feat(api): add on-demand world backup endpoint and Job executor (§B4 Sync)

Add POST /api/v1/servers/{name}/backup: an owner or admin snapshots a
stopped server's world into the archive store on demand, recorded as a
first-class world_backups row (reason `manual`) — restorable by the
existing restore path and expired by the reaper's retention pass, so it
never leaks as an orphan archive. This is the break-glass "Sync" op,
resolved as immediate/on-demand backup.

felis-api cannot archive in-process (the world PVC is RWO, held by the
operator StatefulSet), so the work hands off to a one-shot Kubernetes Job
(new internal/backupjob) that mounts the world PVC read-only and the
backup PVC read-write, plus the felis config Secret so it self-records
its row atomically like the reaper. The Pod mirrors restore's weak-SA
isolation (SA token un-mounted, non-root, read-only rootfs, drop ALL);
the one reviewed departure is that config-Secret mount, frozen by
jobspec_test.go. Handler answers 202 backing_up; gated on the server
being Stopped (RWO world PVC), owner-or-admin, and FELIS_IMAGE +
FELIS_BACKUP_PVC being wired (else 503 backup_unavailable).

Each request mints a unique Job name (backup-<server>-<rand>) so a repeat
on-demand backup produces a fresh archive rather than colliding with a
just-finished Job still inside its TTL window and silently no-op'ing the
retry.
This commit is contained in:
flyemoji committed 2026-07-07 10:04:30 +09:00
1 parent fad48ff21d
commit 7a7c0d53ab
16 files changed
+1396 -1

No files matched your search

+74
View File
@@ -176,3 +176,77 @@ func (a *API) handleRestoreBackup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
"backup_id": backup.ID,
})
}
// handleBackupNow starts an on-demand backup of a server's world (POST
// /api/v1/servers/{name}/backup; spec §18/§19 WorldArchiver, run on demand). It is
// the "back up before I touch it" lever the break-glass console and the owner both
// reach for. Authorization mirrors handleRestoreBackup's front half — the shared
// "who may act on this server's world" gate — but stops short of restore's backup
// resolution and former-owner-match, because a backup is initiated by the CURRENT
// owner and records their ownership; there is no prior owner's data to leak:
//
// ① name validation
// ② ServerByName — an unknown server is 404
// ③ owner-or-admin, else 403 (an unowned server passes only for admin, so a
// released world can still be snapshotted by an operator before disposal)
// ④ stopped gate: the world PVC is RWO and held by a running server, so a backup
// Job cannot double-mount it — refuse unless the server is fully stopped. This
// also guarantees a quiescent, non-torn archive.
// ⑤ hand off to the Backuper. Backup is asynchronous (a backup Job), so success
// means "enqueued" and the handler answers 202.
//
// The former owner recorded on the backup is the server's current OwnerID (empty for
// an unowned server backed up by an admin), so the resulting world_backups row is
// restorable by that owner exactly like an inactivity backup.
func (a *API) handleBackupNow(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
p := principalFromContext(r.Context())
name := r.PathValue("name")
if err := naming.ValidateServerName(name); err != nil {
writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_name", "invalid server name: %v", err))
return
}
rec, err := a.Repo.ServerByName(r.Context(), name)
if err != nil {
a.writeLookupError(w, r, err)
return
}
if !a.isOwnerOrAdmin(p, rec) {
writeError(w, r, errForbidden)
return
}
// Stopped gate: the world PVC is RWO and held by a running server, so a backup
// Job cannot double-mount it (mirrors the restore gate). Ready means it is up;
// any desiredState other than Stopped means it owns the RWO volume.
info, err := a.Cluster.GetServer(r.Context(), name)
if err != nil {
a.writeLookupError(w, r, err)
return
}
if info.Ready || info.DesiredState != string(v1alpha1.DesiredStopped) {
writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusConflict, "not_stopped",
"stop the server before backing up its world"))
return
}
// Backuper is optional: when unwired the endpoint reports 503 rather than
// panicking, so the authorization boundary above is exercised even before the
// backup-Job executor is wired (see Backuper).
if a.Backuper == nil {
writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "backup_unavailable",
"backup subsystem is not configured"))
return
}
if err := a.Backuper.Backup(r.Context(), name, rec.OwnerID); err != nil {
a.writeLookupError(w, r, err)
return
}
a.audit(r, p.Email, "backup.create", name)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]any{
"name": name,
"status": "backing_up",
})
}