+	if ran {
+		t.Fatal("the handler ran although the onboarding check could not be made")
+	}
+	if w.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable || errCode(w.Body.Bytes()) != "auth_unavailable" {
+		t.Fatalf("got %d %s, want 503 auth_unavailable", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}

internal/api/pgrepo.go

@@ -1401,9 +1401,14 @@ func (p *PGRepo) PasskeyCredentialsForUser(ctx context.Context, userID string) (
 // last_used_at. credential_id is UNIQUE so exactly one row is touched; a missing row (the
 // credential was unbound mid-ceremony) affects zero rows and is a successful no-op, never an
 // error — the assertion is already cryptographically complete by the time this runs.
+//
+// The counter only moves forward: two assertions verified at once against the same stored
+// value land in either order, and the lower one must not overwrite the higher, or a clone
+// replaying the count in between would pass the next check.
 func (p *PGRepo) AdvanceCredentialSignCount(ctx context.Context, credentialID string, newSignCount uint32, usedAt time.Time) error {
 	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
-		`UPDATE webauthn_credentials SET sign_count = $2, last_used_at = $3 WHERE credential_id = $1`,
+		`UPDATE webauthn_credentials SET sign_count = GREATEST(sign_count, $2), last_used_at = $3
+		  WHERE credential_id = $1`,
 		credentialID, int64(newSignCount), usedAt)
 	return err
 }
@@ -1738,31 +1743,35 @@ func (p *PGRepo) DeleteUser(ctx context.Context, userID, _ string) error {
 }
 
 // SetUserDisabled flips the disabled flag. Setting disabled→true additionally
-// revokes every live session so the account is immediately locked out.
+// revokes every live session so the account is immediately locked out. Both land
+// in one transaction: a disable whose revocation failed is rolled back and
+// reported, so the admin never reads "disabled" while a session still stands.
 func (p *PGRepo) SetUserDisabled(ctx context.Context, userID string, disabled bool) error {
-	// Guard: the user must exist and not be deleted.
+	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
-	var ok bool
+	if err != nil {
-	if err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
-		`SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM users WHERE id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL)`,
-		userID).Scan(&ok); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	if !ok {
+	defer func() { _ = tx.Rollback() }()
+
+	res, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
+		`UPDATE users SET disabled = $2 WHERE id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`, userID, disabled)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if n, err := res.RowsAffected(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	} else if n == 0 {
 		return ErrNotFound
 	}
 
-	if _, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
-		`UPDATE users SET disabled = $2 WHERE id = $1`, userID, disabled); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-
 	if disabled {
-		// Revoke every live session so the lockout is immediate.
+		if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
-		_, _ = p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
 			`UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at = now() WHERE user_id = $1 AND revoked_at IS NULL`,
-			userID)
+			userID); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
 	}
-	return nil
+	return tx.Commit()
 }
 
 // ---- quota admin ----

internal/pgint/store_test.go

@@ -4,11 +4,14 @@ package pgint
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"database/sql"
 	"errors"
 	"os"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 
+	"felis.lolicon.best/internal/api"
 	"felis.lolicon.best/internal/store"
 
 	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgconn"
@@ -133,3 +136,96 @@ func TestMigrationBodyHasNoStatementLimit(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("statement_timeout inside a migration = %q, want 0", v)
 	}
 }
+
+// Two assertions verified against the same stored counter can land in either
+// order; the lower one never pulls the counter back, and both stamp the use.
+func TestSignCountNeverMovesBack(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	u := newUser(t, "user", "signcount")
+	cid := "cid-" + suffix(t)
+	if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO webauthn_credentials (id, user_id, credential_id, public_key, sign_count) VALUES ($1,$2,$3,'pk',4)`,
+		"cred-"+suffix(t), u.ID, cid); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	later := mustNow().Add(time.Minute).Truncate(time.Microsecond)
+	if err := repo.AdvanceCredentialSignCount(ctx, cid, 6, mustNow()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := repo.AdvanceCredentialSignCount(ctx, cid, 5, later); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var n int64
+	var used time.Time
+	if err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
+		`SELECT sign_count, last_used_at FROM webauthn_credentials WHERE credential_id = $1`, cid).Scan(&n, &used); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if n != 6 {
+		t.Errorf("sign_count = %d after 6 then 5, want 6", n)
+	}
+	if !used.Equal(later) {
+		t.Errorf("last_used_at = %v, want the later use %v", used, later)
+	}
+}
+
+// Disabling revokes the sessions in the same transaction: when the revocation
+// fails, the flag is not left set, and the caller hears about it.
+func TestSetUserDisabledIsAtomic(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	u := newUser(t, "user", "disable")
+	hash := "h-" + suffix(t)
+	if err := repo.CreateSession(ctx, hash, u.ID, mustNow().Add(time.Hour)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	// Make every session update fail, as a lost connection or a lock timeout would.
+	fn := "pgint_refuse_" + suffix(t)
+	for _, stmt := range []string{
+		`CREATE FUNCTION ` + fn + `() RETURNS trigger LANGUAGE plpgsql AS $$ BEGIN RAISE EXCEPTION 'refused'; END $$`,
+		`CREATE TRIGGER ` + fn + ` BEFORE UPDATE ON sessions FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION ` + fn + `()`,
+	} {
+		if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, stmt); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	dropped := false
+	drop := func() {
+		if dropped {
+			return
+		}
+		dropped = true
+		_, _ = db.ExecContext(ctx, `DROP TRIGGER `+fn+` ON sessions`)
+		_, _ = db.ExecContext(ctx, `DROP FUNCTION `+fn+`()`)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(drop)
+
+	if err := repo.SetUserDisabled(ctx, u.ID, true); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("SetUserDisabled succeeded although its sessions could not be revoked")
+	}
+	var disabled bool
+	if err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT disabled FROM users WHERE id = $1`, u.ID).Scan(&disabled); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if disabled {
+		t.Fatal("the account was left disabled with its sessions still live")
+	}
+
+	drop()
+	if err := repo.SetUserDisabled(ctx, u.ID, true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := repo.SessionUser(ctx, hash, mustNow()); !errors.Is(err, api.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("session after disable = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
+	}
+	var revoked sql.NullTime
+	if err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT revoked_at FROM sessions WHERE token_hash = $1`, hash).Scan(&revoked); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !revoked.Valid {
+		t.Fatal("disable left the session unrevoked")
+	}
+	if err := repo.SetUserDisabled(ctx, "no-such-"+suffix(t), true); !errors.Is(err, api.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("SetUserDisabled(missing) = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
+	}
+}