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+# Internal-face break-glass world backup endpoint (§B4 "Sync", phase 2a)
+
+- **Type:** feature (addition)
+- **Date:** 2026-07-07
+- **Area:** `internal/api`, `docs/openapi.yaml` — Go, oracle-verified
+- **Commit:** `f2fc57c`
+- **Task:** #31 Phase B4 break-glass ops — the "Sync" operation. Per the user's
+  **"两者都要"** decision the feature is built in two halves: the felis-api endpoint
+  that does the real backup-Job orchestration (phase 1, `7a7c0d5`) and a break-glass
+  menu peer that calls it while the API is alive (phase 2b, follow-up). **This change
+  is phase 2a: the second, internal face of that endpoint** — the door the console
+  peer will knock on.
+
+## What it does
+
+Adds `POST /api/v1/internal/servers/{name}/backup`, an **internal-face** twin of the
+external `POST /api/v1/servers/{name}/backup`. The on-node break-glass console (root
+on the host, holding the service token) POSTs here to snapshot a stopped world while
+felis-api is alive. Same 202 `backing_up` / 409 `not_stopped` / 503
+`backup_unavailable` / 404 / 400 `bad_name` surface as the external face.
+
+## Why
+
+The console cannot render the backup Job itself: it lacks the deployment coordinates
+(`FELIS_IMAGE`, `FELIS_BACKUP_PVC`) that only felis-api holds — the same reason the
+endpoint exists at all (phase 1). But the external face requires a Cloudflare-Access
+Principal the console does not have. The internal face authenticates with the service
+token (a trusted machine caller, no Principal), so the console can reach the same
+orchestration without a browser session.
+
+## Design decisions
+
+- **No owner gate on the internal face.** The external handler enforces owner-or-admin
+  from the Principal; the internal handler has none — the service token IS the
+  authorization (the operator already has root on the node), so a server owned by
+  someone else still backs up. This mirrors how the other internal-face handlers
+  (op-login approve, QR poll) trust the token rather than a Principal.
+- **Shared `enqueueBackup` tail.** The RWO stopped-gate, the optional-Backuper 503,
+  the async hand-off, and the audit+202 were refactored out of `handleBackupNow` into
+  a single `enqueueBackup(w, r, name, rec, actor, source)` that both faces call. The
+  two faces differ **only** in how the caller is authorized and in the audit
+  actor/source — the security-critical stopped-gate is single-sourced so the faces
+  cannot drift apart.
+- **Audit attributed to break-glass/internal.** The internal handler audits directly
+  via `Repo.Audit` with `Actor:"break-glass", Source:"internal"` (the `a.audit`
+  helper hardcodes `Source:"external"`), so a console-initiated backup is
+  distinguishable in the audit log from an owner's self-service one.
+- **Console does not double-audit.** Unlike the halt peer — which writes the CRD
+  directly and audits locally — the backup peer goes through the API, and the API
+  audits at the boundary. Auditing is single-sourced there; the console will not
+  emit its own row.
+
+## Files
+
+| File | Change |
+|---|---|
+| `internal/api/handlers_backups.go` | **+`handleInternalBackup`**, **+`enqueueBackup`**; `handleBackupNow` tail now calls `enqueueBackup(..., p.Email, "external")` |
+| `internal/api/api.go` | register `POST /api/v1/internal/servers/{name}/backup` on the internal-face route table |
+| `docs/openapi.yaml` | document the `internalBackupNow` operation (`x-felis-face: [internal]`, `serviceToken` security) |
+| `internal/api/handlers_backup_now_test.go` | **+`TestInternalBackup`** — no-owner-gate, break-glass/internal audit, stopped-gate/503/404/400 |
+
+## Verification
+
+WSL oracle (go1.26.4, authoritative for Go):
+
+```
+go build ./...  &&  go vet ./...  &&  go test ./...   → ALL GREEN
+```
+
+`TestOpenAPIMatchesServedRoutes` gates the new route against `docs/openapi.yaml` in
+both directions (served⇔documented) and passes. `TestInternalBackup` (5 subtests) and
+the existing `TestBackupNow` (10) both pass — the external refactor is
+behaviour-preserving (same audit actor `p.Email`/source `external`).
+
+## Self-review outcome
+
+- **ponytail (over-engineering):** the internal face is not a copy of the external
+  handler — the shared tail (`enqueueBackup`) collapses the duplication, and the two
+  handlers hold only their distinct auth + audit-attribution. No new abstraction
+  beyond the one shared function two callers already justify.
+- **correctness:** the no-owner-gate difference is deliberate and matches the other
+  service-token handlers; the stopped-gate is unchanged and now single-sourced, so the
+  external and internal faces cannot diverge on the RWO safety check.
diff --git a/docs/changes/INDEX.md b/docs/changes/INDEX.md
index 9cd6f75..bad9185 100644
--- a/docs/changes/INDEX.md
+++ b/docs/changes/INDEX.md
@@ -207,3 +207,4 @@ primary record.
 | c2ee21a | 2026-07-06 | feat(breakglass): add halt-a-server op to the recovery console (§B4) |
 | c1aa38b | 2026-07-06 | feat(velocity): add /felis migrate to open an account migration (§B3 inherit) |
 | 7a7c0d5 | 2026-07-07 | feat(api): add on-demand world backup endpoint and Job executor (§B4 Sync) |
+| f2fc57c | 2026-07-07 | feat(api): add internal-face break-glass world backup endpoint (§B4 Sync) |