fix(api): a session-store outage answers 503, not 401

Resolving a session cookie failed identically whether the credential was
missing or Postgres was unreachable: local_auth_enabled read errors fell into
the fail-closed 'disabled' branch and SessionUser errors into 'invalid
session', both surfacing as 401 'authentication required' — a lie that reads
as 'log in again' during an outage. Split the enabled-read into
(enabled, error), tag non-ErrNotFound store failures with errAuthBackend, and
map that to a new 503 auth_unavailable in requireExternal. Fail-closed is
unchanged: missing setting / bad value / missing session stay 401.

internal/api/api_test.go

@@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ type fakeRepo struct {
 	staff    map[string]*StaffUser   // username -> staff login row
 	sessions map[string]*fakeSession // token_hash -> session
 	settings map[string][]byte       // key -> jsonb value
+	// failSessionUser / failGetSetting force those reads to fail with a generic
+	// (non-ErrNotFound) error, simulating a store outage for the 503 auth path.
+	failSessionUser error
+	failGetSetting  error
 	// player email OTPs (spec §B2). Keyed by row id; the verify path scans for the
 	// newest live (user, purpose) just as the PG query does.
 	otps map[string]*fakeEmailOTP
@@ -768,6 +772,9 @@ func (f *fakeRepo) CreateSession(_ context.Context, tokenHash, userID string, ex
 	return nil
 }
 func (f *fakeRepo) SessionUser(_ context.Context, tokenHash string, now time.Time) (*SessionedUser, error) {
+	if f.failSessionUser != nil {
+		return nil, f.failSessionUser
+	}
 	s, ok := f.sessions[tokenHash]
 	if !ok || s.revoked || !s.expiresAt.After(now) {
 		return nil, ErrNotFound
@@ -788,6 +795,9 @@ func (f *fakeRepo) RevokeSession(_ context.Context, tokenHash string) error {
 	return nil
 }
 func (f *fakeRepo) GetSetting(_ context.Context, key string) ([]byte, error) {
+	if f.failGetSetting != nil {
+		return nil, f.failGetSetting
+	}
 	if v, ok := f.settings[key]; ok {
 		return v, nil
 	}
@@ -2195,3 +2205,38 @@ func TestAccessVerifier(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	})
 }
+
+// TestSessionAuthOutageIs503Not401: a session-store outage must surface as 503
+// auth_unavailable, not a 401 that reads as "please log in again". Both failure
+// points are covered — the local_auth_enabled read and the session row read —
+// plus the regression that a genuinely missing session still answers 401.
+func TestSessionAuthOutageIs503Not401(t *testing.T) {
+	apiWith := func(repo *fakeRepo) *API {
+		a := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
+		a.External = SessionAuth{Repo: repo, RootDomain: testRoot, AdminHostname: "op.console." + testRoot}
+		return a
+	}
+	cookie := map[string]string{"Cookie": sessionCookieName + "=any"}
+	outage := errors.New("dial tcp 10.0.0.5:5432: connect: connection refused")
+
+	repo := newFakeRepo()
+	repo.settings[LocalAuthEnabledKey] = []byte("true")
+	repo.failGetSetting = outage
+	if w := do(apiWith(repo).ExternalHandler(), "GET", "/api/v1/me", "", cookie); w.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable || decodeErr(t, w) != "auth_unavailable" {
+		t.Fatalf("settings read outage = %d body %s, want 503 auth_unavailable", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+
+	repo = newFakeRepo()
+	repo.settings[LocalAuthEnabledKey] = []byte("true")
+	repo.failSessionUser = outage
+	if w := do(apiWith(repo).ExternalHandler(), "GET", "/api/v1/me", "", cookie); w.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable || decodeErr(t, w) != "auth_unavailable" {
+		t.Fatalf("session read outage = %d body %s, want 503 auth_unavailable", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+
+	// Regression: fail-closed auth (missing/invalid session) stays a 401.
+	repo = newFakeRepo()
+	repo.settings[LocalAuthEnabledKey] = []byte("true")
+	if w := do(apiWith(repo).ExternalHandler(), "GET", "/api/v1/me", "", cookie); w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized || decodeErr(t, w) != "unauthorized" {
+		t.Fatalf("missing session = %d body %s, want 401 unauthorized", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}

internal/api/errors.go

@@ -89,6 +89,11 @@ func newError(status int, code, format string, a ...any) *apiError {
 // Common errors reused across handlers.
 var (
 	errUnauthorized = newError(http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized", "authentication required")
+	// errAuthUnavailable answers when the session store itself is unreachable
+	// (Postgres down): an outage is not a credential verdict, so the caller gets
+	// 503 "retry" instead of a 401 that reads as "log in again".
+	errAuthUnavailable = newError(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "auth_unavailable",
+		"authentication is temporarily unavailable; retry shortly")
 	errForbidden  = newError(http.StatusForbidden, "forbidden", "not permitted")
 	errBadRequest = newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "invalid request")
 )

internal/api/middleware.go

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"crypto/rand"
 	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
 	"log"
 	"net/http"
 	"runtime/debug"
@@ -95,6 +96,11 @@ func (a *API) requireInternal(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 func (a *API) requireExternal(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		p, err := a.External.Authenticate(r)
+		if errors.Is(err, errAuthBackend) {
+			// Session store unreachable — an outage, not a missing credential.
+			writeError(w, r, errAuthUnavailable)
+			return
+		}
 		if err != nil || p == nil {
 			writeError(w, r, errUnauthorized)
 			return

internal/api/session.go

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
@@ -145,14 +146,24 @@ func (s SessionAuth) Authenticate(r *http.Request) (*Principal, error) {
 	}
 
 	ctx := r.Context()
-	if !localAuthEnabled(ctx, s.Repo) {
+	enabled, err := localAuthEnabledStatus(ctx, s.Repo)
+	if err != nil {
+		// The session store is unreachable: this is an outage, not a verdict on
+		// the caller's credentials, so the middleware answers 503 rather than a
+		// misleading "please log in".
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", errAuthBackend, err)
+	}
+	if !enabled {
 		// A cookie was presented but local auth is off: reject, never fall through.
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("local auth disabled")
 	}
 
 	u, err := s.Repo.SessionUser(ctx, hashCookie(cookie.Value), s.now())
-	if err != nil {
+	switch {
+	case errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound):
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid session: %w", err)
+	case err != nil:
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", errAuthBackend, err)
 	}
 	return &Principal{
 		UserID:         u.ID,
@@ -164,6 +175,11 @@ func (s SessionAuth) Authenticate(r *http.Request) (*Principal, error) {
 	}, nil
 }
 
+// errAuthBackend marks an authentication failure caused by the session store
+// being unreachable (e.g. Postgres down) rather than by a missing or invalid
+// credential. Middleware maps it to 503 so an outage is not misreported as 401.
+var errAuthBackend = errors.New("auth backend unavailable")
+
 // localAuthEnabled reports whether the runtime local_auth_enabled toggle is true.
 // A missing setting, a read error, or a non-true value all read as disabled — the
 // gate fails closed so local sessions are honored, and new ones minted, only on an
@@ -171,15 +187,28 @@ func (s SessionAuth) Authenticate(r *http.Request) (*Principal, error) {
 // (minting one) consult it, so the two never disagree about whether local auth is
 // live.
 func localAuthEnabled(ctx context.Context, repo Repo) bool {
+	enabled, _ := localAuthEnabledStatus(ctx, repo)
+	return enabled
+}
+
+// localAuthEnabledStatus is localAuthEnabled with the outage case kept apart: a
+// MISSING setting (ErrNotFound — never enabled) reads as (false, nil), while a
+// store read failure reads as (false, err) so SessionAuth can tell "local auth
+// is off" (401) from "the database is down" (503). An unreadable value still
+// fails closed as disabled — it is a config fault, not an outage.
+func localAuthEnabledStatus(ctx context.Context, repo Repo) (bool, error) {
 	raw, err := repo.GetSetting(ctx, LocalAuthEnabledKey)
-	if err != nil {
-		return false // ErrNotFound (never enabled) or a transient read error → closed
+	switch {
+	case errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound):
+		return false, nil
+	case err != nil:
+		return false, err
 	}
 	var enabled bool
 	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &enabled); err != nil {
-		return false
+		return false, nil
 	}
-	return enabled
+	return enabled, nil
 }
 
 // ensure SessionAuth satisfies ExternalAuth at compile time.