chore: drop tool-name markers from source comments

Seventeen comments opened with a tag naming the tool that wrote them.
The tag goes and each comment keeps its reasoning, now starting as a
plain sentence. None of the reasoning changes.

The AGENTS.md note in .gitignore drops the story of how the file got
into the tree and keeps the one fact a reader needs: its advice to run
go fmt is destructive on this CRLF working tree.

Comments only; no code, build or test changes.

internal/api/handlers_access.go

@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ type lpPermissionView struct {
 // maxLPInfoPages bounds how many "permission info" pages the read projector
 // chases per request. LuckPerms paginates its reply, so one command shows only
 // the first page; we follow the header's page count up to this cap.
-// ponytail: 10 pages ≈ 150 entries — raise if a real user outgrows it.
+// 10 pages ≈ 150 entries — raise if a real user outgrows it.
 const maxLPInfoPages = 10
 
 // handleAccessLuckPermsInfo is the read projector for a player's LuckPerms

internal/api/handlers_hasjoined.go

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ var felisAuthNS = uuid.NewSHA1(uuid.NameSpaceURL, []byte("nano.felis.lolicon.bes
 
 // authHTTPClient calls the upstream Yggdrasil roots. The timeout bounds one login
 // against a hung source; the resolver moves on to the next source on any failure.
-// ponytail: one shared client, sequential priority scan — a third-party login costs one
+// One shared client, sequential priority scan — a third-party login costs one
 // wasted Mojang round-trip; add parallel fan-out only if login latency bites.
 var authHTTPClient = &http.Client{
 	Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ const mcUsernameMax = 16
 // TRUNCATED to fit rather than the rename being skipped when it would not fit — skipping is
 // what would silently hand a 14-character premium name back to the squatter.
 //
-// ponytail: two players of one source whose names agree on their first mcUsernameMax-len(prefix)-1
+// Two players of one source whose names agree on their first mcUsernameMax-len(prefix)-1
 // characters truncate onto the same in-game name, as does a prefixed name that happens to be
 // a premium name itself. Both cost an "already connected" bounce, not an identity: the UUID
 // rewrite is what keeps players apart, and it does not depend on the name at all. Add a
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ func isPremiumName(ctx context.Context, username string) bool {
 	}
 
 	premiumNames.Lock()
-	// ponytail: bounded by dropping the whole map rather than evicting LRU — entries are
+	// Bounded by dropping the whole map rather than evicting LRU — entries are
 	// only minted by players who actually authenticated somewhere, so this is a backstop
 	// against an unbounded map, not a cache policy worth tuning.
 	if len(premiumNames.m) >= premiumCacheMax {

internal/backupjob/backup.go

@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ type Backuper struct {
 // just-finished Job still inside its TTL window. ErrAlreadyExists is kept only as a
 // defensive no-op against the astronomically unlikely suffix collision.
 //
-// ponytail: unique names mean two truly simultaneous taps can schedule two backup
+// Unique names mean two truly simultaneous taps can schedule two backup
 // Pods; both mount the world PVC read-only so neither corrupts anything, and if they
 // land on different nodes the RWO attach fails one cleanly. Add single-flight-on-
 // running only if a real double-tap storm ever shows up.
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ func (b *Backuper) Backup(ctx context.Context, serverName, formerOwner string) e
 func jobNameSuffix() string {
 	var b [4]byte
 	if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
-		// ponytail: crypto/rand only fails if the OS RNG is gone — unrecoverable.
+		// crypto/rand only fails if the OS RNG is gone — unrecoverable.
 		panic("backupjob: crypto/rand: " + err.Error())
 	}
 	return hex.EncodeToString(b[:])

internal/cfsetup/runner.go

@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ func (r *ExecRunner) CreateTunnel(ctx context.Context, name string) (string, str
 // the file (authenticating with cert.pem, keeping the same id/DNS/Access), healing
 // the re-run. The secret is written to the file, not stdout.
 func (r *ExecRunner) ensureCredentials(ctx context.Context, id, credPath string) error {
-	// ponytail: any existing file counts as healthy; re-fetch only on absence
+	// Any existing file counts as healthy; re-fetch only on absence
 	// (the failure actually seen). A truncated/zero-byte file would still
 	// crash-loop — validate the JSON here if that ever shows up.
 	if _, err := os.Stat(credPath); err == nil {

internal/fileedit/exec.go

@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ func list(r *os.Root, path string) Result {
 // denied; a write is left alone because writing the file leaks nothing and is
 // equally futile.
 //
-// ponytail: an exact match on one cleaned path, not a pattern. This is the whole
+// An exact match on one cleaned path, not a pattern. This is the whole
 // known exposure — grep FELIS_FORWARDING_SECRET across deploy/ — and if another
 // image ever persists a platform secret into the mount, add its path here rather
 // than inventing a matcher.

internal/updater/gatherer_host.go

@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ func velocityJarVersion(path string) (updates.Version, error) {
 
 // manifestAttr returns one attribute value from a jar's META-INF/MANIFEST.MF.
 //
-// ponytail: this does not implement the JAR spec's 72-byte line folding (a wrapped
+// This does not implement the JAR spec's 72-byte line folding (a wrapped
 // value continues on the next line after a single leading space). Version values are
 // far short of the wrap point, so folding cannot bite here; if this ever reads a long
 // attribute, join continuation lines before splitting on ':'.