feat(operator): gate op.console to staff and land owner setup there

The operator console (op.console.<root>) requires internal permission
verification on top of Zero-Trust: a passkey is not access. requireExternal
now refuses any non-admin principal arriving on the admin host, before any
handler, so op.console is staff-only at the door rather than per-route —
including on the passwordless demo face where Cloudflare Access is not in
front. The gate is inert on the player console (console.<root>).

Owner first-run setup is staff onboarding, so `felis setup` mints the
one-time setup URL on op.console.<root>/setup (was console.<root>). The
passkey verifier lists both console and op.console in RPOrigins so the
one-time binding asserts on either face under the shared console.<root>
RP-ID.

Session admin-access now includes role=owner, not only admin: the owner is
a superset of admin, so excluding it left IsOwner() unreachable through a
passwordless session. No path assigns role=owner yet — this is forward
consistency.

The bootstrap summary now names console.<root> the player panel and
op.console.<root> the operator console where the Owner runs setup, fixing
text that told operators not to run setup there.

Tests: op.console door gate (non-admin refused, player console unaffected,
admin passes) and owner session admin-access; the setup-bind default-host
test follows the move to op.console.
This commit is contained in:
flyemoji committed 2026-07-16 18:03:30 +09:00
1 parent 26b62e91cd
commit 60732a6283
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@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ func (s SessionAuth) Authenticate(r *http.Request) (*Principal, error) {
UserID: u.ID,
Email: u.Email,
Role: u.Role,
ViaAdminAccess: u.Role == "admin" && hostIsAdminConsole(r, s.RootDomain, s.AdminHostname),
ViaAdminAccess: (u.Role == "admin" || u.Role == "owner") && hostIsAdminConsole(r, s.RootDomain, s.AdminHostname),
EmailVerified: u.EmailVerified,
ViaSession: true,
}, nil