feat(auth): migrate console login to passwordless

Replace console password auth with a passwordless surface — the pre-session
login doors plus an identifier-first discovery endpoint — and remove the
password paths.

- Login doors (Public, pre-session): email-OTP, passkey assertion, op.console
  login with in-game approval, and setup-token redeem.
- /api/v1/auth/options: identifier-first discovery reporting which console
  methods an email can use. The single sanctioned existence oracle; methods
  are computed with no role branch, so staff and player accounts in the same
  credential state return byte-identical bodies (staffness invisible by
  construction).
- Remove password auth: drop StaffUser.PasswordHash and the /auth/login,
  /auth/change-password and /users/{id}/reset-password endpoints (and test).
- Data layer: UserByEmail, verified-email uniqueness, setup-token store
  (migration 0012).
- Reconcile docs/openapi.yaml with the served surface; the method/path/face/
  tier parity gate (TestOpenAPIMatchesServedRoutes) passes.
- felis TUI: in-game MC bind, owner/break-glass OP provisioning, version.
- Velocity /felis command suite.

Consolidates the accumulated backend migration work; the frontend (panel/)
is left untouched. Full Go tree green on WSL (go build ./... && go test ./...).

AGENTS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# AGENTS.md
+
+This file helps Autohand understand how to work with this project.
+
+## Project Overview
+
+- **Language**: Go
+- **Package Manager**: go
+
+## Commands
+
+- **Build**: `go build`
+- **Run**: `go run .`
+- **Test**: `go test ./...`
+- **Format**: `go fmt ./...`
+- **Vet**: `go vet ./...`
+
+## Instruction Sources
+
+- Check saved memories and preferences before implementation work.
+- Follow this AGENTS.md file for repository-specific guidance.
+- AGENTS.md takes precedence over CLAUDE.md when both files provide instructions.
+
+## Code Style
+
+- Follow Go idioms and conventions
+- Use short variable names in small scopes
+- Handle errors explicitly
+- Follow existing patterns in the codebase
+- Use meaningful variable and function names
+- Add comments for complex logic
+- Keep functions focused and small
+
+## Constraints
+
+- Do not modify files outside the project directory
+- Ask before making breaking changes
+- Prefer editing existing files over creating new ones
+- Do not delete files without confirmation
+- Keep dependencies minimal - avoid adding new ones without good reason
+- Do not commit sensitive data (API keys, secrets, credentials)

cmd/felis/api.go

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 	"os"
 	"regexp"
-	goruntime "runtime"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 
@@ -169,14 +168,6 @@ func cmdAPI(args []string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
 	// agree on what local auth knows.
 	repo := api.NewPGRepo(drv.DB())
 
-	// Bound concurrent login bcrypt to roughly the core count (floored so even a 1–2
-	// vCPU demo box tolerates a handful of simultaneous staff logins). bcrypt is
-	// CPU-costly and the public login route runs a full compare on every request, so
-	// this caps the work a login flood can pile on the scheduler; the excess is shed
-	// as a cheap 429. Staff password logins are rare (players never use this path), so
-	// the cap never bites legitimate use.
-	loginBcryptCap := max(goruntime.NumCPU(), 4)
-
 	a := &api.API{
 		Repo:    repo,
 		Cluster: api.NewK8sCluster(cl, cfg.K8s.Namespace),
@@ -203,7 +194,6 @@ func cmdAPI(args []string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
 		},
 		RootDomain:   cfg.Server.RootDomain,
 		WakeCooldown: 30 * time.Second,
-		MaxConcurrentLogins: loginBcryptCap,
 		// Bound concurrent console/build-log SSE streams per principal. Generous enough
 		// for legitimate multi-tab / multi-server watching, while capping how many
 		// upstream follow connections a single caller can tie up if their streams stall.
@@ -232,7 +222,7 @@ func cmdAPI(args []string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
 		fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "felis api: passkey verifier disabled (auth.panel_hostname unset) — passkey endpoints return 503")
 	}
 
-	externalHandler := panel.Handler(a.ExternalHandler(), cfg.Server.RootDomain)
+	externalHandler := panel.Handler(a.ExternalHandler(), cfg.Server.RootDomain, cfg.Auth.PanelHostname, cfg.Auth.AdminHostname, resolvedVersion())
 	internalSrv := newAPIServer(*internalAddr, a.InternalHandler())
 	externalSrv := newAPIServer(cfg.Server.Listen, externalHandler)
 

cmd/felis/breakglass.go

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ package main
 import (
 	"context"
 	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
@@ -11,13 +13,13 @@ import (
 	"io"
 	"os"
 	"strings"
+	"time"
 
 	"felis.lolicon.best/internal/api"
 	"felis.lolicon.best/internal/config"
 	"felis.lolicon.best/internal/store"
 
 	tea "github.com/charmbracelet/bubbletea"
-	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
 )
 
 // `felis breakGlass` is the local break-glass emergency console (spec §B). Its
@@ -64,27 +66,31 @@ import (
 // bare Enter) keeps the unverified root override from happening by reflex.
 const breakGlassOverrideToken = "OVERRIDE"
 
-// bootstrapPasswordAlphabet excludes visually ambiguous glyphs (0/O, 1/I/l) so a
+// ownerStore is the minimal repo surface the break-glass / setup console needs.
-// human can transcribe a generated one-time password off a terminal without error.
-const bootstrapPasswordAlphabet = "ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz23456789"
-
-// ownerStore is the minimal repo surface the break-glass console needs.
 // *api.PGRepo satisfies it; the unit tests drive a fake, so the core logic
-// (authentication, provisioning, accountability audit) is exercised without a
+// (recovery, provisioning, accountability audit) is exercised without a
 // database or a terminal.
 type ownerStore interface {
-	// AdminExists reports whether any authenticatable staff account already exists.
+	// AdminExists reports whether any admin account already exists.
 	// It is the bootstrap-vs-recovery switch.
 	AdminExists(ctx context.Context) (bool, error)
-	// UserByUsername loads a staff login projection for credential verification.
+	// UserByUsername loads a staff login projection.
 	UserByUsername(ctx context.Context, username string) (*api.StaffUser, error)
-	UpsertOwner(ctx context.Context, id, username, email, passwordHash string, mustChange bool) error
+	UpsertOwner(ctx context.Context, id, username, email string) error
 	// InsertOperator mints a NEW Operator staff account. Unlike UpsertOwner it is
 	// insert-only: a username already taken is a conflict (api.ErrConflict), never a
 	// silent reset, so adding an Operator can never clobber the Owner or an existing
 	// Operator. The row is role=admin, identical in shape to the Owner — Felis has no
-	// separate operator DB role (migration 0003: staff = role=admin WITH a hash).
+	// separate operator DB role (migration 0003: staff = role=admin).
-	InsertOperator(ctx context.Context, id, username, email, passwordHash string, mustChange bool) error
+	InsertOperator(ctx context.Context, id, username, email string) error
+	// RedeemLinkCodeForOwner consumes an in-game link code and creates-or-promotes
+	// the bound user to role='admin' (Owner). It is the `felis setup` MC-bind path:
+	// the operator enters limbo, runs /link, types the code here, and the bound
+	// account becomes the passwordless Owner. Unlike RedeemPlayerBindCode it does NOT
+	// refuse staff — setup deliberately elevates the bound account.
+	RedeemLinkCodeForOwner(ctx context.Context, newUserID, code string, now time.Time) (userID, mcUUID, authSource string, err error)
+	// CreateSetupToken mints a one-time setup token for first-web-login bootstrap.
+	CreateSetupToken(ctx context.Context, tokenHash, userID string, expiresAt time.Time) error
 	SetSetting(ctx context.Context, key string, value []byte) error
 	// Audit records the break-glass accountability row.
 	Audit(ctx context.Context, e api.AuditEntry) error
@@ -164,20 +170,14 @@ func cmdBreakGlass(args []string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
 			fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "\nfelis breakGlass: Owner account %q provisioned; local-password login is ENABLED.\n", res.username)
 		}
 		fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "Recorded as %q (mode: %s, os user: %s).\n", res.accountable, res.mode, res.osUser)
-		if res.displayPassword != "" {
+		if res.setupTokenURL != "" {
-			// A one-time password was generated (recovery / root override). It is shown,
+			fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "One-time setup URL (opens a lockdown session to verify email / enroll passkey):\n\n    %s\n\n", res.setupTokenURL)
-			// never persisted: only the bcrypt hash reached the database.
-			fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "One-time password (you MUST change it on first login):\n\n    %s\n\n", res.displayPassword)
-		} else {
-			// Bootstrap: the operator typed the password themselves, so we do NOT echo it
-			// back into scrollback.
-			fmt.Fprintln(stdout, "Log in with the password you just entered (you MUST change it on first login).")
 		}
 		if res.auditWarning != "" {
 			fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "WARNING: the accountability audit row was NOT written: %s\n", res.auditWarning)
 		}
 		if url := adminLoginURL(res.rootDomain, res.adminHostname); url != "" {
-			fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "Log in at %s with that username and password.\n", url)
+			fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "Admin console: %s\n", url)
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -229,54 +229,12 @@ func newOwnerID() string {
 	return "usr-" + hex.EncodeToString(b[:])
 }
 
-// generateBootstrapPassword returns a fresh one-time password from the unambiguous
+// authenticateAdmin resolves a typed admin username for recovery-mode attribution.
-// alphabet. It rejection-samples to avoid modulo bias, so every position is uniform
+// Password verification is gone (passwordless design); Phase 3 replaces this with
-// over the alphabet. 20 chars over a 57-symbol alphabet is ~116 bits — far more than
+// email-OTP recovery. For now it confirms the named admin exists.
-// the must-change credential needs, and it is rotated on first login regardless.
+func authenticateAdmin(ctx context.Context, s ownerStore, username string) (matched string, ok bool, err error) {
-func generateBootstrapPassword() (string, error) {
-	const n = 20
-	// Largest multiple of the alphabet size that fits in a byte; bytes at or above it
-	// are discarded so the surviving values map uniformly (no modulo bias).
-	limit := byte(256 - (256 % len(bootstrapPasswordAlphabet)))
-	out := make([]byte, 0, n)
-	var b [1]byte
-	for len(out) < n {
-		if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
-			return "", fmt.Errorf("generate bootstrap password: %w", err)
-		}
-		if b[0] >= limit {
-			continue
-		}
-		out = append(out, bootstrapPasswordAlphabet[int(b[0])%len(bootstrapPasswordAlphabet)])
-	}
-	return string(out), nil
-}
-
-// validateOwnerPassword mirrors api.validateNewPassword (handlers_auth.go): a
-// break-glass credential must satisfy the SAME 8–72-byte rule the panel's own
-// change-password enforces, so an operator can never set a password here that the
-// web change-password flow would later reject. 72 is bcrypt's hard input limit.
-func validateOwnerPassword(pw string) error {
-	if len(pw) < 8 {
-		return errors.New("password must be at least 8 characters")
-	}
-	if len(pw) > 72 {
-		return errors.New("password must be at most 72 bytes")
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// authenticateAdmin verifies a typed credential against an existing admin account
-// for recovery-mode attribution. matched is the stored username on success.
-//
-// ok==false with err==nil is NOT a failure to surface — it means the credential did
-// not match any admin password. The caller offers an explicit root override instead
-// of refusing, because break-glass must still recover when no admin credential can
-// be produced (a forgotten password is the canonical reason the web login is
-// unreachable in the first place). Only a real datastore fault returns err.
-func authenticateAdmin(ctx context.Context, s ownerStore, username, password string) (matched string, ok bool, err error) {
 	username = strings.TrimSpace(username)
-	if username == "" || password == "" {
+	if username == "" {
 		return "", false, nil
 	}
 	u, err := s.UserByUsername(ctx, username)
@@ -286,70 +244,47 @@ func authenticateAdmin(ctx context.Context, s ownerStore, username, password str
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", false, err
 	}
-	// Only an admin row carrying a bcrypt hash is an authenticatable staff identity;
+	if u.Role != "admin" {
-	// a player row (role=user, hash NULL → empty PasswordHash) can never attribute a
-	// break-glass action.
-	if u.Role != "admin" || u.PasswordHash == "" {
-		return "", false, nil
-	}
-	if bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(u.PasswordHash), []byte(password)) != nil {
 		return "", false, nil
 	}
 	return u.Username, true, nil
 }
 
-// provisionOwner mints or resets the single Owner account direct-to-Postgres with
+// provisionOwner mints or resets the single Owner account direct-to-Postgres,
-// the given (already-validated-by-the-caller) password. The account is created with
+// passwordless. The account is role=admin with no password — the Owner completes
-// must_change_password=true, which is load-bearing: it is what arms the API's
+// passwordless login setup via the web setup-token flow after `felis setup`.
-// lockdown middleware so the Owner can do nothing but change the password on first
+func provisionOwner(ctx context.Context, s ownerStore, username, email string) error {
-// login. Only the bcrypt hash reaches the database; the plaintext never does.
-func provisionOwner(ctx context.Context, s ownerStore, username, email, password string) error {
 	username = strings.TrimSpace(username)
 	if username == "" {
 		return errors.New("owner username is required")
 	}
-	if err := validateOwnerPassword(password); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
 	id := newOwnerID()
 	if id == "" {
 		return errors.New("generate owner id: entropy source failed")
 	}
-	hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
+	if err := s.UpsertOwner(ctx, id, username, strings.TrimSpace(email)); err != nil {
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("hash owner password: %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := s.UpsertOwner(ctx, id, username, strings.TrimSpace(email), string(hash), true); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("write owner: %w", err)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 
 // provisionOperator mints a NEW Operator staff account direct-to-Postgres. Like the
-// Owner it requires must_change_password=true but carries role='admin' (the single
+// Owner it is role=admin and passwordless — Felis has no separate operator DB role,
-// above-admin 'owner' role was added in migration 0011 and is exclusive to the first
+// so an Operator is simply an additional staff admin (migration 0003). UNLIKE
-// account — every subsequent staff is a plain admin). UNLIKE provisionOwner, which
+// provisionOwner, which upserts the single Owner and resets it on a username
-// username conflict, this is insert-only: a username already taken returns
+// conflict, this is insert-only: a username already taken returns api.ErrConflict
-// api.ErrConflict rather than overwriting a live account, so adding an Operator can
+// rather than overwriting a live account, so adding an Operator can never silently
-// never silently clobber the Owner's or another Operator's credential. Only the
+// clobber the Owner's or another Operator's account.
-// bcrypt hash reaches the database; the plaintext never does.
+func provisionOperator(ctx context.Context, s ownerStore, username, email string) error {
-func provisionOperator(ctx context.Context, s ownerStore, username, email, password string) error {
 	username = strings.TrimSpace(username)
 	if username == "" {
 		return errors.New("operator username is required")
 	}
-	if err := validateOwnerPassword(password); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
 	id := newOwnerID()
 	if id == "" {
 		return errors.New("generate operator id: entropy source failed")
 	}
-	hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
+	if err := s.InsertOperator(ctx, id, username, strings.TrimSpace(email)); err != nil {
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("hash operator password: %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := s.InsertOperator(ctx, id, username, strings.TrimSpace(email), string(hash), true); err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, api.ErrConflict) {
 			// Wrap %w so errors.Is(err, api.ErrConflict) still holds — the TUI can render
 			// a "name already taken" message — while keeping a clear human string.
@@ -381,50 +316,84 @@ type breakGlassOp struct {
 	osUser         string // $SUDO_USER (or "root"); recorded in the payload
 	ownerUsername  string
 	ownerEmail     string
-	ownerPassword  string // typed (bootstrap); "" => generate a one-time password
 	attemptedAdmin string // recovery / override: the admin username the operator typed
 }
 
 // breakGlassOutcome is what performBreakGlass reports back to the TUI.
 type breakGlassOutcome struct {
-	displayPassword string // non-empty only when a one-time password was generated
+	setupTokenURL string // non-empty when setup minted a one-time first-login URL
 	auditErr      error  // non-nil if the accountability row could not be written
 }
 
 // performBreakGlass executes a resolved break-glass operation: provision (or reset)
 // the Owner, enable local-password login, then record a best-effort accountability
-// audit row. A typed ownerPassword (bootstrap) is used as-is; an empty one (recovery
+// audit row. The Owner is passwordless — the setup-token flow handles first-login
-// / root override) is replaced with a generated one-time password returned for
+// setup. The audit write is best-effort: a logging failure is reported via auditErr
-// one-time display. The audit write is best-effort: a logging failure is reported
+// but does NOT fail the recovery — break-glass must still work when the audit sink
-// via auditErr but does NOT fail the recovery — break-glass must still work when the
+// is unhappy.
-// audit sink is unhappy.
 func performBreakGlass(ctx context.Context, s ownerStore, op breakGlassOp) (breakGlassOutcome, error) {
-	password := op.ownerPassword
+	if err := provisionOwner(ctx, s, op.ownerUsername, op.ownerEmail); err != nil {
-	generated := false
-	if password == "" {
-		p, err := generateBootstrapPassword()
-		if err != nil {
 		return breakGlassOutcome{}, err
 	}
-		password, generated = p, true
+	// Record accountability the instant the account is written — BEFORE enabling
-	}
+	// local auth, which can still fail. The audit is best-effort, so doing it first
-	if err := provisionOwner(ctx, s, op.ownerUsername, op.ownerEmail, password); err != nil {
+	// never blocks the recovery.
-		return breakGlassOutcome{}, err
-	}
-	// Record accountability the instant the credential changes — BEFORE enabling
-	// local auth, which can still fail. Auditing only after both writes would let a
-	// failed enableLocalAuth leave a just-reset credential with no "who did it" row;
-	// the audit is best-effort, so doing it first never blocks the recovery.
 	out := breakGlassOutcome{auditErr: auditBreakGlass(ctx, s, op)}
-	if generated {
-		out.displayPassword = password
-	}
 	if err := enableLocalAuth(ctx, s); err != nil {
 		return breakGlassOutcome{}, err
 	}
 	return out, nil
 }
 
+// setupTokenTTL bounds how long a one-time setup URL is valid. The operator opens
+// it right after setup completes, so a generous-but-bounded window is enough.
+const setupTokenTTL = 30 * time.Minute
+
+// newSetupToken returns a fresh opaque setup token (256 bits, URL-safe) and its
+// sha-256 hex hash. Only the hash is persisted; the raw value rides in the URL.
+func newSetupToken() (raw, hash string, err error) {
+	var b [32]byte
+	if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("generate setup token: %w", err)
+	}
+	raw = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b[:])
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(raw))
+	return raw, hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]), nil
+}
+
+// performSetupMCBind is the `felis setup` Owner-establishment path: the operator
+// binds their Minecraft account via an in-game /link code, the bound user is
+// promoted to role='admin' (passwordless Owner), and a one-time setup URL is
+// minted for the first web login where the Owner verifies email / enrolls a
+// passkey. adminHostname is the op.console host the URL points at.
+func performSetupMCBind(ctx context.Context, s ownerStore, code, adminHostname string) (breakGlassOutcome, error) {
+	code = strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToUpper(code))
+	if code == "" {
+		return breakGlassOutcome{}, errors.New("link code is required")
+	}
+	newID := newOwnerID()
+	if newID == "" {
+		return breakGlassOutcome{}, errors.New("generate owner id: entropy source failed")
+	}
+	userID, _, _, err := s.RedeemLinkCodeForOwner(ctx, newID, code, time.Now())
+	if err != nil {
+		return breakGlassOutcome{}, fmt.Errorf("bind minecraft account: %w", err)
+	}
+	raw, hash, err := newSetupToken()
+	if err != nil {
+		return breakGlassOutcome{}, err
+	}
+	if err := s.CreateSetupToken(ctx, hash, userID, time.Now().Add(setupTokenTTL)); err != nil {
+		return breakGlassOutcome{}, fmt.Errorf("mint setup token: %w", err)
+	}
+	host := strings.TrimSpace(adminHostname)
+	if host == "" {
+		host = "op.console.localhost"
+	}
+	url := "https://" + host + "/setup?token=" + raw
+	return breakGlassOutcome{setupTokenURL: url}, nil
+}
+
 // auditBreakGlass writes the break-glass accountability row. The actor is the
 // resolved human identity (a verified admin in recovery, the OS user otherwise);
 // the payload carries the full who/what/how so an after-the-fact reader can tell a
@@ -454,9 +423,7 @@ func auditBreakGlass(ctx context.Context, s ownerStore, op breakGlassOp) error {
 }
 
 // performAddOperator mints a NEW Operator account and records a best-effort
-// accountability row. It mirrors performBreakGlass — a typed password is used as-is,
+// accountability row. It mirrors performBreakGlass — passwordless — with two
-// an empty one is replaced with a generated one-time password returned for one-time
-// display (the common case: hand a fresh credential to the new operator) — with two
 // deliberate differences. (1) It provisions insert-only (provisionOperator), so it
 // can never reset an existing account the way the Owner upsert does. (2) It does NOT
 // touch local_auth_enabled: adding an Operator presupposes an already-configured,
@@ -465,22 +432,10 @@ func auditBreakGlass(ctx context.Context, s ownerStore, op breakGlassOp) error {
 // the Owner break-glass thread alone. The audit is best-effort and written only after
 // a successful provision; a conflict mints nothing, so there is nothing to attribute.
 func performAddOperator(ctx context.Context, s ownerStore, op breakGlassOp) (breakGlassOutcome, error) {
-	password := op.ownerPassword
+	if err := provisionOperator(ctx, s, op.ownerUsername, op.ownerEmail); err != nil {
-	generated := false
-	if password == "" {
-		p, err := generateBootstrapPassword()
-		if err != nil {
-			return breakGlassOutcome{}, err
-		}
-		password, generated = p, true
-	}
-	if err := provisionOperator(ctx, s, op.ownerUsername, op.ownerEmail, password); err != nil {
 		return breakGlassOutcome{}, err
 	}
 	out := breakGlassOutcome{auditErr: auditAddOperator(ctx, s, op)}
-	if generated {
-		out.displayPassword = password
-	}
 	return out, nil
 }
 
@@ -520,7 +475,7 @@ type breakGlassResult struct {
 	accountable   string
 	osUser        string
 	username      string
-	displayPassword string // empty when the operator typed their own bootstrap password
+	setupTokenURL string // non-empty when setup minted a one-time first-login URL
 	auditWarning  string
 	rootDomain    string
 	adminHostname string

cmd/felis/breakglass_test.go

@@ -2,38 +2,65 @@ package main
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 
 	"felis.lolicon.best/internal/api"
-
-	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
 )
 
-// fakeOwnerStore records what break-glass provisioning writes and answers the
+// fakeOwnerStore records what break-glass / setup provisioning writes and answers
-// identity lookups, so the core logic (authentication, provisioning, accountability
+// the identity lookups, so the core logic (admin resolution, provisioning,
-// audit) is exercised without a database or a terminal.
+// accountability audit, setup-token mint) is exercised without a database or a
+// terminal. The design is passwordless: accounts carry no credential, and the
+// Owner completes first-login through the setup-token web flow.
 type fakeOwnerStore struct {
 	upserts  []upsertCall
 	inserts  []upsertCall
 	settings map[string][]byte
 	audits   []api.AuditEntry
+	tokens   []setupTokenCall
+	redeems  []redeemCall
 	users    map[string]*api.StaffUser // keyed by username
 	admins   bool                      // AdminExists answer
 
+	// RedeemLinkCodeForOwner's success result. redeemUserID defaults to the fresh id
+	// the caller passes (the unlinked-UUID case) when left empty.
+	redeemUserID     string
+	redeemMCUUID     string
+	redeemAuthSource string
+
 	upsertErr      error
 	insertErr      error
 	setErr         error
 	auditErr       error
 	userErr        error // non-not-found error from UserByUsername
 	adminErr       error
+	redeemErr      error
+	createTokenErr error
 }
 
+// upsertCall is a recorded owner/operator provision. Passwordless: the row is pure
+// identity (id, username, email) with an implied role=admin.
 type upsertCall struct {
-	id, username, email, passwordHash string
+	id, username, email string
-	mustChange                        bool
+}
+
+// setupTokenCall is a recorded CreateSetupToken write. Only the hash is persisted.
+type setupTokenCall struct {
+	tokenHash string
+	userID    string
+	expiresAt time.Time
+}
+
+// redeemCall records the inputs RedeemLinkCodeForOwner was called with.
+type redeemCall struct {
+	newUserID string
+	code      string
 }
 
 func (f *fakeOwnerStore) AdminExists(_ context.Context) (bool, error) {
@@ -53,33 +80,55 @@ func (f *fakeOwnerStore) UserByUsername(_ context.Context, username string) (*ap
 	return nil, api.ErrNotFound
 }
 
-func (f *fakeOwnerStore) UpsertOwner(_ context.Context, id, username, email, passwordHash string, mustChange bool) error {
+func (f *fakeOwnerStore) UpsertOwner(_ context.Context, id, username, email string) error {
 	if f.upsertErr != nil {
 		return f.upsertErr
 	}
-	f.upserts = append(f.upserts, upsertCall{id, username, email, passwordHash, mustChange})
+	f.upserts = append(f.upserts, upsertCall{id, username, email})
 	return nil
 }
 
 // InsertOperator records an insert-only Operator provision. A username already in
-// the users map is a conflict (api.ErrConflict), mirroring the PGRepo ON CONFLICT
+// the users map is a conflict (api.ErrConflict), mirroring the PGRepo insert-only
-// DO NOTHING + zero-RowsAffected contract; a fresh one is recorded and reflected
+// contract; a fresh one is recorded and reflected into users so a later lookup — or
-// into users so a later lookup — or a second insert of the same name — sees it.
+// a second insert of the same name — sees it. The row is passwordless (role=admin).
-func (f *fakeOwnerStore) InsertOperator(_ context.Context, id, username, email, passwordHash string, mustChange bool) error {
+func (f *fakeOwnerStore) InsertOperator(_ context.Context, id, username, email string) error {
 	if f.insertErr != nil {
 		return f.insertErr
 	}
 	if _, taken := f.users[username]; taken {
 		return api.ErrConflict
 	}
-	f.inserts = append(f.inserts, upsertCall{id, username, email, passwordHash, mustChange})
+	f.inserts = append(f.inserts, upsertCall{id, username, email})
 	if f.users == nil {
 		f.users = map[string]*api.StaffUser{}
 	}
-	f.users[username] = &api.StaffUser{
+	f.users[username] = &api.StaffUser{ID: id, Username: username, Email: email, Role: "admin"}
-		ID: id, Username: username, Email: email,
+	return nil
-		Role: "admin", PasswordHash: passwordHash, MustChangePassword: mustChange,
+}
+
+// RedeemLinkCodeForOwner records the call and returns the configured Owner identity
+// (or the injected error). The real method consumes a link code and promotes the
+// bound account; the fake models only its inputs and outputs.
+func (f *fakeOwnerStore) RedeemLinkCodeForOwner(_ context.Context, newUserID, code string, _ time.Time) (string, string, string, error) {
+	if f.redeemErr != nil {
+		return "", "", "", f.redeemErr
 	}
+	f.redeems = append(f.redeems, redeemCall{newUserID, code})
+	userID := f.redeemUserID
+	if userID == "" {
+		userID = newUserID // unlinked UUID → the fresh id becomes the Owner
+	}
+	return userID, f.redeemMCUUID, f.redeemAuthSource, nil
+}
+
+// CreateSetupToken records a minted setup token (hash only), or fails with the
+// injected error without recording it.
+func (f *fakeOwnerStore) CreateSetupToken(_ context.Context, tokenHash, userID string, expiresAt time.Time) error {
+	if f.createTokenErr != nil {
+		return f.createTokenErr
+	}
+	f.tokens = append(f.tokens, setupTokenCall{tokenHash, userID, expiresAt})
 	return nil
 }
 
@@ -102,49 +151,18 @@ func (f *fakeOwnerStore) Audit(_ context.Context, e api.AuditEntry) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// mkAdmin builds an authenticatable admin row (role=admin, real bcrypt hash) for the
+// mkAdmin builds a resolvable staff row (role=admin). The design is passwordless,
-// fake. MinCost keeps the hash fast — these tests are about wiring, not bcrypt.
+// so a staff account is identity + role — there is no credential to attach.
-func mkAdmin(t *testing.T, username, password string) *api.StaffUser {
+func mkAdmin(username string) *api.StaffUser {
-	t.Helper()
+	return &api.StaffUser{ID: "usr-admin", Username: username, Role: "admin"}
-	h, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), bcrypt.MinCost)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("hash: %v", err)
-	}
-	return &api.StaffUser{ID: "usr-admin", Username: username, Role: "admin", PasswordHash: string(h)}
-}
-
-func TestValidateOwnerPassword(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []struct {
-		name string
-		pw   string
-		ok   bool
-	}{
-		{"too short", "1234567", false},
-		{"minimum", "12345678", true},
-		{"comfortable", "Mid-Range-1", true},
-		{"at the bcrypt limit", strings.Repeat("a", 72), true},
-		{"past the bcrypt limit", strings.Repeat("a", 73), false},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			err := validateOwnerPassword(tc.pw)
-			if tc.ok && err != nil {
-				t.Errorf("validateOwnerPassword(%d bytes) = %v, want nil", len(tc.pw), err)
-			}
-			if !tc.ok && err == nil {
-				t.Errorf("validateOwnerPassword(%d bytes) = nil, want error", len(tc.pw))
-			}
-		})
-	}
 }
 
 func TestProvisionOwner(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx := context.Background()
 
-	t.Run("happy path mints a must-change admin with a verifiable hash", func(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("mints a passwordless owner row", func(t *testing.T) {
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
-		const pw = "valid-test-pw"
+		if err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, "owner", "[email protected]"); err != nil {
-		if err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, "owner", "[email protected]", pw); err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("provisionOwner: %v", err)
 		}
 		if len(f.upserts) != 1 {
@@ -157,26 +175,14 @@ func TestProvisionOwner(t *testing.T) {
 		if got.email != "[email protected]" {
 			t.Errorf("email = %q, want [email protected]", got.email)
 		}
-		// must_change_password=true is load-bearing: it arms the API lockdown so the
-		// Owner can do nothing but change the password on first login.
-		if !got.mustChange {
-			t.Error("mustChange = false, want true (forced first-login change)")
-		}
 		if !strings.HasPrefix(got.id, "usr-") {
 			t.Errorf("id = %q, want usr- prefix", got.id)
 		}
-		// Only the hash is stored; the typed plaintext must verify against it.
-		if bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(got.passwordHash), []byte(pw)) != nil {
-			t.Error("typed password does not verify against the stored hash")
-		}
-		if got.passwordHash == pw {
-			t.Error("stored hash equals plaintext — password was not hashed")
-		}
 	})
 
 	t.Run("trims surrounding whitespace", func(t *testing.T) {
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
-		if err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, "  owner  ", "  [email protected]  ", "valid-test-pw"); err != nil {
+		if err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, "  owner  ", "  [email protected]  "); err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("provisionOwner: %v", err)
 		}
 		if f.upserts[0].username != "owner" || f.upserts[0].email != "[email protected]" {
@@ -186,7 +192,7 @@ func TestProvisionOwner(t *testing.T) {
 
 	t.Run("rejects an empty username before any write", func(t *testing.T) {
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
-		if err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, "   ", "", "valid-test-pw"); err == nil {
+		if err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, "   ", ""); err == nil {
 			t.Fatal("want error for empty username")
 		}
 		if len(f.upserts) != 0 {
@@ -194,19 +200,9 @@ func TestProvisionOwner(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	})
 
-	t.Run("rejects a weak password before any write", func(t *testing.T) {
-		f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
-		if err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, "owner", "", "short"); err == nil {
-			t.Fatal("want error for a sub-8-byte password")
-		}
-		if len(f.upserts) != 0 {
-			t.Errorf("want no upsert on weak password, got %d", len(f.upserts))
-		}
-	})
-
 	t.Run("propagates a store error", func(t *testing.T) {
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{upsertErr: errors.New("boom")}
-		if err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, "owner", "", "valid-test-pw"); err == nil {
+		if err := provisionOwner(ctx, f, "owner", ""); err == nil {
 			t.Fatal("want error when the store fails")
 		}
 	})
@@ -233,66 +229,32 @@ func TestEnableLocalAuth(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestGenerateBootstrapPassword(t *testing.T) {
-	const want = 20
-	pw, err := generateBootstrapPassword()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("generateBootstrapPassword: %v", err)
-	}
-	if len(pw) != want {
-		t.Errorf("length = %d, want %d", len(pw), want)
-	}
-	for _, c := range pw {
-		if !strings.ContainsRune(bootstrapPasswordAlphabet, c) {
-			t.Errorf("password contains out-of-alphabet rune %q", c)
-		}
-	}
-	// A generated password must satisfy the same rule provisionOwner enforces.
-	if err := validateOwnerPassword(pw); err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("generated password fails validateOwnerPassword: %v", err)
-	}
-	other, err := generateBootstrapPassword()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if pw == other {
-		t.Error("two calls produced the same password")
-	}
-}
-
 func TestAuthenticateAdmin(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx := context.Background()
 
-	t.Run("verifies a matching admin credential", func(t *testing.T) {
+	// Password verification is gone (passwordless design): authenticateAdmin now only
-		f := &fakeOwnerStore{users: map[string]*api.StaffUser{"root": mkAdmin(t, "root", "correct horse")}}
+	// resolves the named admin so recovery can attribute the audit to a real identity.
-		matched, ok, err := authenticateAdmin(ctx, f, "root", "correct horse")
+	// The security boundary is the break-glass root gate, not a typed secret.
+
+	t.Run("resolves an existing admin for attribution", func(t *testing.T) {
+		f := &fakeOwnerStore{users: map[string]*api.StaffUser{"root": mkAdmin("root")}}
+		matched, ok, err := authenticateAdmin(ctx, f, "root")
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("authenticateAdmin: %v", err)
 		}
 		if !ok {
-			t.Fatal("ok = false, want true for the correct password")
+			t.Fatal("ok = false, want true for an existing admin")
 		}
 		if matched != "root" {
 			t.Errorf("matched = %q, want root", matched)
 		}
 	})
 
-	t.Run("a wrong password is a non-match, not an error", func(t *testing.T) {
-		f := &fakeOwnerStore{users: map[string]*api.StaffUser{"root": mkAdmin(t, "root", "correct horse")}}
-		_, ok, err := authenticateAdmin(ctx, f, "root", "wrong")
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
-		}
-		if ok {
-			t.Error("ok = true, want false for a wrong password")
-		}
-	})
-
 	t.Run("a non-admin role can never attribute a break-glass", func(t *testing.T) {
-		player := mkAdmin(t, "alice", "correct horse")
+		player := mkAdmin("alice")
-		player.Role = "user" // a player row, even with a hash, is not staff
+		player.Role = "user" // a player row is not staff
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{users: map[string]*api.StaffUser{"alice": player}}
-		_, ok, err := authenticateAdmin(ctx, f, "alice", "correct horse")
+		_, ok, err := authenticateAdmin(ctx, f, "alice")
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
 		}
@@ -301,22 +263,9 @@ func TestAuthenticateAdmin(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	})
 
-	t.Run("a hashless admin row is a non-match", func(t *testing.T) {
-		f := &fakeOwnerStore{users: map[string]*api.StaffUser{
-			"ghost": {Username: "ghost", Role: "admin", PasswordHash: ""},
-		}}
-		_, ok, err := authenticateAdmin(ctx, f, "ghost", "anything")
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
-		}
-		if ok {
-			t.Error("ok = true, want false when no hash is set")
-		}
-	})
-
 	t.Run("an unknown user is a non-match, not an error", func(t *testing.T) {
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
-		_, ok, err := authenticateAdmin(ctx, f, "nobody", "pw")
+		_, ok, err := authenticateAdmin(ctx, f, "nobody")
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
 		}
@@ -325,19 +274,16 @@ func TestAuthenticateAdmin(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	})
 
-	t.Run("empty input is a non-match with no store call", func(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("an empty username is a non-match with no store call", func(t *testing.T) {
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{userErr: errors.New("must not be called")}
-		if _, ok, err := authenticateAdmin(ctx, f, "", "pw"); ok || err != nil {
+		if _, ok, err := authenticateAdmin(ctx, f, ""); ok || err != nil {
 			t.Errorf("empty username: ok=%v err=%v, want false,nil", ok, err)
 		}
-		if _, ok, err := authenticateAdmin(ctx, f, "root", ""); ok || err != nil {
-			t.Errorf("empty password: ok=%v err=%v, want false,nil", ok, err)
-		}
 	})
 
 	t.Run("a datastore fault is surfaced", func(t *testing.T) {
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{userErr: errors.New("db down")}
-		if _, _, err := authenticateAdmin(ctx, f, "root", "pw"); err == nil {
+		if _, _, err := authenticateAdmin(ctx, f, "root"); err == nil {
 			t.Fatal("want error when the store fails")
 		}
 	})
@@ -360,7 +306,7 @@ func auditOf(t *testing.T, f *fakeOwnerStore) (api.AuditEntry, map[string]any) {
 func TestPerformBreakGlass(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx := context.Background()
 
-	t.Run("bootstrap uses the typed password and never echoes it", func(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("bootstrap provisions the owner, enables local auth, and audits", func(t *testing.T) {
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
 		op := breakGlassOp{
 			mode:          "bootstrap",
@@ -368,21 +314,16 @@ func TestPerformBreakGlass(t *testing.T) {
 			osUser:        "deploybot",
 			ownerUsername: "owner",
 			ownerEmail:    "[email protected]",
-			ownerPassword: "valid-test-pw",
 		}
 		out, err := performBreakGlass(ctx, f, op)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("performBreakGlass: %v", err)
 		}
-		// The operator typed their own password, so it must NOT be surfaced for display.
-		if out.displayPassword != "" {
-			t.Errorf("displayPassword = %q, want empty for a typed bootstrap password", out.displayPassword)
-		}
 		if out.auditErr != nil {
 			t.Errorf("auditErr = %v, want nil", out.auditErr)
 		}
-		if len(f.upserts) != 1 || bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(f.upserts[0].passwordHash), []byte("valid-test-pw")) != nil {
+		if len(f.upserts) != 1 || f.upserts[0].username != "owner" {
-			t.Error("owner was not provisioned with the typed password")
+			t.Errorf("owner was not provisioned: %+v", f.upserts)
 		}
 		if _, ok := f.settings[api.LocalAuthEnabledKey]; !ok {
 			t.Error("local auth was not enabled — login would 403")
@@ -402,7 +343,7 @@ func TestPerformBreakGlass(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	})
 
-	t.Run("recovery generates a one-time password and records a verified row", func(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("recovery provisions the owner and records a verified row", func(t *testing.T) {
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
 		op := breakGlassOp{
 			mode:           "recovery",
@@ -415,12 +356,14 @@ func TestPerformBreakGlass(t *testing.T) {
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("performBreakGlass: %v", err)
 		}
-		if out.displayPassword == "" {
+		if out.auditErr != nil {
-			t.Fatal("displayPassword empty, want a generated one-time password")
+			t.Errorf("auditErr = %v, want nil", out.auditErr)
 		}
-		// The shown password must be the one actually stored (as a hash).
+		if len(f.upserts) != 1 {
-		if bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(f.upserts[0].passwordHash), []byte(out.displayPassword)) != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("want 1 upsert, got %d", len(f.upserts))
-			t.Error("displayed password does not match the stored hash")
+		}
+		if _, ok := f.settings[api.LocalAuthEnabledKey]; !ok {
+			t.Error("local auth was not enabled")
 		}
 		e, payload := auditOf(t, f)
 		if e.Actor != "root" || e.Action != "break_glass.recovery" {
@@ -443,13 +386,9 @@ func TestPerformBreakGlass(t *testing.T) {
 			ownerUsername:  "owner",
 			attemptedAdmin: "typo-admin",
 		}
-		out, err := performBreakGlass(ctx, f, op)
+		if _, err := performBreakGlass(ctx, f, op); err != nil {
-		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("performBreakGlass: %v", err)
 		}
-		if out.displayPassword == "" {
-			t.Error("displayPassword empty, want a generated one-time password")
-		}
 		e, payload := auditOf(t, f)
 		if e.Actor != "alice" || e.Action != "break_glass.root_override" {
 			t.Errorf("audit envelope = %+v, want actor=alice action=break_glass.root_override", e)
@@ -484,7 +423,7 @@ func TestPerformBreakGlass(t *testing.T) {
 
 	t.Run("does not enable local auth or audit if the owner write fails", func(t *testing.T) {
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{upsertErr: errors.New("boom")}
-		op := breakGlassOp{mode: "bootstrap", accountable: "root", osUser: "root", ownerUsername: "owner", ownerPassword: "valid-test-pw"}
+		op := breakGlassOp{mode: "bootstrap", accountable: "root", osUser: "root", ownerUsername: "owner"}
 		if _, err := performBreakGlass(ctx, f, op); err == nil {
 			t.Fatal("want error when the owner write fails")
 		}
@@ -497,9 +436,9 @@ func TestPerformBreakGlass(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 
 	t.Run("records accountability before enabling local auth, surviving an enableLocalAuth failure", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// The credential is reset by provisionOwner; if the audit were written only
+		// The Owner is written by provisionOwner; if the audit were written only after
-		// after enableLocalAuth, a failed toggle write would leave that reset with no
+		// enableLocalAuth, a failed toggle write would leave that write with no "who did
-		// "who did it" row. Order guarantees the accountability row lands first.
+		// it" row. Order guarantees the accountability row lands first.
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{setErr: errors.New("settings write down")}
 		op := breakGlassOp{mode: "recovery", accountable: "root", osUser: "alice", ownerUsername: "owner", attemptedAdmin: "root"}
 		if _, err := performBreakGlass(ctx, f, op); err == nil {
@@ -535,10 +474,9 @@ func TestAccountableOSUser(t *testing.T) {
 func TestProvisionOperator(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx := context.Background()
 
-	t.Run("happy path mints a must-change admin with a verifiable hash", func(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("mints a passwordless operator row (insert-only)", func(t *testing.T) {
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
-		const pw = "valid-test-pw"
+		if err := provisionOperator(ctx, f, "ops-jordan", "[email protected]"); err != nil {
-		if err := provisionOperator(ctx, f, "ops-jordan", "[email protected]", pw); err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("provisionOperator: %v", err)
 		}
 		// Insert-only: it records an insert and never touches the Owner upsert path.
@@ -555,29 +493,18 @@ func TestProvisionOperator(t *testing.T) {
 		if got.email != "[email protected]" {
 			t.Errorf("email = %q, want [email protected]", got.email)
 		}
-		// must_change_password=true arms the API lockdown for the new operator too.
-		if !got.mustChange {
-			t.Error("mustChange = false, want true (forced first-login change)")
-		}
 		if !strings.HasPrefix(got.id, "usr-") {
 			t.Errorf("id = %q, want usr- prefix", got.id)
 		}
-		// Only the hash is stored; the typed plaintext must verify against it.
-		if bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(got.passwordHash), []byte(pw)) != nil {
-			t.Error("typed password does not verify against the stored hash")
-		}
-		if got.passwordHash == pw {
-			t.Error("stored hash equals plaintext — password was not hashed")
-		}
 	})
 
 	t.Run("a taken username is a conflict, not a silent reset", func(t *testing.T) {
 		// The Owner already holds this username. Operator-add must refuse rather than
 		// overwrite it the way UpsertOwner would.
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{users: map[string]*api.StaffUser{
-			"owner": {ID: "usr-owner", Username: "owner", Role: "admin", PasswordHash: "x"},
+			"owner": {ID: "usr-owner", Username: "owner", Role: "admin"},
 		}}
-		err := provisionOperator(ctx, f, "owner", "", "valid-test-pw")
+		err := provisionOperator(ctx, f, "owner", "")
 		if err == nil {
 			t.Fatal("want error when the username is already taken")
 		}
@@ -589,14 +516,14 @@ func TestProvisionOperator(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Errorf("want no insert on conflict, got %d", len(f.inserts))
 		}
 		// The pre-existing account must be untouched.
-		if f.users["owner"].PasswordHash != "x" {
+		if f.users["owner"].ID != "usr-owner" {
-			t.Error("conflicting insert clobbered the existing account's hash")
+			t.Error("conflicting insert clobbered the existing account")
 		}
 	})
 
 	t.Run("trims surrounding whitespace", func(t *testing.T) {
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
-		if err := provisionOperator(ctx, f, "  ops  ", "  [email protected]  ", "valid-test-pw"); err != nil {
+		if err := provisionOperator(ctx, f, "  ops  ", "  [email protected]  "); err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("provisionOperator: %v", err)
 		}
 		if f.inserts[0].username != "ops" || f.inserts[0].email != "[email protected]" {
@@ -606,7 +533,7 @@ func TestProvisionOperator(t *testing.T) {
 
 	t.Run("rejects an empty username before any write", func(t *testing.T) {
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
-		if err := provisionOperator(ctx, f, "   ", "", "valid-test-pw"); err == nil {
+		if err := provisionOperator(ctx, f, "   ", ""); err == nil {
 			t.Fatal("want error for empty username")
 		}
 		if len(f.inserts) != 0 {
@@ -614,19 +541,9 @@ func TestProvisionOperator(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	})
 
-	t.Run("rejects a weak password before any write", func(t *testing.T) {
-		f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
-		if err := provisionOperator(ctx, f, "ops", "", "short"); err == nil {
-			t.Fatal("want error for a sub-8-byte password")
-		}
-		if len(f.inserts) != 0 {
-			t.Errorf("want no insert on weak password, got %d", len(f.inserts))
-		}
-	})
-
 	t.Run("propagates a non-conflict store error without mislabeling it", func(t *testing.T) {
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{insertErr: errors.New("boom")}
-		err := provisionOperator(ctx, f, "ops", "", "valid-test-pw")
+		err := provisionOperator(ctx, f, "ops", "")
 		if err == nil {
 			t.Fatal("want error when the store fails")
 		}
@@ -640,7 +557,7 @@ func TestProvisionOperator(t *testing.T) {
 func TestPerformAddOperator(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx := context.Background()
 
-	t.Run("typed password is used as-is, never echoed, and never flips local auth", func(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("provisions an operator, audits, and never flips local auth", func(t *testing.T) {
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
 		op := breakGlassOp{
 			mode:           "recovery",
@@ -648,19 +565,17 @@ func TestPerformAddOperator(t *testing.T) {
 			osUser:         "alice",
 			ownerUsername:  "ops-jordan",
 			ownerEmail:     "[email protected]",
-			ownerPassword:  "valid-test-pw",
 			attemptedAdmin: "root",
 		}
 		out, err := performAddOperator(ctx, f, op)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("performAddOperator: %v", err)
 		}
-		// The operator's password was typed, so it must NOT be surfaced for display.
+		if out.auditErr != nil {
-		if out.displayPassword != "" {
+			t.Errorf("auditErr = %v, want nil", out.auditErr)
-			t.Errorf("displayPassword = %q, want empty for a typed password", out.displayPassword)
 		}
-		if len(f.inserts) != 1 || bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(f.inserts[0].passwordHash), []byte("valid-test-pw")) != nil {
+		if len(f.inserts) != 1 || f.inserts[0].username != "ops-jordan" {
-			t.Error("operator was not provisioned with the typed password")
+			t.Errorf("operator was not provisioned: %+v", f.inserts)
 		}
 		// Adding an Operator must NOT flip the global local-auth gate (Owner-only).
 		if _, ok := f.settings[api.LocalAuthEnabledKey]; ok {
@@ -682,19 +597,14 @@ func TestPerformAddOperator(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	})
 
-	t.Run("an empty password generates a one-time credential matching the stored hash", func(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("root override records an unverified operator row", func(t *testing.T) {
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
 		op := breakGlassOp{mode: "root_override", accountable: "alice", osUser: "alice", ownerUsername: "ops", attemptedAdmin: "typo-admin"}
-		out, err := performAddOperator(ctx, f, op)
+		if _, err := performAddOperator(ctx, f, op); err != nil {
-		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("performAddOperator: %v", err)
 		}
-		if out.displayPassword == "" {
+		if len(f.inserts) != 1 {
-			t.Fatal("displayPassword empty, want a generated one-time password to hand off")
+			t.Fatalf("want 1 insert, got %d", len(f.inserts))
-		}
-		// The shown password must be the one actually stored (as a hash).
-		if bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(f.inserts[0].passwordHash), []byte(out.displayPassword)) != nil {
-			t.Error("displayed password does not match the stored hash")
 		}
 		_, payload := auditOf(t, f)
 		if payload["verified"] != false {
@@ -719,9 +629,9 @@ func TestPerformAddOperator(t *testing.T) {
 
 	t.Run("a conflict mints nothing and writes no audit row", func(t *testing.T) {
 		f := &fakeOwnerStore{users: map[string]*api.StaffUser{
-			"owner": {ID: "usr-owner", Username: "owner", Role: "admin", PasswordHash: "x"},
+			"owner": {ID: "usr-owner", Username: "owner", Role: "admin"},
 		}}
-		op := breakGlassOp{mode: "recovery", accountable: "root", osUser: "alice", ownerUsername: "owner", ownerPassword: "valid-test-pw", attemptedAdmin: "root"}
+		op := breakGlassOp{mode: "recovery", accountable: "root", osUser: "alice", ownerUsername: "owner", attemptedAdmin: "root"}
 		if _, err := performAddOperator(ctx, f, op); err == nil {
 			t.Fatal("want error when the operator username is already taken")
 		}
@@ -733,3 +643,94 @@ func TestPerformAddOperator(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	})
 }
+
+func TestPerformSetupMCBind(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	t.Run("binds the owner and mints a setup URL whose token hash is what is stored", func(t *testing.T) {
+		f := &fakeOwnerStore{redeemUserID: "usr-owner-1"}
+		out, err := performSetupMCBind(ctx, f, "  abc-123  ", "op.console.example.com")
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("performSetupMCBind: %v", err)
+		}
+		const prefix = "https://op.console.example.com/setup?token="
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(out.setupTokenURL, prefix) {
+			t.Fatalf("setup URL = %q, want prefix %q", out.setupTokenURL, prefix)
+		}
+		// The link code is trimmed and upper-cased before redemption.
+		if len(f.redeems) != 1 {
+			t.Fatalf("want 1 redeem, got %d", len(f.redeems))
+		}
+		if f.redeems[0].code != "ABC-123" {
+			t.Errorf("redeemed code = %q, want ABC-123 (trimmed + upper-cased)", f.redeems[0].code)
+		}
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(f.redeems[0].newUserID, "usr-") {
+			t.Errorf("redeem newUserID = %q, want usr- prefix", f.redeems[0].newUserID)
+		}
+		// Exactly one token minted, for the redeemed user, and only its hash stored —
+		// the stored hash must be sha-256 of the raw token carried in the URL.
+		if len(f.tokens) != 1 {
+			t.Fatalf("want 1 setup token, got %d", len(f.tokens))
+		}
+		tok := f.tokens[0]
+		if tok.userID != "usr-owner-1" {
+			t.Errorf("token userID = %q, want usr-owner-1 (the redeemed owner)", tok.userID)
+		}
+		raw := strings.TrimPrefix(out.setupTokenURL, prefix)
+		sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(raw))
+		if tok.tokenHash != hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]) {
+			t.Error("stored token hash is not sha-256 of the raw token in the URL")
+		}
+		if tok.tokenHash == raw || tok.tokenHash == "" {
+			t.Error("the raw token (or nothing) was stored instead of its hash")
+		}
+		// The token is short-lived and in the future.
+		if !tok.expiresAt.After(time.Now()) {
+			t.Errorf("token expiresAt = %v, want a future time", tok.expiresAt)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("an empty link code mints nothing", func(t *testing.T) {
+		f := &fakeOwnerStore{}
+		if _, err := performSetupMCBind(ctx, f, "   ", "op.console.example.com"); err == nil {
+			t.Fatal("want error for an empty link code")
+		}
+		if len(f.redeems) != 0 || len(f.tokens) != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("want no redeem/token on an empty code, got redeems=%d tokens=%d", len(f.redeems), len(f.tokens))
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("a link-code redemption failure mints no token", func(t *testing.T) {
+		f := &fakeOwnerStore{redeemErr: errors.New("code expired")}
+		if _, err := performSetupMCBind(ctx, f, "abc-123", "op.console.example.com"); err == nil {
+			t.Fatal("want error when the link code cannot be redeemed")
+		}
+		if len(f.tokens) != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("want no token minted on a redeem failure, got %d", len(f.tokens))
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("a token-store failure surfaces after the bind", func(t *testing.T) {
+		f := &fakeOwnerStore{redeemUserID: "usr-owner-1", createTokenErr: errors.New("db down")}
+		if _, err := performSetupMCBind(ctx, f, "abc-123", "op.console.example.com"); err == nil {
+			t.Fatal("want error when the setup token cannot be stored")
+		}
+		if len(f.redeems) != 1 {
+			t.Errorf("want the redeem to have happened before the token write, got %d", len(f.redeems))
+		}
+		if len(f.tokens) != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("want no recorded token when the store fails, got %d", len(f.tokens))
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("defaults the op.console host when adminHostname is empty", func(t *testing.T) {
+		f := &fakeOwnerStore{redeemUserID: "usr-owner-1"}
+		out, err := performSetupMCBind(ctx, f, "abc-123", "  ")
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("performSetupMCBind: %v", err)
+		}
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(out.setupTokenURL, "https://op.console.localhost/setup?token=") {
+			t.Errorf("setup URL = %q, want the op.console.localhost default host", out.setupTokenURL)
+		}
+	})
+}

cmd/felis/setup.go

@@ -24,6 +24,15 @@ const hostBootstrapKubeconfigPath = "/etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml"
 
 var errHostBootstrapCancelled = errors.New("host bootstrap cancelled")
 
+// channelName maps the --dev flag to the release channel deploy/bootstrap.sh
+// understands. Release is the default so a bare `felis setup` is production.
+func channelName(dev bool) string {
+	if dev {
+		return "dev"
+	}
+	return "release"
+}
+
 // cmdSetup is the normal first-run operator console. It is intentionally separate
 // from breakGlass: setup creates the initial Owner and optional web edge; breakGlass
 // is reserved for emergency local recovery/reset.
@@ -31,12 +40,20 @@ func cmdSetup(args []string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
 	fs := flag.NewFlagSet("setup", flag.ContinueOnError)
 	fs.SetOutput(stderr)
 	cfgPath := fs.String("config", defaultSetupConfigPath, "path to felis.toml")
+	dev := fs.Bool("dev", false, "install the dev channel (felis:dev, main HEAD) instead of the default release channel (felis:release, newest tag)")
 	if err := fs.Parse(args); err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, flag.ErrHelp) {
 			return 0
 		}
 		return 2
 	}
+	// The channel governs which image tag/source ref the host bootstrap builds.
+	// runBootstrap forwards the whole environment, so exporting it here is enough
+	// to reach deploy/bootstrap.sh without threading a parameter through the TUI.
+	if err := os.Setenv("FELIS_CHANNEL", channelName(*dev)); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "felis setup: %v\n", err)
+		return 1
+	}
 	configFlagSet := false
 	fs.Visit(func(f *flag.Flag) {
 		if f.Name == "config" {
@@ -112,18 +129,16 @@ func cmdSetup(args []string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
 	}
 
 	if res.provisioned {
-		fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "\nfelis setup: Owner account %q provisioned; local-password login is ENABLED.\n", res.username)
+		fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "\nfelis setup: Owner account %q provisioned (passwordless).\n", res.username)
 		fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "Recorded as %q (mode: %s, os user: %s).\n", res.accountable, res.mode, res.osUser)
-		if res.displayPassword != "" {
+		if res.setupTokenURL != "" {
-			fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "One-time password (you MUST change it on first login):\n\n    %s\n\n", res.displayPassword)
+			fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "Open this URL to complete passwordless login setup (verify email / enroll passkey):\n\n    %s\n\n", res.setupTokenURL)
-		} else {
-			fmt.Fprintln(stdout, "Log in with the password you just entered (you MUST change it on first login).")
 		}
 		if res.auditWarning != "" {
 			fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "WARNING: the accountability audit row was NOT written: %s\n", res.auditWarning)
 		}
 		if panelURL != "" {
-			fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "Log in at %s with that username and password.\n", panelURL)
+			fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "Admin console: %s\n", panelURL)
 			fmt.Fprintln(stdout, "The local HTTPS certificate is self-signed; your browser may ask for confirmation on first visit.")
 		}
 	}

cmd/felis/tui_height_measure_test.go

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ func TestWizardViewsFitTerminal(t *testing.T) {
 		msg  tea.Msg
 	}{
 		{"owner", preflightDoneMsg{}},
-		{"connect", ownerResultMsg{username: "owner", displayPassword: "hunter2pw"}},
+		{"connect", ownerResultMsg{username: "owner", setupTokenURL: "https://op.console.example.com/setup?token=t0ken"}},
 		{"summary", connectResultMsg{method: connectLocal, panelHostname: "panel.example.com"}},
 	}
 

cmd/felis/tui_mc_bind.go

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/charmbracelet/bubbles/spinner"
+	tea "github.com/charmbracelet/bubbletea"
+	"github.com/charmbracelet/huh"
+)
+
+// mcBindModel is the `felis setup` Owner-establishment screen: the operator
+// joins the server, runs /link to get a one-time code, and types it here. The
+// bound Minecraft account is promoted to the passwordless Owner, and a one-time
+// setup URL is minted for the first web login. It replaces the old ownerModel
+// bootstrap form in setup mode — no username/email/password is typed here, the
+// MC identity is the root of trust.
+type mcBindModel struct {
+	ctx       context.Context
+	store     ownerStore
+	adminHost string
+	osUser    string
+
+	step    mcBindStep
+	form    *huh.Form
+	sp      spinner.Model
+	working string
+
+	linkCode      string
+	setupTokenURL string
+
+	width, height int
+}
+
+type mcBindStep int
+
+const (
+	mcBindForm mcBindStep = iota
+	mcBindWorking
+	mcBindDone
+)
+
+type mcBindMsg struct {
+	outcome breakGlassOutcome
+	err     error
+}
+
+func newMCBindModel(ctx context.Context, store ownerStore, adminHost, osUser string) *mcBindModel {
+	sp := spinner.New()
+	sp.Spinner = spinner.Dot
+	sp.Style = tuiLabel
+	m := &mcBindModel{
+		ctx:       ctx,
+		store:     store,
+		adminHost: adminHost,
+		osUser:    osUser,
+		sp:        sp,
+		step:      mcBindForm,
+	}
+	m.form = m.buildForm()
+	return m
+}
+
+func (m *mcBindModel) buildForm() *huh.Form {
+	return m.sized(newFelisForm(huh.NewGroup(
+		huh.NewNote().
+			Title("Bind your Minecraft account").
+			Description("Join the server and run /link to get a one-time code,\nthen type it here. Your bound account becomes the\npasswordless Owner."),
+		huh.NewInput().
+			Title("Link code").
+			Placeholder("ABCD12").
+			Value(&m.linkCode).
+			Validate(requiredField("link code")),
+	)))
+}
+
+func (m *mcBindModel) sized(f *huh.Form) *huh.Form {
+	if m.width > 0 {
+		return f.WithWidth(m.width).WithHeight(m.height)
+	}
+	return f
+}
+
+func (m *mcBindModel) setSize(w, h int) {
+	m.width, m.height = w, h
+	if m.form != nil {
+		m.form = m.form.WithWidth(w).WithHeight(h)
+	}
+}
+
+func (m *mcBindModel) Init() tea.Cmd { return m.form.Init() }
+
+func (m *mcBindModel) Update(msg tea.Msg) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
+	switch msg := msg.(type) {
+	case mcBindMsg:
+		if msg.err != nil {
+			return m, m.failCmd(msg.err)
+		}
+		m.step = mcBindDone
+		m.setupTokenURL = msg.outcome.setupTokenURL
+		return m, nil
+
+	case spinner.TickMsg:
+		if m.step == mcBindWorking {
+			var cmd tea.Cmd
+			m.sp, cmd = m.sp.Update(msg)
+			return m, cmd
+		}
+		return m, nil
+
+	case tea.KeyMsg:
+		switch m.step {
+		case mcBindDone:
+			switch msg.String() {
+			case "ctrl+c", "esc", "enter":
+				return m, m.resultCmd()
+			}
+			return m, nil
+		case mcBindWorking:
+			if msg.String() == "ctrl+c" {
+				return m, tea.Quit
+			}
+			return m, nil
+		default:
+			switch msg.String() {
+			case "ctrl+c", "esc":
+				return m, tea.Quit
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if m.step == mcBindForm && m.form != nil {
+		form, cmd := m.form.Update(msg)
+		if f, ok := form.(*huh.Form); ok {
+			m.form = f
+		}
+		switch m.form.State {
+		case huh.StateCompleted:
+			return m.onFormComplete()
+		case huh.StateAborted:
+			return m, tea.Quit
+		}
+		return m, cmd
+	}
+	return m, nil
+}
+
+func (m *mcBindModel) onFormComplete() (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
+	m.step = mcBindWorking
+	m.working = "Binding Minecraft account…"
+	code := strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToUpper(m.linkCode))
+	return m, tea.Batch(m.sp.Tick, func() tea.Msg {
+		out, err := performSetupMCBind(m.ctx, m.store, code, m.adminHost)
+		return mcBindMsg{outcome: out, err: err}
+	})
+}
+
+func (m *mcBindModel) failCmd(err error) tea.Cmd {
+	return func() tea.Msg { return ownerResultMsg{err: err} }
+}
+
+func (m *mcBindModel) resultCmd() tea.Cmd {
+	return func() tea.Msg {
+		return ownerResultMsg{
+			setupTokenURL: m.setupTokenURL,
+			mode:          "setup",
+			accountable:   m.osUser,
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (m *mcBindModel) View() string {
+	switch m.step {
+	case mcBindWorking:
+		msg := m.working
+		if msg == "" {
+			msg = "Working…"
+		}
+		return "  " + m.sp.View() + " " + tuiHint.Render(msg) + "\n"
+	case mcBindDone:
+		return m.doneView()
+	default:
+		if m.form == nil {
+			return ""
+		}
+		return m.form.View()
+	}
+}
+
+func (m *mcBindModel) doneView() string {
+	var b strings.Builder
+	b.WriteString(tuiSuccessBanner("Owner account is ready.") + "\n\n")
+
+	var box strings.Builder
+	if m.setupTokenURL != "" {
+		box.WriteString(tuiLabel.Render("setup URL  ") + "\n" + tuiPassword.Render(m.setupTokenURL) + "\n\n")
+		box.WriteString(tuiWarn.Render("Open this URL to complete passwordless login setup.\nIt is shown only once."))
+	}
+	b.WriteString(tuiCardStyle.Render(box.String()) + "\n\n")
+	b.WriteString(tuiAction("enter", "continue"))
+	return b.String()
+}

cmd/felis/tui_menu_test.go

@@ -76,9 +76,9 @@ func TestProvisionCmdSelectsPathByOperation(t *testing.T) {
 		if _, ok := f.settings[api.LocalAuthEnabledKey]; ok {
 			t.Error("the operator path flipped local auth — only the Owner thread may")
 		}
-		// No password was typed, so a one-time credential is surfaced to hand off.
+		// The provision is fully done: the audit row landed (no recoverable audit error).
-		if msg.outcome.displayPassword == "" {
+		if msg.outcome.auditErr != nil {
-			t.Error("want a generated one-time password to hand to the new operator")
+			t.Errorf("operator provision recorded an audit error: %v", msg.outcome.auditErr)
 		}
 	})
 
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ func TestOwnerResultCmdCarriesIsOperator(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx := context.Background()
 
 	op := newOperatorModel(ctx, &fakeOwnerStore{}, "root")
-	op.username, op.displayPassword, op.mode, op.accountable = "ops", "pw", "recovery", "root"
+	op.username, op.mode, op.accountable = "ops", "recovery", "root"
 	if res := op.ownerResultCmd()().(ownerResultMsg); !res.isOperator {
 		t.Error("operator result.isOperator = false, want true")
 	}

cmd/felis/tui_owner.go

@@ -66,15 +66,12 @@ type ownerModel struct {
 
 	// huh-bound form values
 	authUser    string
-	authPass     string
 	overrideTok string
 	ownerUser   string
 	ownerEmail  string
-	ownerPass    string
-	ownerConfirm string
 
 	username      string
-	displayPassword string
+	setupTokenURL string
 	auditWarning  string
 }
 
@@ -191,7 +188,7 @@ func (m *ownerModel) Update(msg tea.Msg) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
 			return m, m.failCmd(msg.err)
 		}
 		m.step = owDone
-		m.displayPassword = msg.outcome.displayPassword
+		m.setupTokenURL = msg.outcome.setupTokenURL
 		if msg.outcome.auditErr != nil {
 			m.auditWarning = msg.outcome.auditErr.Error()
 		}
@@ -255,10 +252,10 @@ func (m *ownerModel) onFormComplete() (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
 	case owAuth:
 		m.attempt = strings.TrimSpace(m.authUser)
 		m.step = owWorking
-		m.working = "Verifying admin credential…"
+		m.working = "Verifying admin…"
-		user, pass := m.authUser, m.authPass
+		user := m.authUser
 		return m, tea.Batch(m.sp.Tick, func() tea.Msg {
-			matched, ok, err := authenticateAdmin(m.ctx, m.store, user, pass)
+			matched, ok, err := authenticateAdmin(m.ctx, m.store, user)
 			return owAuthMsg{matched: matched, ok: ok, err: err}
 		})
 	case owOverride:
@@ -277,17 +274,12 @@ func (m *ownerModel) onFormComplete() (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
 }
 
 func (m *ownerModel) provisionCmd() tea.Cmd {
-	password := ""
-	if m.mode == "bootstrap" {
-		password = m.ownerPass
-	}
 	op := breakGlassOp{
 		mode:           m.mode,
 		accountable:    m.accountable,
 		osUser:         m.osUser,
 		ownerUsername:  m.username,
 		ownerEmail:     m.ownerEmail,
-		ownerPassword:  password,
 		attemptedAdmin: m.attempt,
 	}
 	// performAddOperator and performBreakGlass share a signature; the operation
@@ -312,7 +304,7 @@ func (m *ownerModel) ownerResultCmd() tea.Cmd {
 	return func() tea.Msg {
 		return ownerResultMsg{
 			username:      m.username,
-			displayPassword: m.displayPassword,
+			setupTokenURL: m.setupTokenURL,
 			mode:          m.mode,
 			accountable:   m.accountable,
 			auditWarning:  m.auditWarning,
@@ -332,11 +324,6 @@ func (m *ownerModel) buildAuthForm() *huh.Form {
 			Title("Admin username").
 			Value(&m.authUser).
 			Validate(requiredField("admin username")),
-		huh.NewInput().
-			Title("Admin password").
-			EchoMode(huh.EchoModePassword).
-			Value(&m.authPass).
-			Validate(requiredField("admin password")),
 	)))
 }
 
@@ -364,18 +351,16 @@ func (m *ownerModel) buildProvisionForm() *huh.Form {
 	desc := fmt.Sprintf("Create the first Owner — recorded as OS user %q.", m.osUser)
 	switch m.mode {
 	case "recovery":
-		desc = fmt.Sprintf("Authenticated as %q — a one-time password will be generated.", m.accountable)
+		desc = fmt.Sprintf("Authenticated as %q.", m.accountable)
 	case "root_override":
-		desc = "Root override — a one-time password will be generated."
+		desc = "Root override — the Owner will be reset."
 	}
 	if m.operation == bgAddOperator {
-		// Operator-add never bootstraps (an admin is already present to authorize it),
-		// so it is always one of the generated-password modes.
 		switch m.mode {
 		case "recovery":
-			desc = fmt.Sprintf("Add an Operator — authenticated as %q; a one-time password will be generated.", m.accountable)
+			desc = fmt.Sprintf("Add an Operator — authenticated as %q.", m.accountable)
 		case "root_override":
-			desc = "Add an Operator (root override) — a one-time password will be generated."
+			desc = "Add an Operator (root override)."
 		}
 	}
 	if m.provisionErr != nil {
@@ -396,26 +381,6 @@ func (m *ownerModel) buildProvisionForm() *huh.Form {
 			Placeholder("[email protected]").
 			Value(&m.ownerEmail),
 	}
-	if m.mode == "bootstrap" {
-		fields = append(fields,
-			huh.NewInput().
-				Title("Owner password").
-				Description("at least 8 characters").
-				EchoMode(huh.EchoModePassword).
-				Value(&m.ownerPass).
-				Validate(validateOwnerPassword),
-			huh.NewInput().
-				Title("Confirm password").
-				EchoMode(huh.EchoModePassword).
-				Value(&m.ownerConfirm).
-				Validate(func(s string) error {
-					if s != m.ownerPass {
-						return errors.New("the two passwords do not match")
-					}
-					return nil
-				}),
-		)
-	}
 	return m.sized(newFelisForm(huh.NewGroup(fields...)))
 }
 
@@ -454,11 +419,9 @@ func (m *ownerModel) doneView() string {
 
 	var box strings.Builder
 	box.WriteString(tuiLabel.Render("username  ") + m.username + "\n")
-	if m.displayPassword != "" {
+	if m.setupTokenURL != "" {
-		box.WriteString(tuiLabel.Render("password  ") + tuiPassword.Render(m.displayPassword) + "\n\n")
+		box.WriteString("\n" + tuiLabel.Render("setup URL  ") + "\n" + tuiPassword.Render(m.setupTokenURL) + "\n\n")
-		box.WriteString(tuiWarn.Render("Record this password — it is shown only once."))
+		box.WriteString(tuiWarn.Render("Open this URL to complete passwordless login setup. It is shown only once."))
-	} else {
-		box.WriteString(tuiHint.Render("Log in with the password you entered."))
 	}
 	if m.auditWarning != "" {
 		box.WriteString("\n\n" + tuiWarn.Render("Audit warning: "+m.auditWarning))

cmd/felis/tui_root.go

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ type preflightDoneMsg struct{}
 
 type ownerResultMsg struct {
 	username      string
-	displayPassword string
+	setupTokenURL string
 	mode          string
 	accountable   string
 	auditWarning  string
@@ -207,6 +207,9 @@ func (m *rootModel) Update(msg tea.Msg) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
 			return m.showStatus()
 		}
 		m.stage = stageOwner
+		if m.mode == consoleModeSetup {
+			return m.adopt(newMCBindModel(m.ctx, m.store, m.adminHost, m.osUser))
+		}
 		return m.adopt(newOwnerModel(m.ctx, m.store, m.osUser, false))
 
 	case menuChoiceMsg:
@@ -228,7 +231,7 @@ func (m *rootModel) Update(msg tea.Msg) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
 		m.result.provisioned = true
 		m.result.isOperator = msg.isOperator
 		m.result.username = msg.username
-		m.result.displayPassword = msg.displayPassword
+		m.result.setupTokenURL = msg.setupTokenURL
 		m.result.mode = msg.mode
 		m.result.accountable = msg.accountable
 		m.result.auditWarning = msg.auditWarning
@@ -363,7 +366,7 @@ func (m *rootModel) reviewBody(stage int) string {
 		if m.result.username != "" {
 			b.WriteString(tuiLabel.Render("username  ") + m.result.username + "\n")
 		}
-		b.WriteString(tuiHint.Render("Created and recorded. The one-time password was shown on the Owner step."))
+		b.WriteString(tuiHint.Render("Created and recorded. The one-time setup URL was shown on the Owner step."))
 	case stageConnect:
 		b.WriteString(tuiOK.Render("✓ Connection") + "\n")
 		b.WriteString(tuiLabel.Render("method    ") + connectMethodLabel(m.result.connectMethod) + "\n")
@@ -488,7 +491,7 @@ func (m *rootModel) showSummary() (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
 	return m.adopt(&summaryModel{
 		panelURL:      m.result.panelURL,
 		ownerUsername: m.result.username,
-		ownerPassword: m.result.displayPassword,
+		setupTokenURL: m.result.setupTokenURL,
 		accessLabel:   connectMethodLabel(m.result.connectMethod),
 		storageLabel:  m.result.storageDetail,
 		routedHosts:   routed,

cmd/felis/tui_root_test.go

@@ -52,24 +52,26 @@ func TestRootSetupHappyPath(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("initial screen = %T, want *preflightModel", m.screen)
 	}
 
-	// Preflight done → Owner.
+	// Preflight done → MC-bind (setup mode establishes the Owner by binding a
+	// Minecraft account, not by typing a username/password). The stage label is
+	// still stageOwner; only the screen differs by mode.
 	m = drive(t, m, preflightDoneMsg{})
 	if m.stage != stageOwner {
 		t.Fatalf("after preflight, stage = %v, want stageOwner", m.stage)
 	}
-	if _, ok := m.screen.(*ownerModel); !ok {
+	if _, ok := m.screen.(*mcBindModel); !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("after preflight, screen = %T, want *ownerModel", m.screen)
+		t.Fatalf("after preflight, screen = %T, want *mcBindModel", m.screen)
 	}
 
 	// Owner provisioned → Connection chooser.
-	m = drive(t, m, ownerResultMsg{username: "owner", displayPassword: "hunter2"})
+	m = drive(t, m, ownerResultMsg{username: "owner", setupTokenURL: "https://op.console.example.com/setup?token=t0ken"})
 	if m.stage != stageConnect {
 		t.Fatalf("after owner, stage = %v, want stageConnect", m.stage)
 	}
 	if _, ok := m.screen.(*connectChooserModel); !ok {
 		t.Fatalf("after owner, screen = %T, want *connectChooserModel", m.screen)
 	}
-	if !m.result.provisioned || m.result.username != "owner" || m.result.displayPassword != "hunter2" {
+	if !m.result.provisioned || m.result.username != "owner" || m.result.setupTokenURL != "https://op.console.example.com/setup?token=t0ken" {
 		t.Fatalf("owner result not recorded: %+v", m.result)
 	}
 
@@ -115,8 +117,8 @@ func TestRootSetupHappyPath(t *testing.T) {
 	if want := "https://panel.felis.example.com"; sum.panelURL != want {
 		t.Fatalf("summary panelURL = %q, want %q", sum.panelURL, want)
 	}
-	if sum.ownerPassword != "hunter2" {
+	if want := "https://op.console.example.com/setup?token=t0ken"; sum.setupTokenURL != want {
-		t.Fatalf("summary ownerPassword = %q, want %q", sum.ownerPassword, "hunter2")
+		t.Fatalf("summary setupTokenURL = %q, want %q", sum.setupTokenURL, want)
 	}
 	if sum.alreadySetUp {
 		t.Fatalf("first-run summary should not be marked alreadySetUp")
@@ -150,7 +152,7 @@ func TestRootSetupLocalSummary(t *testing.T) {
 func TestRootReconfigureConnectSkipsStorage(t *testing.T) {
 	m := newTestRoot(false, consoleModeSetup, "")
 	m = drive(t, m, preflightDoneMsg{})
-	m = drive(t, m, ownerResultMsg{username: "owner", displayPassword: "hunter2"})
+	m = drive(t, m, ownerResultMsg{username: "owner", setupTokenURL: "https://op.console.example.com/setup?token=t0ken"})
 	m = drive(t, m, connectResultMsg{method: connectLocal, panelHostname: "panel.felis.example.com"})
 	m = drive(t, m, storageResultMsg{method: storageS3, detail: "s3://bucket"})
 	if _, ok := m.screen.(*summaryModel); !ok {
@@ -257,7 +259,7 @@ func TestRootBreakGlassQuitsAfterOwner(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("after the menu choice, screen = %T, want *ownerModel", m.screen)
 	}
 
-	next, cmd := m.Update(ownerResultMsg{username: "owner", displayPassword: "pw", mode: "recovery"})
+	next, cmd := m.Update(ownerResultMsg{username: "owner", setupTokenURL: "https://op.console.example.com/setup?token=t0ken", mode: "recovery"})
 	rm := next.(*rootModel)
 	if _, ok := rm.screen.(*connectChooserModel); ok {
 		t.Fatalf("break-glass must not enter the connection chooser")
@@ -292,7 +294,7 @@ func TestRootRailReviewNavigation(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// Advance to the Connection chooser (a select — it yields ←/→).
-	m = drive(t, m, ownerResultMsg{username: "owner", displayPassword: "hunter2"})
+	m = drive(t, m, ownerResultMsg{username: "owner", setupTokenURL: "https://op.console.example.com/setup?token=t0ken"})
 	if m.reviewing != -1 {
 		t.Fatalf("fresh chooser should start live, reviewing = %d", m.reviewing)
 	}
@@ -352,8 +354,8 @@ func TestSetupRailSpansBootstrap(t *testing.T) {
 	m := newTestRoot(false, consoleModeSetup, "")
 	m = drive(t, m, tea.WindowSizeMsg{Width: 90, Height: 30})
 	m = drive(t, m, preflightDoneMsg{})
-	if _, ok := m.screen.(*ownerModel); !ok {
+	if _, ok := m.screen.(*mcBindModel); !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("expected owner screen after preflight, got %T", m.screen)
+		t.Fatalf("expected MC-bind screen after preflight, got %T", m.screen)
 	}
 	if v := m.View(); !strings.Contains(v, "✓ Bootstrap") {
 		t.Fatalf("wizard rail should carry Bootstrap as a completed step, got:\n%s", v)

cmd/felis/tui_summary.go

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import (
 type summaryModel struct {
 	panelURL      string
 	ownerUsername string
-	ownerPassword string // one-time; shown once
+	setupTokenURL string // one-time first-login URL; shown once
 	accessLabel   string
 	storageLabel  string // build-context storage backend recap; empty to omit
 	routedHosts   []string
@@ -55,9 +55,9 @@ func (m *summaryModel) View() string {
 	if m.ownerUsername != "" {
 		card.WriteString(tuiLabel.Render("owner     ") + m.ownerUsername + "\n")
 	}
-	if m.ownerPassword != "" {
+	if m.setupTokenURL != "" {
-		card.WriteString(tuiLabel.Render("password  ") + tuiPassword.Render(m.ownerPassword) + "\n")
+		card.WriteString(tuiLabel.Render("setup URL ") + tuiPassword.Render(m.setupTokenURL) + "\n")
-		card.WriteString("          " + tuiWarn.Render("shown only once — record it now") + "\n")
+		card.WriteString("          " + tuiWarn.Render("one-time link — open it to finish login setup") + "\n")
 	}
 	if m.accessLabel != "" {
 		card.WriteString(tuiLabel.Render("access    ") + m.accessLabel + "\n")

cmd/felis/version.go

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"runtime"
+	"runtime/debug"
+)
+
+// version is the build stamp injected at link time via
+//
+//	-ldflags "-X main.version=<git describe>"
+//
+// deploy/bootstrap.sh computes it from the checked-out source with
+// `git describe --tags --always --dirty`: the release channel builds the newest
+// vX.Y.Z tag (a clean name like v1.0.0-earlyAccess), the dev channel builds main
+// HEAD (a tag+distance+gSHA string). It stays "dev" for an un-stamped local
+// `go build`, where ReadBuildInfo below still surfaces the vcs revision.
+var version = "dev"
+
+// cmdVersion prints the build stamp. It takes no flags and never touches the
+// cluster, so it is safe to run as any user (unlike setup/breakGlass).
+func cmdVersion(args []string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
+	fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "felis %s\n", resolvedVersion())
+	fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "  go:       %s %s/%s\n", runtime.Version(), runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
+	if rev, ok := vcsRevision(); ok {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "  revision: %s\n", rev)
+	}
+	return 0
+}
+
+// resolvedVersion prefers the ldflag stamp, then the module version recorded by
+// `go install`, and only reports "unknown" when neither is present.
+func resolvedVersion() string {
+	if version != "" {
+		return version
+	}
+	if bi, ok := debug.ReadBuildInfo(); ok && bi.Main.Version != "" {
+		return bi.Main.Version
+	}
+	return "unknown"
+}
+
+// vcsRevision returns the git commit the binary was built from when the build
+// carried VCS stamping (local `go build` in a checkout; the docker build strips
+// .git, so there the ldflag version carries the identity instead).
+func vcsRevision() (string, bool) {
+	bi, ok := debug.ReadBuildInfo()
+	if !ok {
+		return "", false
+	}
+	for _, s := range bi.Settings {
+		if s.Key == "vcs.revision" && s.Value != "" {
+			return s.Value, true
+		}
+	}
+	return "", false
+}

docs/openapi.yaml

@@ -879,6 +879,94 @@ paths:
         '401':
           $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthorized'
 
+  /api/v1/internal/op-login/pending:
+    get:
+      tags: [account-internal]
+      operationId: opLoginPending
+      summary: List live pending op.console login requests, oldest first (spec §B).
+      description: >
+        Internal-only. Velocity polls it and pushes waiting requests to online admins,
+        who approve one with /felis web op approve <id>. No pending request is secret
+        to the operator crew.
+      x-felis-face: [internal]
+      x-felis-tier: service
+      security: [{ serviceToken: [] }]
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: The pending requests awaiting an in-game vouch.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema:
+                type: object
+                required: [pending]
+                properties:
+                  pending:
+                    type: array
+                    items:
+                      type: object
+                      required: [request_id, username, email, created_at]
+                      properties:
+                        request_id: { type: string }
+                        username: { type: string }
+                        email: { type: string }
+                        created_at: { type: string, format: date-time }
+        '401':
+          $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthorized'
+
+  /api/v1/internal/op-login/{id}/approve:
+    post:
+      tags: [account-internal]
+      operationId: opLoginApprove
+      summary: Record an in-game admin's vouch for a pending op.console login (spec §B).
+      description: >
+        Internal-only second factor: velocity submits the online-mode UUID of the
+        in-game admin running /felis web op approve. The API resolves it to a linked
+        role=admin account (else 403 not_admin) and flips the request approved. A
+        missing or no-longer-pending request is 404. Self-approval is allowed — an
+        online staff member vouching as their own admin identity is a genuine second
+        factor distinct from the mailbox.
+      x-felis-face: [internal]
+      x-felis-tier: service
+      security: [{ serviceToken: [] }]
+      parameters:
+        - { name: id, in: path, required: true, schema: { type: string } }
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema:
+              type: object
+              required: [approver_uuid]
+              properties:
+                approver_uuid: { type: string, format: uuid }
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: The vouch was recorded; the request is now approved.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema:
+                type: object
+                required: [approved]
+                properties:
+                  approved: { type: boolean, const: true }
+        '400':
+          description: approver_uuid is required (bad_request).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '401':
+          $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthorized'
+        '403':
+          description: The approver is not a linked administrator (not_admin).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '404':
+          description: No pending operator login with that id (op_login_not_found).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+
   # ----------------------------------------------------- external: servers ---
   /api/v1/servers/{name}/wake:
     post:
@@ -1431,18 +1519,22 @@ paths:
           $ref: '#/components/responses/NotFound'
 
   # -------------------------------------------------- external: local auth ---
-  /api/v1/auth/login:
+  /api/v1/auth/options:
     post:
       tags: [auth]
-      operationId: login
+      operationId: authOptions
-      summary: Log in with a local username + password (op.console).
+      summary: Identifier-first login discovery — which methods can this email use (spec §B, #71).
       description: >-
-        Verifies a username+password against the users row and, on success, mints
+        Public, pre-session discovery for the SPA's identifier-first form: given a typed
-        a host-only session cookie (spec §B). Mounted Public — there is no prior
+        email, report which console login methods the account can use (passkey and/or
-        principal — but local auth must be enabled (local_auth_enabled), so a
+        email-OTP) so the UI prompts for the right authenticator. This is the deliberate
-        deployment fronted entirely by Zero Trust never accepts a local password.
+        counter-slice to the anti-enumeration login doors — the ONE sanctioned place
-        Every failure returns the same vague invalid_credentials after a uniform
+        account existence is disclosed, so an unknown address returns an empty methods
-        bcrypt compare, so usernames cannot be enumerated by response or timing.
+        array. It never reveals staffness: methods are computed identically for every
+        resolved account (no role branch), so a staff and a player address in the same
+        credential state return byte-identical bodies. passkey is offered only when a
+        verifier is wired. Sends no mail and mutates nothing; not rate-limited at the app
+        layer (volumetric abuse is bounded at the edge). Gated on local_auth_enabled.
       x-felis-face: [external]
       x-felis-tier: public
       security: []
@@ -1452,37 +1544,521 @@ paths:
           application/json:
             schema:
               type: object
-              required: [username, password]
+              required: [email]
               properties:
-                username: { type: string }
+                email: { type: string, format: email }
-                password: { type: string, format: password }
       responses:
         '200':
-          description: Session established; the cookie is set on the response.
+          description: >-
+            The login methods available for the address, in a deterministic order
+            (passkey before email_otp). An empty array means no verified account.
           content:
             application/json:
               schema:
                 type: object
-                required: [user_id, role, must_change_password]
+                required: [methods]
                 properties:
-                  user_id: { type: string }
+                  methods:
-                  role:
+                    type: array
-                    type: string
+                    items: { type: string, enum: [passkey, email_otp] }
-                    enum: [user, admin]
-                  must_change_password:
-                    type: boolean
-                    description: >-
-                      True when this account still owes its first-login password
-                      change; the panel routes straight to the change-password card.
         '400':
-          $ref: '#/components/responses/BadRequest'
+          description: A valid email is required (bad_request).
-        '401':
-          description: Invalid username or password (vague by design).
           content:
             application/json:
               schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
         '403':
-          description: Local password login is disabled on this deployment.
+          description: Local session login is disabled on this deployment (local_auth_disabled).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '415':
+          description: Request body was not application/json.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+
+  /api/v1/auth/passkey/login/begin:
+    post:
+      tags: [auth]
+      operationId: passkeyLoginBegin
+      summary: Begin a passwordless passkey (WebAuthn) login (spec §14, §B).
+      description: >-
+        First leg of the public, pre-session passkey assertion door: the caller
+        supplies the email that selects the account and, on success, receives the raw
+        PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions to hand to navigator.credentials.get(). The
+        matching challenge is stashed server-side and redeemed by finish. Mounted
+        Public (no prior principal) and gated on local_auth_enabled. An unknown
+        address and a known account with no enrolled passkey both return the SAME 400
+        no_passkey, so the door is not an existence oracle; a per-recipient cooldown
+        (shared shape with the email-OTP and op-login doors) throttles probing.
+      x-felis-face: [external]
+      x-felis-tier: public
+      security: []
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema:
+              type: object
+              required: [email]
+              properties:
+                email: { type: string, format: email }
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: >-
+            The WebAuthn assertion options (PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions), passed
+            through verbatim from the authenticator library for the browser to consume.
+            The body is the WebAuthn standard shape and is not modelled here.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { type: object, additionalProperties: true }
+        '400':
+          description: >-
+            Invalid email (bad_request); or no passkey is enrolled for the account, or
+            the address is unknown — indistinguishable by design (no_passkey); or the
+            authenticator library could not start the ceremony (passkey_login_failed).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '403':
+          description: Local session login is disabled on this deployment (local_auth_disabled).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '415':
+          description: Request body was not application/json.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '429':
+          description: A passkey login for this recipient was started too recently (otp_resend_cooldown).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '503':
+          description: No passkey verifier is wired on this deployment (passkey_unavailable).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+
+  /api/v1/auth/passkey/login/finish:
+    post:
+      tags: [auth]
+      operationId: passkeyLoginFinish
+      summary: Complete a passkey (WebAuthn) login and mint a session (spec §14, §B).
+      description: >-
+        Second leg of the public passkey door: the caller returns the email (to
+        re-select the account) and the raw navigator.credentials.get() assertion. The
+        stashed login challenge is consumed atomically and the assertion is verified
+        against it; on success a host-only felis_session cookie is minted. Both players
+        and staff may log in this way — a passkey is a two-factor authenticator
+        (possession + user verification), strong enough to stand alone without the
+        in-game approval op-login requires. Every failure mode (unknown address, no
+        live challenge, expired challenge, bad assertion) collapses into one uniform
+        passkey_login_invalid, so the door reveals nothing.
+      x-felis-face: [external]
+      x-felis-tier: public
+      security: []
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema:
+              type: object
+              required: [email, assertion]
+              properties:
+                email: { type: string, format: email }
+                assertion:
+                  type: object
+                  additionalProperties: true
+                  description: >-
+                    The raw PublicKeyCredential from navigator.credentials.get(),
+                    passed to the verifier verbatim (WebAuthn standard shape).
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Assertion verified; a host-only session cookie is set on the response.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema:
+                type: object
+                required: [user_id, role]
+                properties:
+                  user_id: { type: string }
+                  role: { type: string, enum: [user, admin] }
+        '400':
+          description: >-
+            Invalid email or missing assertion (bad_request); or the login could not be
+            completed — unknown address, no live or expired challenge, or a failed
+            assertion, all uniform (passkey_login_invalid).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '403':
+          description: Local session login is disabled on this deployment (local_auth_disabled).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '415':
+          description: Request body was not application/json.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '503':
+          description: No passkey verifier is wired on this deployment (passkey_unavailable).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+
+  /api/v1/auth/email/start:
+    post:
+      tags: [auth]
+      operationId: loginEmailStart
+      summary: Begin a passwordless email-OTP login — mail a one-time code (spec §B).
+      description: >-
+        Public, pre-session console door: the caller supplies an email and, if it
+        resolves to a verified account, a one-time code is mailed under the login
+        purpose. An address with no account returns the SAME 202 with no code minted,
+        and the per-recipient cooldown is kept on that path too, so probing reveals
+        nothing (existence is learnt only at the sanctioned /auth/options oracle).
+        Gated on local_auth_enabled.
+      x-felis-face: [external]
+      x-felis-tier: public
+      security: []
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema:
+              type: object
+              required: [email]
+              properties:
+                email: { type: string, format: email }
+      responses:
+        '202':
+          description: >-
+            Accepted (neutral): a code was mailed if the address has a verified
+            account; the response is identical either way.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema:
+                type: object
+                required: [sent, expires_at]
+                properties:
+                  sent: { type: boolean, const: true }
+                  expires_at: { type: string, format: date-time }
+        '400':
+          description: A valid email is required (bad_request).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '403':
+          description: Local session login is disabled on this deployment (local_auth_disabled).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '415':
+          description: Request body was not application/json.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '429':
+          description: A code for this recipient was requested too recently (otp_resend_cooldown).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+
+  /api/v1/auth/email/verify:
+    post:
+      tags: [auth]
+      operationId: loginEmailVerify
+      summary: Redeem an email-OTP login code into a session (spec §B).
+      description: >-
+        Public, pre-session: resolves the address to an account, verifies the code
+        under the login purpose, and on success mints a host-only felis_session. An
+        unknown address, a wrong or expired code, and an attempt-exhausted code all
+        return the IDENTICAL 400 invalid_code, so the door is not an existence or
+        lockout oracle. Staff are refused (403) — but only AFTER a valid code is
+        redeemed, so only the account owner can ever reach that refusal.
+      x-felis-face: [external]
+      x-felis-tier: public
+      security: []
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema:
+              type: object
+              required: [email, code]
+              properties:
+                email: { type: string, format: email }
+                code: { type: string }
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Code accepted; a host-only session cookie is set on the response.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema:
+                type: object
+                required: [user_id, role]
+                properties:
+                  user_id: { type: string }
+                  role: { type: string, enum: [user, admin] }
+        '400':
+          description: >-
+            A valid email and code are required (bad_request); or the code is wrong,
+            expired, or exhausted (invalid_code, uniform with an unknown address).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '403':
+          description: >-
+            Local session login is disabled (local_auth_disabled), or the account is
+            staff and must sign in at the operator console (staff_account).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '415':
+          description: Request body was not application/json.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+
+  /api/v1/auth/op-login/start:
+    post:
+      tags: [auth]
+      operationId: opLoginStart
+      summary: Begin an op.console staff login — mail an OTP, open an approval request (spec §B).
+      description: >-
+        Public, pre-session first leg of the two-factor operator door: resolves the
+        staff address, opens an op_login request, and mails a one-time code under the
+        op_login purpose, returning the request handle the browser polls. A non-staff
+        or unknown address gets the SAME 202 with a random, non-persisted handle and no
+        mail, so this never becomes a staff-enumeration oracle. Gated on
+        local_auth_enabled.
+      x-felis-face: [external]
+      x-felis-tier: public
+      security: []
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema:
+              type: object
+              required: [email]
+              properties:
+                email: { type: string, format: email }
+      responses:
+        '202':
+          description: >-
+            Accepted (neutral): a request handle to poll. For a staff address a code
+            was mailed and the handle is real; otherwise the handle is a random no-op.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema:
+                type: object
+                required: [request_id, expires_at]
+                properties:
+                  request_id: { type: string }
+                  expires_at: { type: string, format: date-time }
+        '400':
+          description: A valid email is required (bad_request).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '403':
+          description: Local session login is disabled on this deployment (local_auth_disabled).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '415':
+          description: Request body was not application/json.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '429':
+          description: A code for this recipient was requested too recently (otp_resend_cooldown).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+
+  /api/v1/auth/op-login/status/{id}:
+    get:
+      tags: [auth]
+      operationId: opLoginStatus
+      summary: Poll whether an op.console login request has been approved in-game (spec §B).
+      description: >-
+        Public, pre-session read the browser polls after start. Returns approved:true
+        only for a genuinely approved, live, unconsumed request; every other case —
+        unknown, expired, denied, or already-consumed handle — reads approved:false, so
+        a fabricated handle polls false forever and only an in-game admin vouch can flip
+        it true.
+      x-felis-face: [external]
+      x-felis-tier: public
+      security: []
+      parameters:
+        - { name: id, in: path, required: true, schema: { type: string } }
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: The approval state of the request handle.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema:
+                type: object
+                required: [approved]
+                properties:
+                  approved: { type: boolean }
+        '403':
+          description: Local session login is disabled on this deployment (local_auth_disabled).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+
+  /api/v1/auth/op-login/finish:
+    post:
+      tags: [auth]
+      operationId: opLoginFinish
+      summary: Redeem an approved op.console request plus its mailed code into a staff session (spec §B).
+      description: >-
+        Public, pre-session final leg: mints a host-only staff session only when BOTH
+        factors have landed — the request is approved-and-live AND the mailed code
+        verifies. Every failure (unknown handle, not-yet-approved, wrong or locked code,
+        lost race) collapses into one uniform 400 op_login_invalid, so a code-less
+        caller learns nothing. Admin is re-asserted before the session is issued.
+      x-felis-face: [external]
+      x-felis-tier: public
+      security: []
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema:
+              type: object
+              required: [request_id, code]
+              properties:
+                request_id: { type: string }
+                code: { type: string }
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Both factors proven; a host-only session cookie is set on the response.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema:
+                type: object
+                required: [user_id, role]
+                properties:
+                  user_id: { type: string }
+                  role: { type: string, enum: [user, admin] }
+        '400':
+          description: >-
+            request_id and code are required (bad_request); or the login could not be
+            completed — unknown handle, not approved, wrong or locked code, or lost
+            race, all uniform (op_login_invalid).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '403':
+          description: >-
+            Local session login is disabled (local_auth_disabled), or the resolved
+            account is not an operator (staff_account).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '415':
+          description: Request body was not application/json.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+
+  /api/v1/auth/setup/redeem:
+    post:
+      tags: [auth]
+      operationId: setupRedeem
+      summary: Redeem a one-time setup token into a lockdown session (spec §B).
+      description: >-
+        Public, pre-session first-run door: consumes the one-time setup token minted by
+        the felis TUI (stored and looked up by SHA-256 hash, like session cookies),
+        mints a host-only felis_session, and returns the remaining setup steps so the
+        SPA can drive the wizard. An unknown, consumed, or expired token returns a
+        uniform 400 setup_token_invalid. Gated on local_auth_enabled.
+      x-felis-face: [external]
+      x-felis-tier: public
+      security: []
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        content:
+          application/json:
+            schema:
+              type: object
+              required: [token]
+              properties:
+                token: { type: string }
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Token redeemed; a session cookie is set and the setup state is returned.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema:
+                type: object
+                required: [user_id, username, role, email, email_verified, has_passkey, setup_required]
+                properties:
+                  user_id: { type: string }
+                  username: { type: string }
+                  role: { type: string, enum: [user, admin] }
+                  email: { type: string }
+                  email_verified: { type: boolean }
+                  has_passkey: { type: boolean }
+                  setup_required: { type: boolean }
+        '400':
+          description: >-
+            A token is required (bad_request), or it is unknown, already used, or
+            expired (setup_token_invalid).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '403':
+          description: Local session login is disabled on this deployment (local_auth_disabled).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '415':
+          description: Request body was not application/json.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+
+  /api/v1/auth/setup/status:
+    get:
+      tags: [auth]
+      operationId: setupStatus
+      summary: Report the caller's own setup progress (spec §B).
+      description: >-
+        App-tier read the SPA polls after each setup wizard step (email verify, passkey
+        enroll) to decide whether the first-run lockdown can lift. It reads only the
+        principal's own state and is reachable during setup lockdown (the rest of the
+        API is fenced until setup completes).
+      x-felis-face: [external]
+      x-felis-tier: app
+      security: [{ sessionCookie: [] }]
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: The caller's current setup state.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema:
+                type: object
+                required: [user_id, username, role, email, email_verified, has_passkey, setup_required]
+                properties:
+                  user_id: { type: string }
+                  username: { type: string }
+                  role: { type: string, enum: [user, admin] }
+                  email: { type: string }
+                  email_verified: { type: boolean }
+                  has_passkey: { type: boolean }
+                  setup_required: { type: boolean }
+        '401':
+          $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthorized'
+        '404':
+          description: The principal's user row was not found (not_found).
           content:
             application/json:
               schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
@@ -1510,57 +2086,6 @@ paths:
                 properties:
                   ok: { type: boolean, const: true }
 
-  /api/v1/auth/change-password:
-    post:
-      tags: [auth]
-      operationId: changePassword
-      summary: Change the caller's local password (forced first-login or rotation).
-      description: >-
-        Re-verifies the caller's current password, stores a new bcrypt hash, clears
-        must_change_password, and revokes the account's OTHER sessions while keeping
-        the current one (spec §B). Reachable while must_change_password is set, so a
-        forced first-login change can complete — the rest of the API is fenced off
-        until it does. The session authenticates the caller; re-asking the current
-        password additionally blocks a hijacked session from silently rotating the
-        credential.
-      x-felis-face: [external]
-      x-felis-tier: app
-      security: [{ sessionCookie: [] }]
-      requestBody:
-        required: true
-        content:
-          application/json:
-            schema:
-              type: object
-              required: [current_password, new_password]
-              properties:
-                current_password: { type: string, format: password }
-                new_password:
-                  type: string
-                  format: password
-                  minLength: 8
-                  maxLength: 72
-                  description: 8–72 bytes; 72 is bcrypt's hard input limit.
-      responses:
-        '200':
-          description: Password changed; other sessions revoked.
-          content:
-            application/json:
-              schema:
-                type: object
-                required: [ok]
-                properties:
-                  ok: { type: boolean, const: true }
-        '400':
-          description: Weak password, or the new password equals the current one.
-          content:
-            application/json:
-              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
-        '401':
-          $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthorized'
-        '403':
-          $ref: '#/components/responses/Forbidden'
-
   /api/v1/auth/bind:
     post:
       tags: [auth]
@@ -2061,37 +2586,6 @@ paths:
         '404':
           $ref: '#/components/responses/NotFound'
 
-  /api/v1/users/{id}/reset-password:
-    post:
-      tags: [users]
-      operationId: resetPassword
-      summary: >-
-        Generate a high-entropy random password, deliver it to the user's email, and
-        force a first-login change (admin only). No request body — the server owns
-        entropy. The password is never returned to the admin; only the target email is echoed.
-      x-felis-face: [external]
-      x-felis-tier: owner
-      security: [{ accessJWT: [] }]
-      parameters:
-        - { name: id, in: path, required: true, schema: { type: string } }
-      responses:
-        '200':
-          description: Password reset. All existing sessions revoked. Password sent to the user's email.
-          content:
-            application/json:
-              schema:
-                type: object
-                required: [ok, email]
-                properties:
-                  ok: { type: boolean, const: true }
-                  email: { type: string, description: "The recipient email (empty if the user has none)." }
-        '401':
-          $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthorized'
-        '403':
-          $ref: '#/components/responses/Forbidden'
-        '404':
-          $ref: '#/components/responses/NotFound'
-
   /api/v1/users/{id}/quotas:
     get:
       tags: [users]

internal/api/api.go

@@ -104,17 +104,6 @@ type API struct {
 	// a positive value. Enforced via withinRunningCap on the wake path.
 	MaxRunningServers int
 
-	// MaxConcurrentLogins bounds how many password logins may run their (CPU-costly)
-	// bcrypt compare at once on the public /auth/login route. bcrypt is deliberately
-	// expensive and the anti-enumeration path runs a full compare on EVERY request,
-	// so an unbounded flood of concurrent logins would pin every core; capping the
-	// simultaneous compares sheds the excess with a cheap 429 instead. Zero — the
-	// default — disables the cap (same "zero disables" idiom as WakeCooldown /
-	// MaxRunningServers); cmd/felis wires a positive value. It is a concurrency cap,
-	// NOT a per-account lockout, so it never fences a break-glass admin out of the
-	// one account they need. Enforced via loginLimiter in handleLogin.
-	MaxConcurrentLogins int
-
 	// MaxStreamsPerPrincipal caps how many concurrent Server-Sent Event streams
 	// (console + build-log relays, spec §8) a single principal may hold open at once.
 	// Each relay blocks for the lifetime of a client's attachment and, under a stalled
@@ -135,9 +124,6 @@ type API struct {
 	otpCooldownOnce sync.Once
 	otpCooldown     *cooldownLimiter
 
-	loginCapOnce sync.Once
-	loginCap     *concurrencyLimiter
-
 	streamCapOnce sync.Once
 	streamCap     *streamLimiter
 }
@@ -169,16 +155,6 @@ func (a *API) otpLimiter() *cooldownLimiter {
 	return a.otpCooldown
 }
 
-// loginLimiter lazily builds the login bcrypt concurrency cap bound to
-// MaxConcurrentLogins. A zero cap yields a disabled limiter that admits every
-// caller, so a deployment (or test) that leaves it unset pays nothing.
-func (a *API) loginLimiter() *concurrencyLimiter {
-	a.loginCapOnce.Do(func() {
-		a.loginCap = newConcurrencyLimiter(a.MaxConcurrentLogins)
-	})
-	return a.loginCap
-}
-
 // streamGate lazily builds the per-principal SSE stream cap bound to
 // MaxStreamsPerPrincipal. A zero cap yields a disabled limiter that admits every
 // stream, so a deployment (or test) that leaves it unset pays nothing.
@@ -231,13 +207,9 @@ type apiRoute struct {
 	// on one route is harmless but redundant — an owner passes both.
 	Owner bool
 
-	// AllowDuringPasswordChange opts a route OUT of the must_change_password
+	// SetupAllowed marks a route as reachable during the setup-lockdown: a session
-	// lockdown (spec §B). The lockdown is default-deny: every authenticated route is
+	// whose EmailVerified is false is restricted to these routes only.
-	// fenced off for a staff principal that still owes a first-login password change
+	SetupAllowed bool
-	// EXCEPT the few that let it escape the state — change-password, logout, and the
-	// self-identity read /me. A new authenticated route is locked down unless it
-	// sets this, so forgetting the flag fails safe (closed), never open.
-	AllowDuringPasswordChange bool
 
 	h http.HandlerFunc
 }
@@ -283,6 +255,12 @@ func (a *API) internalAPIRoutes() []apiRoute {
 		// Mojang player (same name, different UUID) always passes.
 		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/internal/player/reclaim", h: a.handleReclaimUsername},
 		{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/internal/player/blacklist/{mc_uuid}", h: a.handleCheckBlacklist},
+		// Op-login (passwordless console login): an in-game op requests a login that
+		// the web owner/admin approves, then redeems for a session. Internal face
+		// carries the pending queue and the approve action (service-token auth, no
+		// Principal); the external face carries the start/status/finish the op drives.
+		{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/internal/op-login/pending", h: a.handleOpLoginPending},
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/internal/op-login/{id}/approve", h: a.handleOpLoginApprove},
 	}
 }
 
@@ -294,14 +272,26 @@ func (a *API) externalAPIRoutes() []apiRoute {
 	return []apiRoute{
 		{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/healthz", Public: true, h: a.handleHealthz},
 
-		// Local-password auth (spec §B), the op.console login surface. login/logout
+		// logout is Public: it reads the cookie directly so it works even after
-		// are Public (pre-session: a caller has no principal yet, and logout reads the
+		// expiry. The rest of the auth surface (identifier-first options discovery,
-		// cookie directly so it works even after expiry). change-password requires a
+		// setup redeem/status, passkey login, email OTP login, op-login) is Public and
-		// live session and stays reachable while must_change_password is set
+		// pre-session: a caller has no principal yet.
-		// (AllowDuringPasswordChange) so a forced first-login change can complete.
-		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/auth/login", Public: true, h: a.handleLogin},
 		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/auth/logout", Public: true, h: a.handleLogout},
-		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/auth/change-password", AllowDuringPasswordChange: true, h: a.handleChangePassword},
+		// Identifier-first discovery (#71): given an email, report which console methods
+		// it can use so the SPA prompts for the right authenticator. The deliberate
+		// counter-slice to the anti-enumeration doors — the ONE sanctioned place existence
+		// is disclosed — but it never reveals staffness (methods computed with no role
+		// branch, so a staff and a player address in the same state are indistinguishable).
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/auth/options", Public: true, h: a.handleAuthOptions},
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/auth/setup/redeem", Public: true, h: a.handleSetupRedeem},
+		{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/auth/setup/status", SetupAllowed: true, h: a.handleSetupStatus},
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/begin", Public: true, h: a.handlePasskeyLoginBegin},
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/finish", Public: true, h: a.handlePasskeyLoginFinish},
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/auth/email/start", Public: true, h: a.handleLoginEmailStart},
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/auth/email/verify", Public: true, h: a.handleLoginEmailVerify},
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/auth/op-login/start", Public: true, h: a.handleOpLoginStart},
+		{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/auth/op-login/status/{id}", Public: true, h: a.handleOpLoginStatus},
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/auth/op-login/finish", Public: true, h: a.handleOpLoginFinish},
 		// Player-console bootstrap (console-tier access model): the account-less
 		// player's door into console.<root_domain>. Public — like login there is no prior
 		// principal — and session-minting, but the artifact it consumes is a one-time
@@ -341,10 +331,10 @@ func (a *API) externalAPIRoutes() []apiRoute {
 		// every authenticated principal may read its OWN identity. is_admin is the
 		// server-computed Principal.IsAdmin() (Role + admin Access path), so the client
 		// never re-derives the graded-ZT rule; it remains UX truth, not enforcement.
-		// /me is exempt from the first-login lockdown so the panel can read its own
+		// /me is reachable during setup-lockdown so the panel can read its own
-		// identity (including must_change_password) to render the change-password card.
+		// identity (including email_verified) to drive the setup flow.
-		{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/me", AllowDuringPasswordChange: true, h: a.handleMe},
+		{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/me", SetupAllowed: true, h: a.handleMe},
-		{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/me/servers", h: a.handleMyServers},
+		{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/me/servers", SetupAllowed: true, h: a.handleMyServers},
 		// World backups (spec §7, §466). Both are app-tier: GET /backups is scoped
 		// inside the handler (admin sees all; a user sees only worlds they formerly
 		// owned), and restore is gated by owner-or-admin PLUS a former-owner match, so
@@ -355,26 +345,26 @@ func (a *API) externalAPIRoutes() []apiRoute {
 		// pointer handleClaim's 412 emits), /verify consumes the in-game code and binds
 		// the account. App-tier, not admin — linking your own account is an ordinary
 		// authenticated operation.
-		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/link/start", h: a.handleLinkStart},
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/link/start", SetupAllowed: true, h: a.handleLinkStart},
-		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/link/verify", h: a.handleLinkVerify},
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/link/verify", SetupAllowed: true, h: a.handleLinkVerify},
 		// Email verification (spec §B2 onboarding), web side: /start mints+delivers a
 		// one-time code for the caller's chosen address, /verify redeems it and flips
 		// email_verified. App-tier like the link routes — proving control of your own
 		// email is an ordinary authenticated operation, scoped to the principal.
-		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/email/start", h: a.handleEmailOTPStart},
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/email/start", SetupAllowed: true, h: a.handleEmailOTPStart},
-		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/email/verify", h: a.handleEmailOTPVerify},
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/email/verify", SetupAllowed: true, h: a.handleEmailOTPVerify},
 		// Passkey enrollment (spec §14 WebAuthn / Phase 6 bind), web side: /register/begin
 		// mints a credential-creation challenge for the caller, /register/finish verifies
 		// the authenticator's attestation and binds the passkey, and the credentials
 		// collection lists and unbinds the caller's OWN passkeys. App-tier like the email
 		// routes — binding a passkey to your own account is an ordinary authenticated
 		// operation, scoped entirely to the principal (the body never names a user). This
-		// is enrollment only; passkey LOGIN/assertion is a deferred slice (see migration
+		// is the ENROLLMENT side; the passkey LOGIN/assertion door is the Public,
-		// 0007 and handlers_passkey.go).
+		// pre-session /api/v1/auth/passkey/login/{begin,finish} pair above.
-		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/passkey/register/begin", h: a.handlePasskeyRegisterBegin},
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/passkey/register/begin", SetupAllowed: true, h: a.handlePasskeyRegisterBegin},
-		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/passkey/register/finish", h: a.handlePasskeyRegisterFinish},
+		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/passkey/register/finish", SetupAllowed: true, h: a.handlePasskeyRegisterFinish},
-		{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/passkey/credentials", h: a.handlePasskeyList},
+		{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/passkey/credentials", SetupAllowed: true, h: a.handlePasskeyList},
-		{Method: "DELETE", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/passkey/credentials/{id}", h: a.handlePasskeyDelete},
+		{Method: "DELETE", Pattern: "/api/v1/account/passkey/credentials/{id}", SetupAllowed: true, h: a.handlePasskeyDelete},
 		// Modpack submission (user-directed lane over §16), user side: a user files an upload for review
 		// and lists their own. App-tier — the submitter and the "my uploads" scope are
 		// both taken from the principal, never the body, so an ordinary authenticated
@@ -431,7 +421,6 @@ func (a *API) externalAPIRoutes() []apiRoute {
 		{Method: "PATCH", Pattern: "/api/v1/users/{id}", Owner: true, h: a.handlePatchUser},
 		{Method: "DELETE", Pattern: "/api/v1/users/{id}", Owner: true, h: a.handleDeleteUser},
 		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/users/{id}/disable", Owner: true, h: a.handleDisableUser},
-		{Method: "POST", Pattern: "/api/v1/users/{id}/reset-password", Owner: true, h: a.handleResetPassword},
 		{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/users/{id}/quotas", Owner: true, h: a.handleGetQuotas},
 		{Method: "PUT", Pattern: "/api/v1/users/{id}/quotas", Owner: true, h: a.handleSetQuotas},
 		{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/users/{id}/sessions", Owner: true, h: a.handleListUserSessions},
@@ -477,15 +466,22 @@ func (a *API) buildFace(routes []apiRoute, guard func(http.Handler) http.Handler
 		if rt.Admin {
 			h = a.adminOnly(rt.h)
 		}
-		// Default-deny first-login lockdown (spec §B): wrap every authenticated route
+		// Default-deny setup-lockdown: wrap every authenticated route unless it
-		// unless it explicitly opts out. The wrapper is nil-principal safe, so it is
+		// explicitly opts out. The wrapper is nil-principal safe, so it is inert on
-		// inert on the internal face (service-token callers carry no Principal).
+		// the internal face (service-token callers carry no Principal).
-		if !rt.AllowDuringPasswordChange {
+		if !rt.SetupAllowed {
-			h = a.lockdownDuringPasswordChange(h)
+			h = a.requireEmailVerified(h)
 		}
 		auth.HandleFunc(pattern, h)
 	}
-	mux.Handle("/api/v1/", guard(auth))
+	guarded := guard(auth)
+	mux.Handle("/api/v1/", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if _, pattern := auth.Handler(r); pattern == "" {
+			http.NotFound(w, r)
+			return
+		}
+		guarded.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+	}))
 	return a.baseChain(mux)
 }
 
@@ -494,6 +490,25 @@ func (a *API) baseChain(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	return withRequestID(withRecover(h))
 }
 
+// requireEmailVerified fences an authenticated route behind the setup-lockdown:
+// a session whose EmailVerified is false (a freshly-onboarded principal that has
+// not yet proved control of its email) is restricted to SetupAllowed routes only.
+// The wrapper is nil-principal safe, so it is inert on the internal face
+// (service-token callers carry no Principal) and on the external face's admin
+// Zero-Trust paths (those carry an IsAdmin/IsOwner principal that has already
+// passed email verification at account creation).
+func (a *API) requireEmailVerified(h http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
+	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		p := principalFromContext(r.Context())
+		if p != nil && p.ViaSession && !p.EmailVerified {
+			writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusForbidden, "setup_required",
+				"email verification is required before this action is available"))
+			return
+		}
+		h(w, r)
+	}
+}
+
 // ---- request context plumbing ----
 
 type ctxKey int

internal/api/api_test.go

@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ type fakeRepo struct {
 	// player email OTPs (spec §B2). Keyed by row id; the verify path scans for the
 	// newest live (user, purpose) just as the PG query does.
 	otps map[string]*fakeEmailOTP
+	// op-login requests (spec §B op-login). opLogins mirrors op_login_requests keyed
+	// by id; the in-game approve/finish paths mutate status/consumed in place, and
+	// tests plant rows directly to drive the status/finish/pending-list paths.
+	opLogins map[string]*fakeOpLogin
+	// setup tokens (spec §B setup)
+	setupTokens map[string]fakeSetupToken
 	// username-collision reclaim (spec §B3). blacklist mirrors username_blacklist
 	// (mc_uuid -> barred), holds mirrors player_data_holds keyed by the held
 	// (squatter) mc_uuid — both keyed by UUID, matching the PG UNIQUE(mc_uuid)
@@ -141,6 +147,29 @@ type fakeLinkCode struct {
 	expiresAt  time.Time
 }
 
+// fakeOpLogin mirrors an op_login_requests row (spec §B op-login) at the granularity
+// the verifiable layer exercises: status ('pending'|'approved'|'denied') is the
+// projection of (approved_at, denied_at) the handler's status/finish gates read,
+// consumed mirrors consumed_at (the single-use guard), and createdAt orders the
+// pending list oldest-first (the PG ORDER BY created_at).
+type fakeOpLogin struct {
+	id        string
+	userID    string
+	email     string
+	status    string
+	consumed  bool
+	expiresAt time.Time
+	createdAt time.Time
+}
+
+// fakeSetupToken mirrors a setup_tokens row (spec §B setup): a one-time
+// lockdown-enrollment token. ConsumedAt is zero until the /setup flow redeems it.
+type fakeSetupToken struct {
+	TokenHash, UserID string
+	ExpiresAt         time.Time
+	ConsumedAt        time.Time
+}
+
 func newFakeRepo() *fakeRepo {
 	return &fakeRepo{
 		bySub: map[string]*ServerRecord{}, byName: map[string]*ServerRecord{},
@@ -156,12 +185,14 @@ func newFakeRepo() *fakeRepo {
 		sessions:          map[string]*fakeSession{},
 		settings:          map[string][]byte{},
 		otps:              map[string]*fakeEmailOTP{},
+		opLogins:          map[string]*fakeOpLogin{},
+		setupTokens:       map[string]fakeSetupToken{},
 		blacklist:         map[string]bool{},
 		holds:             map[string]fakeDataHold{},
 		passkeyCreds:      map[string]PasskeyCredential{},
 		passkeyChallenges: map[string]*fakePasskeyChallenge{},
 		fakeQuotas:        map[string]*QuotaView{},
-}
+	}
 }
 
 func (f *fakeRepo) ServerBySubdomain(_ context.Context, s string) (*ServerRecord, error) {
@@ -375,14 +406,19 @@ func (f *fakeRepo) DeleteAllPasskeyCredentialsForUser(_ context.Context, userID
 }
 
 // fakePasskeyVerifier is the hermetic PasskeyVerifier: it performs no real attestation
-// crypto, so it exercises the enrollment STATE MACHINE (challenge persistence, consume,
+// or assertion crypto, so it exercises the enrollment AND login STATE MACHINES (challenge
-// conflict, audit) without go-webauthn. BeginRegistration returns a fixed options blob
+// persistence, consume, conflict, audit, session mint) without go-webauthn.
-// and an opaque session marker; FinishRegistration returns the credential the test
+// BeginRegistration/BeginLogin return a fixed options blob and an opaque session marker;
-// preloaded, or a forced error when failErr is set (to drive the 400 path).
+// FinishRegistration returns the credential the test preloaded and FinishLogin the
+// assertion it preloaded, or a forced error when failErr is set (to drive the finish 400
+// path). beginLoginErr drives BeginLogin's own failure branch — a user with no assertable
+// credential — which the login-begin handler maps to passkey_login_failed.
 type fakePasskeyVerifier struct {
 	options       json.RawMessage
 	credential    VerifiedCredential
+	assertion     VerifiedAssertion
 	failErr       error
+	beginLoginErr error
 	// lastUser/lastSession capture what the handler passed, so a test can assert the
 	// stashed SessionData round-trips and the existing credentials reach the verifier.
 	lastUser    PasskeyUser
@@ -406,6 +442,28 @@ func (v *fakePasskeyVerifier) FinishRegistration(user PasskeyUser, sessionData [
 	}
 	return v.credential, nil
 }
+
+func (v *fakePasskeyVerifier) BeginLogin(user PasskeyUser) (json.RawMessage, []byte, error) {
+	v.lastUser = user
+	if v.beginLoginErr != nil {
+		return nil, nil, v.beginLoginErr
+	}
+	opts := v.options
+	if opts == nil {
+		opts = json.RawMessage(`{"publicKey":{"challenge":"YXNzZXJ0"}}`)
+	}
+	return opts, []byte("login-session:" + user.ID), nil
+}
+
+func (v *fakePasskeyVerifier) FinishLogin(user PasskeyUser, sessionData []byte, _ io.Reader) (VerifiedAssertion, error) {
+	v.lastUser = user
+	v.lastSession = sessionData
+	if v.failErr != nil {
+		return VerifiedAssertion{}, v.failErr
+	}
+	return v.assertion, nil
+}
+
 func (f *fakeRepo) UserInAllowlist(_ context.Context, n, u string) (bool, error) {
 	return f.allowlist[n][u], nil
 }
@@ -438,7 +496,7 @@ func (f *fakeRepo) IsUsernameBlacklisted(_ context.Context, mcUUID string) (bool
 
 // IsProtectedAdminLink mirrors PGRepo's JOIN of account_links to users: linked,
 // auth_source 'thirdparty', and the linked user an admin — no password-hash test, so
-// an SSO Operator (role='admin', empty PasswordHash) is protected like any other.
+// an SSO Operator (role='admin', with no password) is protected like any other.
 func (f *fakeRepo) IsProtectedAdminLink(_ context.Context, mcUUID string) (bool, error) {
 	userID, ok := f.links[mcUUID]
 	if !ok || f.linkAuthSource[mcUUID] != authSourceThirdParty {
@@ -569,28 +627,17 @@ func (f *fakeRepo) UserByID(_ context.Context, id string) (*StaffUser, error) {
 	}
 	return nil, ErrNotFound
 }
-func (f *fakeRepo) UpsertOwner(_ context.Context, id, username, email, passwordHash string, mustChange bool) error {
+func (f *fakeRepo) UpsertOwner(_ context.Context, id, username, email string) error {
 	// Mirror PG ON CONFLICT (username): preserve the existing id so live sessions
-	// survive a password reset.
+	// survive a re-bootstrap.
 	if existing, ok := f.staff[username]; ok {
 		id = existing.ID
 	}
 	f.staff[username] = &StaffUser{
 		ID: id, Username: username, Email: email, Role: "admin",
-		PasswordHash: passwordHash, MustChangePassword: mustChange,
 	}
 	return nil
 }
-func (f *fakeRepo) SetPassword(_ context.Context, userID, passwordHash string) error {
-	for _, u := range f.staff {
-		if u.ID == userID {
-			u.PasswordHash = passwordHash
-			u.MustChangePassword = false
-			return nil
-		}
-	}
-	return ErrNotFound
-}
 func (f *fakeRepo) CreateSession(_ context.Context, tokenHash, userID string, expiresAt time.Time) error {
 	f.sessions[tokenHash] = &fakeSession{userID: userID, expiresAt: expiresAt}
 	return nil
@@ -604,7 +651,6 @@ func (f *fakeRepo) SessionUser(_ context.Context, tokenHash string, now time.Tim
 		if u.ID == s.userID {
 			return &SessionedUser{
 				ID: u.ID, Email: u.Email, Role: u.Role,
-				MustChangePassword: u.MustChangePassword,
 			}, nil
 		}
 	}
@@ -717,7 +763,7 @@ func (f *fakeRepo) CreateUser(_ context.Context, input CreateUserInput, _ string
 	id := "test-" + input.Username
 	u := UserView{
 		ID: id, Username: input.Username, Email: input.Email,
-		Role: input.Role, MustChangePassword: input.MustChange,
+		Role:      input.Role,
 		CreatedAt: time.Now(), UpdatedAt: time.Now(),
 	}
 	d := UserDetail{UserView: u}
@@ -775,15 +821,6 @@ func (f *fakeRepo) SetUserDisabled(_ context.Context, userID string, disabled bo
 	return ErrNotFound
 }
 
-func (f *fakeRepo) AdminResetPassword(_ context.Context, userID, passwordHash string) error {
-	for _, su := range f.seededUsers {
-		if su.view.ID == userID {
-			return nil
-		}
-	}
-	return ErrNotFound
-}
-
 // ---- quota admin fakes ----
 
 func (f *fakeRepo) GetQuotas(_ context.Context, userID string) (*QuotaView, error) {
@@ -862,6 +899,152 @@ func (f *fakeRepo) LinkAccount(_ context.Context, userID, mcUUID, authSource str
 	return nil
 }
 
+// ---- op-login & setup token fakes (spec §B op-login / setup) ----
+
+// UserByEmail mirrors PGRepo.UserByEmail: only a VERIFIED address resolves (the
+// address was proven via an email OTP, not merely asserted), and the match is
+// case-insensitive so the caller may type the address in any casing — the STORED
+// casing is what the mailer and audit trail use. A non-verified or unknown address
+// is indistinguishable from no account: both yield ErrNotFound.
+func (f *fakeRepo) UserByEmail(_ context.Context, email string) (*StaffUser, error) {
+	for _, u := range f.staff {
+		if u.EmailVerified && strings.EqualFold(u.Email, email) {
+			su := *u
+			return &su, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return nil, ErrNotFound
+}
+
+// ConsumeLoginEmailOTP mirrors PGRepo.ConsumeLoginEmailOTP: it redeems the newest
+// live code for (user, purpose) WITHOUT the identity side-effect (login already
+// resolved the userID via UserByEmail, so the address is settled). It charges an
+// attempt on a hash mismatch (exactly like VerifyEmailOTP) but never writes
+// users.email or runs the verified-email guard. A missing/expired/consumed code →
+// ErrOTPInvalid; a mismatch → ErrOTPInvalid too (and costs an attempt without
+// consuming); a locked code → ErrOTPLocked; a match → consumed, nil.
+func (f *fakeRepo) ConsumeLoginEmailOTP(_ context.Context, userID, purpose, codeHash string, now time.Time) error {
+	var live *fakeEmailOTP
+	for _, o := range f.otps { // newest live (user, purpose), mirroring VerifyEmailOTP
+		if o.userID != userID || o.purpose != purpose || o.consumed {
+			continue
+		}
+		if live == nil || o.createdAt.After(live.createdAt) {
+			live = o
+		}
+	}
+	if live == nil || !live.expiresAt.After(now) {
+		return ErrOTPInvalid
+	}
+	if live.attempts >= otpMaxAttempts {
+		return ErrOTPLocked
+	}
+	if live.codeHash != codeHash {
+		live.attempts++ // a typo costs an attempt but does not consume the code
+		return ErrOTPInvalid
+	}
+	live.consumed = true
+	return nil
+}
+
+// CreateOpLoginRequest records a fresh pending op.console login attempt. status is
+// born 'pending'; createdAt orders the pending list (the PG ORDER BY created_at).
+func (f *fakeRepo) CreateOpLoginRequest(_ context.Context, id, userID, email string, expiresAt time.Time) error {
+	f.opLogins[id] = &fakeOpLogin{
+		id: id, userID: userID, email: email, status: "pending",
+		expiresAt: expiresAt, createdAt: expiresAt, // createdAt proxy: constant TTL ⇒ later expiry == later creation
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// OpLoginRequestByID loads a request by handle, projecting the fake row into the
+// OpLoginRequest the status/finish paths read (Status, Consumed, ExpiresAt). Status
+// is the (approved_at, denied_at) projection the handler gates on.
+func (f *fakeRepo) OpLoginRequestByID(_ context.Context, id string) (*OpLoginRequest, error) {
+	r, ok := f.opLogins[id]
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return &OpLoginRequest{
+		ID: r.id, UserID: r.userID, Email: r.email, ExpiresAt: r.expiresAt,
+		Status: r.status, Consumed: r.consumed,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// ConsumeOpLoginRequest stamps consumed on an unconsumed, unexpired request (the
+// finish path's single-use guard), mirroring the PG zero-rows-else UPDATE. The
+// approval gate is read by the handler BEFORE this call, so consume only checks
+// consumed_at and expiry (exactly as PG does).
+func (f *fakeRepo) ConsumeOpLoginRequest(_ context.Context, id string, now time.Time) error {
+	r, ok := f.opLogins[id]
+	if !ok || r.consumed || !r.expiresAt.After(now) {
+		return ErrNotFound
+	}
+	r.consumed = true
+	return nil
+}
+
+// ListPendingOpLogins returns the live (pending, unconsumed, unexpired) requests
+// oldest-first, mirroring the PG WHERE consumed_at IS NULL AND approved_at IS NULL
+// AND expires_at > now ORDER BY created_at. Username is joined from the staff map
+// (the in-game admin needs to name who is waiting), exactly as the repo.go contract
+// documents — ListPendingOpLogins is the ONLY path that populates Username.
+func (f *fakeRepo) ListPendingOpLogins(_ context.Context, now time.Time) ([]OpLoginRequest, error) {
+	var out []OpLoginRequest
+	for _, r := range f.opLogins {
+		if r.consumed || r.status != "pending" || !r.expiresAt.After(now) {
+			continue
+		}
+		out = append(out, OpLoginRequest{
+			ID: r.id, UserID: r.userID, Username: f.usernameFor(r.userID),
+			Email: r.email, ExpiresAt: r.expiresAt, Status: "pending", CreatedAt: r.createdAt,
+		})
+	}
+	sort.Slice(out, func(i, j int) bool {
+		if out[i].CreatedAt.Equal(out[j].CreatedAt) {
+			return out[i].ID < out[j].ID
+		}
+		return out[i].CreatedAt.Before(out[j].CreatedAt)
+	})
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// ApproveOpLogin marks a pending request approved by approverUserID, atomically: it
+// flips status to 'approved' only on a still-pending, unconsumed, unexpired row, else
+// ErrNotFound (double approve / dead request is a no-op the caller surfaces as 404).
+func (f *fakeRepo) ApproveOpLogin(_ context.Context, id, approverUserID string, now time.Time) error {
+	r, ok := f.opLogins[id]
+	if !ok || r.consumed || r.status != "pending" || !r.expiresAt.After(now) {
+		return ErrNotFound
+	}
+	r.status = "approved"
+	return nil
+}
+
+// ConsumeSetupToken atomically marks a one-time setup token consumed and returns
+// its user_id, or ErrNotFound when absent, already consumed, or expired.
+func (f *fakeRepo) ConsumeSetupToken(_ context.Context, tokenHash string, now time.Time) (string, error) {
+	tok, ok := f.setupTokens[tokenHash]
+	if !ok || !tok.ConsumedAt.IsZero() || !tok.ExpiresAt.After(now) {
+		return "", ErrNotFound
+	}
+	tok.ConsumedAt = now
+	f.setupTokens[tokenHash] = tok
+	return tok.UserID, nil
+}
+
+// usernameFor joins a userID to its staff username (the ListPendingOpLogins
+// projection the in-game admin needs to name who is waiting). "" when the user is
+// gone — mirroring a missing JOIN row.
+func (f *fakeRepo) usernameFor(userID string) string {
+	for _, u := range f.staff {
+		if u.ID == userID {
+			return u.Username
+		}
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
 // fakeRestorer records the restore it was asked to start and returns a canned
 // error, mirroring the Restorer kick-off contract. The real restore Job is
 // integration-only, so the handler is tested against this fake (spec §466).
@@ -995,6 +1178,10 @@ func do(h http.Handler, method, target, body string, headers map[string]string)
 	return w
 }
 
+var jsonHeader = map[string]string{"Content-Type": "application/json"}
+
+func ctHeader(ct string) map[string]string { return map[string]string{"Content-Type": ct} }
+
 func decodeErr(t *testing.T, w *httptest.ResponseRecorder) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	var raw map[string]map[string]string

internal/api/auth.go

@@ -21,16 +21,23 @@ type Principal struct {
 	Role string
 	// ViaAdminAccess is true only when the request arrived through an admin-graded
 	// path: the admin.* Zero-Trust hostname (Cloudflare Access, the remote face) OR
-	// a local-password session presented on the op.console host (SessionAuth, the
+	// a local session presented on the op.console host (SessionAuth, the
-	// break-glass-enabled face). Admin-tier operations require it in addition to
+	// passwordless face). Admin-tier operations require it in addition to
 	// Role=="admin" (spec §14: ZT is graded by operation). A role=admin session
 	// arriving on the player console (console.*) never sets it.
 	ViaAdminAccess bool
-	// MustChangePassword is set only on the local-password (SessionAuth) path when
+	// EmailVerified mirrors users.email_verified. The lockdown middleware gates
-	// the staff account still owes a first-login change. The JWT path leaves it
+	// setup-incomplete accounts (EmailVerified=false, e.g. a freshly bootstrapped
-	// false. The lockdown middleware fences such a principal to the change-password
+	// Owner who has not yet proven control of their mailbox) to the setup-wizard
-	// and logout surface until it is cleared.
+	// routes only, so an intercepted setup URL cannot yield full admin access
-	MustChangePassword bool
+	// before the email-OTP verification step completes.
+	EmailVerified bool
+	// ViaSession is true when the principal was authenticated via a local session
+	// cookie (SessionAuth), not a Cloudflare-Access JWT. The setup-lockdown gate
+	// only applies to session-authenticated principals — a JWT caller already
+	// passed Zero Trust at the edge, so the local-email-verification gate is not
+	// the right boundary for them.
+	ViaSession bool
 }
 
 // IsAdmin reports whether the principal may perform admin-tier operations.

internal/api/errors.go

@@ -49,6 +49,15 @@ var (
 	// never mints a session for an admin identity. It is distinct from ErrConflict so
 	// the handler answers 403 (wrong door) rather than 409 (already linked).
 	ErrPlayerBindForbidden = errors.New("bind code belongs to a staff account")
+	// ErrEmailTaken means a verified email would collide with another account's
+	// already-verified address (spec §B email-first login foundation, migration 0010).
+	// VerifyEmailOTP returns it — WITHOUT consuming the code, since the address, not
+	// the code, is the problem — when a DIFFERENT user has already proven the same
+	// address case-insensitively. It is the clean, application-level counterpart of
+	// the users_verified_email_unique index: a sequential double-verify meets this
+	// guard and gets a 409 instead of a raw unique-violation 500. Distinct from
+	// ErrConflict so the message can name the cause (the email is spoken for).
+	ErrEmailTaken = errors.New("email already verified on another account")
 )
 
 // apiError is a handler-level error carrying an HTTP status and a stable,
@@ -73,19 +82,6 @@ var (
 	errUnauthorized = newError(http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized", "authentication required")
 	errForbidden    = newError(http.StatusForbidden, "forbidden", "not permitted")
 	errBadRequest   = newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "invalid request")
-	// errInvalidCredentials is the single, deliberately vague answer to any failed
-	// local-password login (spec §B): unknown username, player row, or wrong
-	// password all collapse to it so the response never reveals which usernames
-	// carry a password. The anti-enumeration dummy-hash compare keeps the timing
-	// uniform alongside it (handlers_auth.go).
-	errInvalidCredentials = newError(http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid_credentials", "invalid username or password")
-	// errPasswordChangeRequired fences a staff principal that still owes a
-	// first-login password change to the change-password surface. The lockdown
-	// middleware returns it from every authenticated route except the opt-out set
-	// (change-password / logout / me), so a half-onboarded account cannot act until
-	// it sets its own password.
-	errPasswordChangeRequired = newError(http.StatusForbidden, "password_change_required",
-		"change your password before continuing")
 )
 
 // writeJSON writes v as an indented JSON body with the given status.

internal/api/handlers_auth.go

@@ -1,127 +1,12 @@
 package api
 
-import (
+import "net/http"
-	"net/http"
 
-	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
+// Passwordless auth handlers (spec §B). Staff (Owner/Operator) authenticate via
-)
+// email-OTP / passkey + in-game approve on op.console; players via bind code or
-
+// email-OTP on console. There is NO password login path. This file holds only the
-// Local-password auth handlers (spec §B). Owner/Operator log in to op.console with
+// logout handler — the login doors live in handlers_auth_email.go (email OTP),
-// username+password when Zero Trust is not in front of the API (the demo's primary
+// handlers_onboard.go (bind code), and the deferred passkey-login slice.
-// web login, and the always-available break-glass-enabled path). These three
-// handlers are the whole surface: log in, log out, change password. `felis
-// breakGlass` mints/resets the credentials direct-to-Postgres; the panel never
-// creates a staff account.
-
-// bcryptCost is the work factor for every password hash we write. It is read back
-// from each stored hash on compare, so raising it later re-hashes lazily on the
-// next change without invalidating existing hashes.
-const bcryptCost = bcrypt.DefaultCost
-
-// dummyPasswordHash is a real bcrypt hash, at bcryptCost, of a throwaway value. A
-// failed login (unknown username, or a player row with no password) compares the
-// supplied password against it anyway, so the response time matches a real
-// password check and cannot be used to enumerate which usernames carry a password.
-// It is computed once at init — real and same-cost, never a short-circuit — and
-// the throwaway value is never a valid credential because the surrounding logic
-// rejects any login whose user has no stored hash regardless of the compare.
-var dummyPasswordHash = mustDummyHash()
-
-func mustDummyHash() []byte {
-	h, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte("felis-anti-enumeration-placeholder"), bcryptCost)
-	if err != nil {
-		panic("bcrypt dummy hash: " + err.Error())
-	}
-	return h
-}
-
-// loginRequest is the op.console login form.
-type loginRequest struct {
-	Username string `json:"username"`
-	Password string `json:"password"`
-}
-
-// handleLogin verifies a username+password against the users row and, on success,
-// mints a server-side session cookie (spec §B). It is mounted Public — there is no
-// prior principal — but still requires local auth to be enabled, so a deployment
-// fronted entirely by Zero Trust never accepts a local password. Every failure
-// returns the same vague errInvalidCredentials after a uniform bcrypt compare.
-func (a *API) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-	if !localAuthEnabled(r.Context(), a.Repo) {
-		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusForbidden, "local_auth_disabled",
-			"local password login is disabled"))
-		return
-	}
-	// Reject a non-JSON body before decoding: this is the public, credential-minting
-	// route, so it is the cross-site-forgery surface requireJSONContentType closes.
-	if err := requireJSONContentType(r); err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	var body loginRequest
-	if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &body); err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-	if body.Username == "" || body.Password == "" {
-		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "username and password are required"))
-		return
-	}
-
-	u, err := a.Repo.UserByUsername(r.Context(), body.Username)
-	if err != nil && !errIsNotFound(err) {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Anti-enumeration: always run a bcrypt compare, even on a missing user or a
-	// player row (empty hash), against the dummy hash. The trailing guard makes the
-	// missing-hash cases fail closed even if a caller supplied the dummy's plaintext.
-	hash := dummyPasswordHash
-	if u != nil && u.PasswordHash != "" {
-		hash = []byte(u.PasswordHash)
-	}
-
-	// Bound concurrent bcrypt: this public route runs a full-cost compare on every
-	// request (the anti-enumeration dummy included), so an unbounded flood of
-	// simultaneous logins would pin every core. Take one of a fixed number of compare
-	// slots and shed the excess with a 429 rather than adding to the CPU pile. The
-	// slot guards only the hash — it is released the instant the compare returns,
-	// before the session I/O — and being a concurrency cap (not a per-username
-	// lockout) it never fences the break-glass admin out. The 429 lands before any
-	// credential distinction, so it leaks nothing about the username either.
-	release, ok := a.loginLimiter().acquire()
-	if !ok {
-		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusTooManyRequests, "auth_busy",
-			"authentication is busy; retry in a moment"))
-		return
-	}
-	matched := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword(hash, []byte(body.Password)) == nil
-	release()
-	if !matched || u == nil || u.PasswordHash == "" {
-		writeError(w, r, errInvalidCredentials)
-		return
-	}
-
-	token, err := newSessionToken()
-	if err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-	expires := a.now().Add(sessionTTL)
-	if err := a.Repo.CreateSession(r.Context(), hashCookie(token), u.ID, expires); err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-	setSessionCookie(w, token, expires)
-	a.audit(r, u.Username, "auth.login", "")
-	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
-		"user_id":              u.ID,
-		"role":                 u.Role,
-		"must_change_password": u.MustChangePassword,
-	})
-}
 
 // handleLogout revokes the presented session and clears the cookie (spec §B). It
 // is mounted Public and idempotent: it reads the cookie directly, so it works even
@@ -133,114 +18,3 @@ func (a *API) handleLogout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	clearSessionCookie(w)
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"ok": true})
 }
-
-// changePasswordRequest is the change-password form.
-type changePasswordRequest struct {
-	CurrentPassword string `json:"current_password"`
-	NewPassword     string `json:"new_password"`
-}
-
-// handleChangePassword re-verifies the caller's current password, stores a new
-// bcrypt hash, clears must_change_password, and revokes the account's OTHER
-// sessions while keeping the current one (spec §B). It is reachable while
-// must_change_password is set (AllowDuringPasswordChange) so a forced first-login
-// change can complete. The session itself authenticates the caller; re-asking the
-// current password additionally blocks a hijacked session from silently rotating
-// the credential.
-func (a *API) handleChangePassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-	p := principalFromContext(r.Context())
-
-	// Defense-in-depth: this route is already CSRF-safe (a session is required, the
-	// cookie is SameSite=Lax, and the current password is re-verified below), but the
-	// same content-type guard keeps every local-auth JSON write uniform.
-	if err := requireJSONContentType(r); err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	var body changePasswordRequest
-	if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &body); err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-	if err := validateNewPassword(body.NewPassword); err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	u, err := a.Repo.UserByID(r.Context(), p.UserID)
-	switch {
-	case errIsNotFound(err):
-		// The session resolved a moment ago but the user is gone: treat as unauthenticated.
-		writeError(w, r, errUnauthorized)
-		return
-	case err != nil:
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-	if u.PasswordHash == "" {
-		// A link-only account has no password to change — it never reaches this path
-		// in practice, but fail closed rather than set a first password here.
-		writeError(w, r, errForbidden)
-		return
-	}
-
-	if bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(u.PasswordHash), []byte(body.CurrentPassword)) != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid_credentials", "current password is incorrect"))
-		return
-	}
-	// The new password must actually differ from the current one.
-	if bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(u.PasswordHash), []byte(body.NewPassword)) == nil {
-		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "password_unchanged",
-			"new password must differ from the current one"))
-		return
-	}
-
-	newHash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(body.NewPassword), bcryptCost)
-	if err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-	if err := a.Repo.SetPassword(r.Context(), u.ID, string(newHash)); err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Log out the account's other devices, keeping the current session. The current
-	// session is identified by the cookie hash; with no cookie (no live session to
-	// keep) every session of the user is revoked, which is the safe direction.
-	keep := ""
-	if c, cerr := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName); cerr == nil {
-		keep = hashCookie(c.Value)
-	}
-	if err := a.Repo.RevokeUserSessionsExcept(r.Context(), u.ID, keep); err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Revoking sessions is not enough: a passkey needs no password, so one planted
-	// through a transiently-hijacked session would outlive the reset as a standing login
-	// foothold. A password change is a possible-compromise signal, so unbind every passkey
-	// as part of the same remediation. The user re-enrolls afterward if they want one; the
-	// email-OTP factor stays available in the meantime, so this never locks anyone out.
-	if err := a.Repo.DeleteAllPasskeyCredentialsForUser(r.Context(), u.ID); err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	a.audit(r, u.Username, "auth.password_change", "")
-	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"ok": true})
-}
-
-// validateNewPassword enforces the minimal password policy: 8–72 bytes. The upper
-// bound is bcrypt's hard limit (it errors past 72 bytes), surfaced here as a clean
-// 400 rather than an opaque 500 from GenerateFromPassword.
-func validateNewPassword(pw string) error {
-	if len(pw) < 8 {
-		return newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "weak_password", "password must be at least 8 characters")
-	}
-	if len(pw) > 72 {
-		return newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "weak_password", "password must be at most 72 bytes")
-	}
-	return nil
-}

internal/api/handlers_auth_email.go

@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// Pre-session Email-OTP LOGIN (spec §B, console.<root_domain> returning-player door).
+// This is the passwordless counterpart of handleLogin and the returning-player
+// counterpart of handleBindRedeem: an account that already proved control of an
+// email (email_verified, migration 0010) logs back in with a one-time code mailed
+// to that address — no password, no in-game Bind Code. The two halves are Public,
+// pre-session routes: the caller has no principal yet, so identity is resolved from
+// the typed email via UserByEmail, exactly as handleBindRedeem resolves it from the
+// code.
+//
+// Distinct from the authenticated /account/email/* onboarding pair in three ways,
+// all load-bearing:
+//
+//   - Purpose. Codes are minted under otpPurposeLogin ("login_email"), never
+//     otpPurposeOnboard, so a login code and an onboarding code for the same user
+//     never clobber or satisfy each other (the email_otps purpose column is exactly
+//     this separator).
+//   - No principal. The throttle cannot key off a user id (there is none yet); it
+//     keys off the typed recipient address, the same anti-bomb dimension the onboard
+//     start uses. Per-source (client-IP) aggregate limiting is deliberately NOT done
+//     here: cooldownLimiter is a one-per-window primitive, so keying it on client IP
+//     would false-positive on shared egress (CGNAT / office NAT), and behind
+//     Cloudflare RemoteAddr is the proxy anyway. The only real harm — bombing one
+//     mailbox — is already bounded per recipient; volumetric per-source limiting
+//     belongs at the edge.
+//   - Refuse staff. Like handleBindRedeem this public door provably never mints a
+//     session for an admin identity: op.console stays behind Zero Trust (and its own
+//     in-game approval gate). The refusal happens only AFTER a valid code is
+//     redeemed (see handleLoginEmailVerify), so a caller without the code cannot use
+//     it to enumerate which addresses are staff.
+//
+// Enumeration is an accepted product decision (a dedicated /auth/options oracle is a
+// sibling slice), so this pair does not go out of its way to equalise timing between
+// existing and unknown addresses — it only keeps the *verify* response uniform so a
+// code-less caller learns nothing a wrong guess would not already reveal.
+
+// otpPurposeLogin scopes a code to the pre-session email LOGIN flow, keeping it from
+// ever colliding with or satisfying an onboarding-email code (otpPurposeOnboard) for
+// the same user. VerifyEmailOTP is queried per (user, purpose), so the two flows are
+// fully independent even for one account with both a live onboarding and a live
+// login code.
+const otpPurposeLogin = "login_email"
+
+// loginEmailStartRequest is the start-login-by-email body: the address whose mailbox
+// the returning player will read the code from.
+type loginEmailStartRequest struct {
+	Email string `json:"email"`
+}
+
+// handleLoginEmailStart mints and mails a login code for a returning account (Public,
+// pre-session). It gates on local sessions being enabled — like handleLogin and
+// handleBindRedeem, minting a code toward a felis_session while SessionAuth would
+// reject that cookie is pointless — reserves the per-recipient cooldown, resolves the
+// address to an account, and (only if one exists) mints a code under otpPurposeLogin.
+// An address with no verified account yields the SAME 202 as a successful send with
+// no code minted: the response never distinguishes the two, and the reservation is
+// kept on that path too so repeated probing of one address is throttled identically
+// to repeated sends.
+func (a *API) handleLoginEmailStart(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if !localAuthEnabled(r.Context(), a.Repo) {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusForbidden, "local_auth_disabled",
+			"session login is disabled"))
+		return
+	}
+	if err := requireJSONContentType(r); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	var req loginEmailStartRequest
+	if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	email := strings.TrimSpace(req.Email)
+	if !looksLikeEmail(email) {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "a valid email is required"))
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Atomically reserve the per-recipient cooldown BEFORE any work, so a burst of
+	// truly concurrent starts yields exactly one winner and each admitted send is one
+	// real, non-idempotent email. The key is namespaced apart from the onboard door's
+	// "email:" key on purpose: this door is unauthenticated, so it must not perturb
+	// the authenticated onboarding throttle. Both caps are 1/window, so a mailbox sees
+	// at most one login code plus one onboard code per window — far below any bomb.
+	emailKey := "login:email:" + strings.ToLower(email)
+	lim := a.otpLimiter()
+	emailAt, ok := lim.reserve(emailKey, otpResendCooldown)
+	if !ok {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusTooManyRequests, "otp_resend_cooldown",
+			"a code was sent recently; wait a moment before requesting another"))
+		return
+	}
+	committed := false
+	defer func() {
+		if !committed {
+			lim.release(emailKey, emailAt)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	// Compute the expiry once so the neutral (no-account) branch and the real-send
+	// branch return byte-identical bodies.
+	expiresAt := a.now().Add(otpTTL)
+
+	u, err := a.Repo.UserByEmail(r.Context(), email)
+	switch {
+	case errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound):
+		// No verified account for this address. Return the same 202 as a real send
+		// (no code minted) and KEEP the reservation, so probing an unknown address is
+		// throttled exactly like resending to a known one — the throttle reveals
+		// nothing, and the accepted /auth/options oracle is where existence is learnt.
+		committed = true
+		writeJSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]any{"sent": true, "expires_at": expiresAt.UTC()})
+		return
+	case err != nil:
+		// A real read error is NOT a neutral outcome: leave committed false so the
+		// deferred rollback frees the window (a transient DB blip must not burn it).
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	code, err := newEmailOTP()
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	id, err := newOTPID()
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	// Mint and deliver against the account's STORED address, not the typed string:
+	// UserByEmail matched case-insensitively, and the code must reach the mailbox of
+	// record. The login redeem (ConsumeLoginEmailOTP) never reads or writes this
+	// address, so the stored casing is authoritative and the row's email snapshot is
+	// purely for the audit trail.
+	if err := a.Repo.CreateEmailOTP(r.Context(), id, u.ID, u.Email, otpCodeHash(code), otpPurposeLogin, expiresAt); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	if err := a.deliverOTP(r.Context(), u.Email, code); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	committed = true
+	a.audit(r, u.Username, "auth.login_email.otp_sent", "")
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]any{"sent": true, "expires_at": expiresAt.UTC()})
+}
+
+// loginEmailVerifyRequest is the verify body: the address and the code read from it.
+// Both are needed because there is no principal — the address selects the account,
+// the code proves control this session.
+type loginEmailVerifyRequest struct {
+	Email string `json:"email"`
+	Code  string `json:"code"`
+}
+
+// handleLoginEmailVerify redeems a login code into a session (Public, pre-session).
+// It resolves the address to an account, verifies the code under otpPurposeLogin, and
+// on success mints the same host-only felis_session as handleLogin. A missing account,
+// a wrong code, AND an attempt-exhausted (locked) code all return the IDENTICAL 400
+// invalid_code, so a code-less caller cannot tell an unknown address from a bad guess
+// or farm a lockout into an is-this-a-real-account oracle. Staff are refused — but only
+// after a valid code is redeemed, so the refusal is reachable solely by the account
+// owner and never leaks which addresses are staff.
+func (a *API) handleLoginEmailVerify(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if !localAuthEnabled(r.Context(), a.Repo) {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusForbidden, "local_auth_disabled",
+			"session login is disabled"))
+		return
+	}
+	if err := requireJSONContentType(r); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	var req loginEmailVerifyRequest
+	if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	email := strings.TrimSpace(req.Email)
+	code := strings.TrimSpace(req.Code)
+	if !looksLikeEmail(email) {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "a valid email is required"))
+		return
+	}
+	if code == "" {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "code is required"))
+		return
+	}
+
+	u, err := a.Repo.UserByEmail(r.Context(), email)
+	switch {
+	case errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound):
+		// Uniform with a wrong code: a caller probing whether an address has an account
+		// gets the same invalid_code either way. (The /auth/options oracle is the
+		// sanctioned place to learn existence; this door does not double as one.)
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_code", "email code is invalid or expired"))
+		return
+	case err != nil:
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Consume the code BEFORE the staff check. Ordering is the whole leak-safety
+	// argument: a caller without a valid code always lands in the invalid_code branch
+	// below — identical for staff and non-staff — so only the account owner, holding a
+	// live code, can ever reach the staff refusal.
+	//
+	// ConsumeLoginEmailOTP, not VerifyEmailOTP: this door only re-proves control of an
+	// already-verified address for the session, so it must NOT rewrite users.email or
+	// run the onboarding taken-check. UserByEmail already guaranteed the account is
+	// verified; touching the row here would let a stale OTP-snapshot address overwrite
+	// the live one and could 500 a correct code on a spurious collision.
+	switch err := a.Repo.ConsumeLoginEmailOTP(r.Context(), u.ID, otpPurposeLogin, otpCodeHash(code), a.now()); {
+	case errors.Is(err, ErrOTPInvalid), errors.Is(err, ErrOTPLocked):
+		// Both a wrong/expired code and an attempt-exhausted one return the SAME 400
+		// invalid_code, byte-identical to the unknown-account branch above. Surfacing
+		// otp_locked as a distinct 429 (as the authenticated onboarding door does) would
+		// turn this public door into the existence oracle its no-account branch is
+		// careful not to be: a code-less prober could mail a code to a victim address,
+		// exhaust the attempt budget, and read otp_locked as "this address has an
+		// account." Enumeration is a product decision reserved for /auth/options, not a
+		// side channel of the login verify.
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_code", "email code is invalid or expired"))
+		return
+	case err != nil:
+		// ConsumeLoginEmailOTP performs no users write, so ErrEmailTaken is structurally
+		// impossible here; anything left is a genuine fault and surfaces as a 500.
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Code redeemed. Refuse staff here — never before the verify — so op.console keeps
+	// its Zero-Trust + in-game-approval gates and this public door provably yields only
+	// a role=user player session (mirrors handleBindRedeem's refuse-staff contract).
+	if u.Role == "admin" {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusForbidden, "staff_account",
+			"that account is staff; sign in at the operator console"))
+		return
+	}
+
+	token, err := newSessionToken()
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	expires := a.now().Add(sessionTTL)
+	if err := a.Repo.CreateSession(r.Context(), hashCookie(token), u.ID, expires); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	setSessionCookie(w, token, expires)
+	a.audit(r, u.Username, "auth.login_email", "")
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
+		"user_id": u.ID,
+		"role":    u.Role,
+	})
+}

internal/api/handlers_auth_email_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,612 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// Pre-session Email-OTP LOGIN tests (spec §B, console.<root_domain> returning-player
+// door). The load-bearing properties, in the order the flow meets them:
+//
+//   - Neutrality on start: an unknown address gets a byte-identical 202 to a real
+//     send AND the same cooldown reservation, so neither the response nor the
+//     throttle is an existence oracle.
+//   - Purpose separation: login codes (otpPurposeLogin) and onboarding codes
+//     (otpPurposeOnboard) never satisfy each other, even for one account holding
+//     both live at once.
+//   - Verify uniformity: unknown address and wrong code collapse to the same
+//     invalid_code envelope, so a code-less caller learns nothing.
+//   - Staff refusal AFTER redeem: only the mailbox owner, holding a live code, can
+//     ever see the staff_account refusal — and the code is spent reaching it.
+
+// seedLoginEmailAPI wires the public email-login door: local sessions enabled and a
+// single verified player "player" (id u1) whose proven address is stored in MIXED
+// case, so the case-insensitivity contracts (resolve on typed lowercase, mint against
+// stored casing) are exercised by default. Both routes are Public — no External
+// wiring needed.
+func seedLoginEmailAPI(t *testing.T) (*API, *fakeRepo, *captureMailer) {
+	t.Helper()
+	repo := newFakeRepo()
+	repo.settings[LocalAuthEnabledKey] = []byte("true")
+	repo.staff["player"] = &StaffUser{
+		ID: "u1", Username: "player", Email: "[email protected]",
+		Role: "user", EmailVerified: true,
+	}
+	mailer := &captureMailer{}
+	api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
+	api.Mailer = mailer
+	return api, repo, mailer
+}
+
+// errEnvelope decodes the standard error body into its stable (code, message) pair —
+// request_id varies per request, so uniformity assertions compare these two fields,
+// never raw bytes.
+func errEnvelope(t *testing.T, w *httptest.ResponseRecorder) (code, msg string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	var raw map[string]map[string]string
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &raw); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("error body not JSON: %v (%s)", err, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	return raw["error"]["code"], raw["error"]["message"]
+}
+
+// TestLoginEmailVertical walks the whole returning-player slice: a typed lowercase
+// address resolves the mixed-case stored account, the code is mailed to the account's
+// STORED casing (the address of record), and redeeming it mints the same host-only
+// felis_session as the password door — single-use, audited on both halves by the
+// account's username. The redeem never rewrites users.email (login re-proves an
+// already-verified address via ConsumeLoginEmailOTP), so the stored casing is
+// untouched by definition.
+func TestLoginEmailVertical(t *testing.T) {
+	api, repo, mailer := seedLoginEmailAPI(t)
+	eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+
+	// 1) start: 202 says "sent" and when it expires — never the code itself.
+	w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+		t.Fatalf("start: code = %d, want 202 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	b := acctBody(t, w)
+	if b["sent"] != true {
+		t.Errorf("start body sent = %v, want true", b["sent"])
+	}
+	if _, leaked := b["code"]; leaked {
+		t.Error("start response must NEVER carry the code")
+	}
+	if s, _ := b["expires_at"].(string); s == "" {
+		t.Error("start must report expires_at")
+	}
+	// The mail goes to the account's STORED address, not the typed casing — the code
+	// is delivered to the mailbox of record regardless of how the player typed it.
+	if mailer.calls != 1 || mailer.email != "[email protected]" {
+		t.Fatalf("mailer: calls=%d email=%q, want 1 send to the STORED casing [email protected]",
+			mailer.calls, mailer.email)
+	}
+	code := mailer.code
+	if len(code) != otpCodeDigits {
+		t.Fatalf("delivered code %q: len = %d, want %d", code, len(code), otpCodeDigits)
+	}
+	// Exactly one row, scoped to the LOGIN purpose, holding a hash — not the digits.
+	if len(repo.otps) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("persisted codes = %d, want 1", len(repo.otps))
+	}
+	for _, o := range repo.otps {
+		if o.purpose != otpPurposeLogin {
+			t.Errorf("otp purpose = %q, want %q", o.purpose, otpPurposeLogin)
+		}
+		if o.codeHash == code {
+			t.Error("store holds the plaintext code, not its hash")
+		}
+	}
+
+	// 2) verify — typed in yet another casing, proving the verify-side resolver is
+	// case-insensitive too — mints the session.
+	w = do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/verify",
+		`{"email":"[email protected]","code":"`+code+`"}`, jsonHeader)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("verify: code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	vb := acctBody(t, w)
+	if vb["user_id"] != "u1" || vb["role"] != "user" {
+		t.Fatalf("verify body = %v, want user_id:u1 role:user", vb)
+	}
+	// The HttpOnly cookie is the whole point — same contract as handleLogin.
+	cookies := w.Result().Cookies()
+	if len(cookies) != 1 || cookies[0].Name != sessionCookieName || cookies[0].Value == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("want one non-empty %s cookie, got %v", sessionCookieName, cookies)
+	}
+	s, ok := repo.sessions[hashCookie(cookies[0].Value)]
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("no session row for the issued cookie (must be stored hashed)")
+	}
+	if s.userID != "u1" {
+		t.Errorf("session userID = %q, want u1", s.userID)
+	}
+	if want := time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0).Add(sessionTTL); !s.expiresAt.Equal(want) {
+		t.Errorf("session expiresAt = %v, want now+sessionTTL = %v", s.expiresAt, want)
+	}
+
+	// Both halves audit by the account's username (there is no principal yet).
+	if n := len(repo.audits); n != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 2 audits (otp_sent, login), got %d: %+v", n, repo.audits)
+	}
+	if repo.audits[0].Action != "auth.login_email.otp_sent" || repo.audits[0].Actor != "player" {
+		t.Errorf("first audit = %+v, want auth.login_email.otp_sent by player", repo.audits[0])
+	}
+	if repo.audits[1].Action != "auth.login_email" || repo.audits[1].Actor != "player" {
+		t.Errorf("second audit = %+v, want auth.login_email by player", repo.audits[1])
+	}
+
+	// 3) single-use: the consumed code buys nothing a second time.
+	if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/verify",
+		`{"email":"[email protected]","code":"`+code+`"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
+		t.Fatalf("replay of consumed code: code = %d body %s, want 400 invalid_code", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// TestLoginEmailStartNeutralOnUnknownAddress pins the start-side anti-enumeration
+// contract: an address with no verified account yields a 202 BYTE-IDENTICAL to a
+// real send (frozen clock ⇒ same expires_at), mints and mails nothing, audits
+// nothing — and still burns the cooldown window, so probing is throttled exactly
+// like sending.
+func TestLoginEmailStartNeutralOnUnknownAddress(t *testing.T) {
+	// A real send for comparison.
+	apiK, _, _ := seedLoginEmailAPI(t)
+	wK := do(apiK.ExternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/start",
+		`{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader)
+	if wK.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+		t.Fatalf("known-address start: code = %d (%s)", wK.Code, wK.Body.String())
+	}
+
+	// The unknown address: same 202, same bytes, nothing behind it.
+	repoU := newFakeRepo()
+	repoU.settings[LocalAuthEnabledKey] = []byte("true")
+	mailerU := &captureMailer{}
+	apiU := newTestAPI(repoU, newFakeCluster())
+	apiU.Mailer = mailerU
+	ehU := apiU.ExternalHandler()
+
+	wU := do(ehU, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader)
+	if wU.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+		t.Fatalf("unknown-address start: code = %d, want 202 (%s)", wU.Code, wU.Body.String())
+	}
+	if wU.Body.String() != wK.Body.String() {
+		t.Errorf("neutral 202 differs from a real send's:\n unknown: %s\n   known: %s",
+			wU.Body.String(), wK.Body.String())
+	}
+	if len(repoU.otps) != 0 || mailerU.calls != 0 || len(repoU.audits) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("neutral path must mint/mail/audit nothing, got otps=%d mails=%d audits=%d",
+			len(repoU.otps), mailerU.calls, len(repoU.audits))
+	}
+	// The reservation is KEPT on the neutral path: re-probing the same unknown
+	// address inside the window is throttled identically to a resend.
+	if w := do(ehU, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests || decodeErr(t, w) != "otp_resend_cooldown" {
+		t.Fatalf("re-probe of unknown address: code = %d body %s, want 429 otp_resend_cooldown",
+			w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+
+	// An UNVERIFIED account is indistinguishable from no account: UserByEmail only
+	// resolves proven addresses, so the door never mails one nobody controls.
+	repoV := newFakeRepo()
+	repoV.settings[LocalAuthEnabledKey] = []byte("true")
+	repoV.staff["u"] = &StaffUser{ID: "u9", Username: "u", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"} // EmailVerified false
+	mailerV := &captureMailer{}
+	apiV := newTestAPI(repoV, newFakeCluster())
+	apiV.Mailer = mailerV
+	if w := do(apiV.ExternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/start",
+		`{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+		t.Fatalf("unverified-address start: code = %d, want neutral 202 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if len(repoV.otps) != 0 || mailerV.calls != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("unverified address must behave as absent, got otps=%d mails=%d",
+			len(repoV.otps), mailerV.calls)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestLoginEmailGates covers the shared front doors of both halves: the fail-closed
+// local-auth toggle, the cross-site-forgery Content-Type guard (these are Public,
+// credential-minting routes — same rationale as handleLogin), and the input gates
+// that must reject before any mint or lookup.
+func TestLoginEmailGates(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("local auth disabled -> 403 on both halves", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api := newTestAPI(newFakeRepo(), newFakeCluster()) // no LocalAuthEnabledKey: fails closed
+		eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+		if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusForbidden || decodeErr(t, w) != "local_auth_disabled" {
+			t.Errorf("start: code = %d body %s, want 403 local_auth_disabled", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/verify", `{"email":"[email protected]","code":"123456"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusForbidden || decodeErr(t, w) != "local_auth_disabled" {
+			t.Errorf("verify: code = %d body %s, want 403 local_auth_disabled", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("non-JSON content type -> 415 on both halves", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, _, _ := seedLoginEmailAPI(t)
+		eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+		for _, ct := range []string{"", "text/plain", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"} {
+			if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, ctHeader(ct)); w.Code != http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType {
+				t.Errorf("start with Content-Type %q: code = %d, want 415", ct, w.Code)
+			}
+			if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/verify", `{"email":"[email protected]","code":"123456"}`, ctHeader(ct)); w.Code != http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType {
+				t.Errorf("verify with Content-Type %q: code = %d, want 415", ct, w.Code)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("start bad email -> 400, nothing minted or mailed", func(t *testing.T) {
+		bad := map[string]string{
+			"missing email": `{}`,
+			"empty email":   `{"email":""}`,
+			"no at-sign":    `{"email":"notanemail"}`,
+			"two at-signs":  `{"email":"a@[email protected]"}`,
+			"unknown field": `{"email":"[email protected]","x":1}`,
+		}
+		for name, body := range bad {
+			api, repo, mailer := seedLoginEmailAPI(t)
+			w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/start", body, jsonHeader)
+			if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+				t.Errorf("%s: code = %d, want 400 (%s)", name, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+			}
+			if len(repo.otps) != 0 || mailer.calls != 0 {
+				t.Errorf("%s: a rejected start must not mint or mail (otps=%d mails=%d)",
+					name, len(repo.otps), mailer.calls)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("verify bad inputs -> 400 bad_request", func(t *testing.T) {
+		bad := map[string]string{
+			"bad email":     `{"email":"notanemail","code":"123456"}`,
+			"empty code":    `{"email":"[email protected]","code":""}`,
+			"missing code":  `{"email":"[email protected]"}`,
+			"unknown field": `{"email":"[email protected]","code":"123456","x":1}`,
+		}
+		for name, body := range bad {
+			api, _, _ := seedLoginEmailAPI(t)
+			w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/verify", body, jsonHeader)
+			if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+				t.Errorf("%s: code = %d, want 400 (%s)", name, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// TestLoginEmailStartRateLimited closes the unauthenticated email-bomb vector on the
+// public door: one send per recipient per window, keyed case-insensitively, and
+// namespaced apart from the authenticated onboarding throttle so neither door can
+// starve the other.
+func TestLoginEmailStartRateLimited(t *testing.T) {
+	start := func(eh http.Handler, email string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+		return do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/start", `{"email":"`+email+`"}`, jsonHeader)
+	}
+
+	t.Run("same recipient is throttled, then recovers after the cooldown", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, repo, mailer := seedLoginEmailAPI(t)
+		clock := time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0)
+		api.Now = func() time.Time { return clock }
+		eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+
+		if w := start(eh, "[email protected]"); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+			t.Fatalf("first send: code = %d, want 202 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if w := start(eh, "[email protected]"); w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests || decodeErr(t, w) != "otp_resend_cooldown" {
+			t.Fatalf("immediate resend: code = %d body %s, want 429 otp_resend_cooldown", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if mailer.calls != 1 || len(repo.otps) != 1 {
+			t.Errorf("throttled resend must not mint or mail: mails=%d otps=%d, want 1/1",
+				mailer.calls, len(repo.otps))
+		}
+		clock = clock.Add(otpResendCooldown + time.Second)
+		if w := start(eh, "[email protected]"); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+			t.Fatalf("post-cooldown send: code = %d, want 202 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("throttle key is case-insensitive", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, _, _ := seedLoginEmailAPI(t)
+		eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+		if w := start(eh, "[email protected]"); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+			t.Fatalf("first send: code = %d, want 202 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		// A recased retype is the same mailbox: it must hit the same window.
+		if w := start(eh, "[email protected]"); w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
+			t.Fatalf("recased resend: code = %d, want 429 (key must be lowercased)", w.Code)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("login and onboard cooldowns are namespaced apart", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// The unauthenticated login door must not perturb the authenticated
+		// onboarding throttle for the same mailbox — distinct keys, so both doors
+		// admit one send each at the same instant.
+		api, _, mailer := seedLoginEmailAPI(t)
+		api.External = staticExternal{p: &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}}
+		eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+
+		if w := start(eh, "[email protected]"); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+			t.Fatalf("login start: code = %d, want 202 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, nil); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+			t.Fatalf("onboard start same mailbox, same instant: code = %d, want 202 — the doors must not share a throttle key (%s)",
+				w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if mailer.calls != 2 {
+			t.Errorf("mailer calls = %d, want 2 (one per door)", mailer.calls)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// TestLoginEmailVerifyRejections is the redeem-side failure matrix. The anchor case
+// is uniformity: an unknown address and a wrong code for a known address answer with
+// the same (code, message) envelope, so the verify half never doubles as an
+// existence oracle. Expired/locked rows are planted directly — the frozen clock
+// makes that the only deterministic route to those branches.
+func TestLoginEmailVerifyRejections(t *testing.T) {
+	verify := func(eh http.Handler, email, code string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+		return do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/verify",
+			`{"email":"`+email+`","code":"`+code+`"}`, jsonHeader)
+	}
+	// liveLogin plants an unconsumed LOGIN-purpose code for u1.
+	liveLogin := func(repo *fakeRepo, id, codeHash string, expiresAt time.Time, attempts int) {
+		repo.otps[id] = &fakeEmailOTP{
+			id: id, userID: "u1", email: "[email protected]", codeHash: codeHash,
+			purpose: otpPurposeLogin, attempts: attempts,
+			expiresAt: expiresAt, createdAt: expiresAt,
+		}
+	}
+
+	t.Run("unknown address is indistinguishable from a wrong code", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Known account, live code, wrong digits.
+		apiW, repoW, _ := seedLoginEmailAPI(t)
+		liveLogin(repoW, "lg", otpCodeHash("123456"), time.Unix(1_700_000_600, 0), 0)
+		wWrong := verify(apiW.ExternalHandler(), "[email protected]", "654321")
+		// No account at all.
+		apiU, _, _ := seedLoginEmailAPI(t)
+		wGhost := verify(apiU.ExternalHandler(), "[email protected]", "654321")
+
+		if wWrong.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || wGhost.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+			t.Fatalf("codes = %d/%d, want 400/400", wWrong.Code, wGhost.Code)
+		}
+		wc, wm := errEnvelope(t, wWrong)
+		gc, gm := errEnvelope(t, wGhost)
+		if wc != "invalid_code" || wc != gc || wm != gm {
+			t.Errorf("envelopes differ: known=(%s,%q) unknown=(%s,%q) — must be identical", wc, wm, gc, gm)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("known address, no live code -> 400 invalid_code", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, repo, _ := seedLoginEmailAPI(t)
+		w := verify(api.ExternalHandler(), "[email protected]", "123456")
+		if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
+			t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if len(repo.sessions) != 0 {
+			t.Error("no session may be minted on a failed verify")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("wrong code charges an attempt, does not consume", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, repo, _ := seedLoginEmailAPI(t)
+		liveLogin(repo, "wr", otpCodeHash("123456"), time.Unix(1_700_000_600, 0), 0)
+		w := verify(api.ExternalHandler(), "[email protected]", "654321")
+		if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
+			t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if repo.otps["wr"].attempts != 1 || repo.otps["wr"].consumed {
+			t.Errorf("attempts=%d consumed=%v, want 1/false", repo.otps["wr"].attempts, repo.otps["wr"].consumed)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("expired code -> 400 invalid_code", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, repo, _ := seedLoginEmailAPI(t)
+		// One second before the frozen clock (time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0)).
+		liveLogin(repo, "ex", otpCodeHash("123456"), time.Unix(1_699_999_999, 0), 0)
+		w := verify(api.ExternalHandler(), "[email protected]", "123456")
+		if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
+			t.Fatalf("code = %d body %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("exhausted code is invisible: same invalid_code as a wrong code, no locked oracle", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// A locked row (attempts == cap) must NOT surface as a distinct 429 otp_locked
+		// on this public, pre-session door: that status would be an existence oracle —
+		// a code-less prober could mail a victim address a code, burn its attempt budget,
+		// and read otp_locked as "this address has an account." It collapses to the SAME
+		// 400 invalid_code a wrong code returns, byte-for-byte. (The authenticated
+		// onboarding door keeps otp_locked as actionable feedback; this one cannot.)
+		api, repo, _ := seedLoginEmailAPI(t)
+		liveLogin(repo, "lk", otpCodeHash("123456"), time.Unix(1_700_000_600, 0), otpMaxAttempts)
+		wLocked := verify(api.ExternalHandler(), "[email protected]", "123456") // correct digits, but exhausted
+
+		// A plain wrong code on a fresh known account, for the byte-for-byte comparison.
+		apiW, repoW, _ := seedLoginEmailAPI(t)
+		liveLogin(repoW, "wr", otpCodeHash("123456"), time.Unix(1_700_000_600, 0), 0)
+		wWrong := verify(apiW.ExternalHandler(), "[email protected]", "654321")
+
+		if wLocked.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+			t.Fatalf("exhausted code: code = %d body %s, want 400 invalid_code (NOT 429 otp_locked)",
+				wLocked.Code, wLocked.Body.String())
+		}
+		lc, lm := errEnvelope(t, wLocked)
+		wc, wm := errEnvelope(t, wWrong)
+		if lc != "invalid_code" || lc != wc || lm != wm {
+			t.Errorf("locked envelope must be identical to a wrong code's: locked=(%s,%q) wrong=(%s,%q)",
+				lc, lm, wc, wm)
+		}
+		if len(repo.sessions) != 0 {
+			t.Error("no session may be minted from a locked code")
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// TestLoginEmailPurposeSeparation proves the email_otps purpose column does its one
+// job in both directions: a live ONBOARDING code cannot open the login door, a live
+// LOGIN code cannot satisfy onboarding verify. Two complementary properties fall out
+// and both are pinned: the OTHER flow's row is never consumed or charged (the
+// per-purpose query never sees it), while the door's OWN live code IS charged one
+// attempt — cross-door digits are just a wrong guess, never a free brute-force try.
+func TestLoginEmailPurposeSeparation(t *testing.T) {
+	api, repo, _ := seedLoginEmailAPI(t)
+	api.External = staticExternal{p: &Principal{UserID: "u1", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user"}}
+	eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+
+	// Both purposes live at once for u1, distinct digits.
+	repo.otps["ob"] = &fakeEmailOTP{
+		id: "ob", userID: "u1", email: "[email protected]", codeHash: otpCodeHash("111111"),
+		purpose: otpPurposeOnboard, expiresAt: time.Unix(1_700_000_600, 0), createdAt: time.Unix(1_700_000_600, 0),
+	}
+	repo.otps["lg"] = &fakeEmailOTP{
+		id: "lg", userID: "u1", email: "[email protected]", codeHash: otpCodeHash("222222"),
+		purpose: otpPurposeLogin, expiresAt: time.Unix(1_700_000_600, 0), createdAt: time.Unix(1_700_000_600, 0),
+	}
+
+	// Onboarding code at the LOGIN door: refused. The onboard row is untouched (the
+	// login-purpose query never saw it); the LIVE LOGIN code is charged one attempt —
+	// to the login door these are simply wrong digits.
+	w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/verify",
+		`{"email":"[email protected]","code":"111111"}`, jsonHeader)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
+		t.Fatalf("onboard code at login door: code = %d body %s, want 400 invalid_code", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if o := repo.otps["ob"]; o.consumed || o.attempts != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("onboard row must be untouched by a login verify: consumed=%v attempts=%d", o.consumed, o.attempts)
+	}
+	if o := repo.otps["lg"]; o.consumed || o.attempts != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("cross-door digits must cost the login code one attempt (never a free guess): consumed=%v attempts=%d",
+			o.consumed, o.attempts)
+	}
+	if len(repo.sessions) != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("a cross-purpose code must never mint a session")
+	}
+
+	// Login code at the ONBOARDING door: refused symmetrically — the login row is not
+	// consumed and not charged further (the onboard-purpose query never saw it; its
+	// one attempt above stands), while the onboard code eats the wrong guess...
+	w = do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/account/email/verify", `{"code":"222222"}`, nil)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
+		t.Fatalf("login code at onboard door: code = %d body %s, want 400 invalid_code", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if o := repo.otps["lg"]; o.consumed || o.attempts != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("login row must not be consumed or re-charged by an onboard verify: consumed=%v attempts=%d",
+			o.consumed, o.attempts)
+	}
+	if o := repo.otps["ob"]; o.consumed || o.attempts != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("cross-door digits must cost the onboard code one attempt: consumed=%v attempts=%d",
+			o.consumed, o.attempts)
+	}
+	// ...and the login code is still redeemable at its own door afterwards.
+	w = do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/verify",
+		`{"email":"[email protected]","code":"222222"}`, jsonHeader)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("login code at its own door after the cross attempts: code = %d, want 200 (%s)",
+			w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// TestLoginEmailVerifyRefusesStaff pins the staff refusal AND its ordering. The
+// public door provably never mints a session for role=admin (op.console keeps its
+// Zero-Trust gate) — but the refusal must be reachable only by the mailbox owner:
+// a wrong code for a staff address answers the same invalid_code as for anyone, and
+// the 403 costs the valid code (verify-then-refuse), so it cannot be farmed as an
+// is-this-address-staff oracle.
+func TestLoginEmailVerifyRefusesStaff(t *testing.T) {
+	repo := newFakeRepo()
+	repo.settings[LocalAuthEnabledKey] = []byte("true")
+	repo.staff["owner"] = &StaffUser{
+		ID: "a1", Username: "owner", Email: "[email protected]",
+		Role: "admin", EmailVerified: true,
+	}
+	mailer := &captureMailer{}
+	api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
+	api.Mailer = mailer
+	eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+
+	// Start happily mails a staff address — the refusal lives at verify, after the
+	// code proves mailbox control, so start stays neutral.
+	if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+		t.Fatalf("start for staff address: code = %d, want 202 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	good := mailer.code
+	if good == "000000" {
+		t.Skip("astronomically unlucky code collision; rerun")
+	}
+
+	// Without the code, staffness is invisible: plain invalid_code.
+	if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/verify",
+		`{"email":"[email protected]","code":"000000"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
+		t.Fatalf("wrong code for staff: code = %d body %s, want 400 invalid_code", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+
+	// With the code: 403 staff_account — and no cookie, no session row, no success audit.
+	w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/verify",
+		`{"email":"[email protected]","code":"`+good+`"}`, jsonHeader)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden || decodeErr(t, w) != "staff_account" {
+		t.Fatalf("valid code for staff: code = %d body %s, want 403 staff_account", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if len(w.Result().Cookies()) != 0 {
+		t.Error("no session cookie may be set for a refused staff login")
+	}
+	if len(repo.sessions) != 0 {
+		t.Error("no session row may be minted for a refused staff login")
+	}
+	for _, a := range repo.audits {
+		if a.Action == "auth.login_email" {
+			t.Error("a refused staff login must not be audited as a successful login")
+		}
+	}
+	// Ordering pin: the refusal consumed the code (verify ran BEFORE the staff
+	// check), so replaying it now collapses to invalid_code.
+	if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/verify",
+		`{"email":"[email protected]","code":"`+good+`"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "invalid_code" {
+		t.Fatalf("replay after staff refusal: code = %d body %s, want 400 invalid_code (code must be spent)",
+			w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// TestLoginEmailFaceSeparation enforces that both halves are web-only: the internal
+// (service-token) face must 404 them, never serve them.
+func TestLoginEmailFaceSeparation(t *testing.T) {
+	api, _, _ := seedLoginEmailAPI(t)
+	ih := api.InternalHandler()
+	if w := do(ih, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("start on internal face: code = %d, want 404", w.Code)
+	}
+	if w := do(ih, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/verify", `{"email":"[email protected]","code":"123456"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("verify on internal face: code = %d, want 404", w.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestLoginEmailStartFailedDeliveryReleasesCooldown covers the reserve→rollback
+// path on the login door: a send that reserves the window but fails to deliver must
+// release it, so the immediate retry is admitted instead of 429'd — a transient SMTP
+// blip must not lock a returning player out for the whole window. The failure is
+// also not audited as a send.
+func TestLoginEmailStartFailedDeliveryReleasesCooldown(t *testing.T) {
+	repo := newFakeRepo()
+	repo.settings[LocalAuthEnabledKey] = []byte("true")
+	repo.staff["player"] = &StaffUser{
+		ID: "u1", Username: "player", Email: "[email protected]",
+		Role: "user", EmailVerified: true,
+	}
+	mailer := &flakyMailer{}
+	api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster()) // frozen clock: both attempts share one window
+	api.Mailer = mailer
+	eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+
+	if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code < 500 {
+		t.Fatalf("first send (mailer fails): code = %d, want 5xx (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	for _, a := range repo.audits {
+		if a.Action == "auth.login_email.otp_sent" {
+			t.Error("a failed delivery must not be audited as otp_sent")
+		}
+	}
+	if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/email/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+		t.Fatalf("retry after failed delivery: code = %d, want 202 (the failed send must release the cooldown) (%s)",
+			w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if mailer.calls != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("mailer calls = %d, want 2 (one failed, one delivered)", mailer.calls)
+	}
+}

internal/api/handlers_auth_options.go

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// Pre-session identifier-first discovery (spec §B, #71). Given a typed email, this
+// Public door reports which console login methods the account can use, so the SPA's
+// identifier-first form can prompt for the right authenticator (a passkey assertion,
+// or "we'll email you a code") instead of guessing.
+//
+// It is the deliberate counter-slice to the anti-enumeration login doors
+// (handlers_auth_email.go, handlers_passkey.go): those refuse to disclose whether an
+// address has an account precisely because THIS endpoint is the one sanctioned place
+// existence is revealed. An empty methods array means "no (verified) account". That
+// makes it a mass-enumeration surface by design — an accepted product decision, the
+// same one the email door's header records. It is bounded only at the edge: the
+// handler sends no mail and mutates nothing, so a per-recipient cooldown would merely
+// block a legitimate retry, and per-source (client-IP) limiting is the edge's job
+// (behind Cloudflare RemoteAddr is the proxy, and CGNAT would false-positive) — see
+// the handlers_auth_email.go header for the same reasoning.
+//
+// It never reveals STAFFNESS. Methods are computed by the SAME rule for every resolved
+// account — no role branch, no operator hint — so a staff email and a player email in
+// the same credential state return byte-identical bodies. The console doors' own
+// post-redemption staff refusal is not previewed here: a staff caller is told
+// email_otp is available and is turned away only later, at op.console's Zero-Trust
+// gate. Staffness is thus invisible by construction, with no side channel to regress.
+type authOptionsRequest struct {
+	Email string `json:"email"`
+}
+
+// handleAuthOptions resolves the typed email and returns the console login methods it
+// can use. Public, pre-session, gated on local_auth_enabled like its sibling doors.
+func (a *API) handleAuthOptions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if !localAuthEnabled(r.Context(), a.Repo) {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusForbidden, "local_auth_disabled",
+			"session login is disabled"))
+		return
+	}
+	if err := requireJSONContentType(r); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	var req authOptionsRequest
+	if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	email := strings.TrimSpace(req.Email)
+	if !looksLikeEmail(email) {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "a valid email is required"))
+		return
+	}
+
+	// methods is initialised non-nil so the no-account branch marshals as [] (not null).
+	methods := []string{}
+
+	u, err := a.Repo.UserByEmail(r.Context(), email)
+	switch {
+	case errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound):
+		// The sanctioned existence oracle: an unknown (or not-yet-verified) address is
+		// not disguised — it honestly reports no methods.
+		writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"methods": methods})
+		return
+	case err != nil:
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Compute methods identically for EVERY resolved account. There is deliberately no
+	// branch on u.Role: a staff address must be indistinguishable from a player address
+	// in the same credential state, so the response carries nothing account-identifying.
+	//
+	// Advertise passkey only when a verifier is actually wired: both login halves 503
+	// passkey_unavailable when a.Passkey is nil regardless of enrolled credentials, so
+	// options must not offer a method the finish door would immediately reject.
+	if a.Passkey != nil {
+		creds, err := a.Repo.PasskeyCredentialsForUser(r.Context(), u.ID)
+		if err != nil {
+			writeError(w, r, err)
+			return
+		}
+		if len(creds) > 0 {
+			methods = append(methods, "passkey")
+		}
+	}
+	// Email-OTP login works for any resolved verified account (UserByEmail resolves only
+	// email_verified rows), so it is always on offer.
+	methods = append(methods, "email_otp")
+
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"methods": methods})
+}

internal/api/handlers_auth_options_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"reflect"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// Pre-session identifier-first discovery tests (spec §B, #71). Load-bearing properties:
+//
+//   - Methods reflect real state: email_otp for any resolved verified account, plus
+//     passkey when a verifier is wired AND the account has >=1 enrolled credential.
+//   - Existence IS disclosed: an unknown address returns an empty methods array. This
+//     endpoint is the deliberate, sanctioned counter-slice to the anti-enumeration
+//     login doors, so it does not disguise non-existence.
+//   - Staffness is NOT disclosed: a staff email and a player email in the same
+//     credential state return BYTE-IDENTICAL bodies — the highest-value guard, because a
+//     role branch here would out which addresses are operators.
+//   - passkey is gated on a wired verifier: options never advertises a method the finish
+//     door would immediately 503.
+
+// seedAuthOptionsAPI wires the discovery door: local sessions enabled, a verified player
+// (u1) and a verified staff account (a1), and a passkey verifier wired by default.
+// Callers seed passkey credentials per-test to set the credential state.
+func seedAuthOptionsAPI(t *testing.T) (*API, *fakeRepo) {
+	t.Helper()
+	repo := newFakeRepo()
+	repo.settings[LocalAuthEnabledKey] = []byte("true")
+	repo.staff["player"] = &StaffUser{ID: "u1", Username: "player", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user", EmailVerified: true}
+	repo.staff["boss"] = &StaffUser{ID: "a1", Username: "boss", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "admin", EmailVerified: true}
+	api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
+	api.Passkey = &fakePasskeyVerifier{}
+	return api, repo
+}
+
+const authOptionsPath = "/api/v1/auth/options"
+
+// optionsMethods pulls the methods array out of a 200 body as []string.
+func optionsMethods(t *testing.T, w *httptest.ResponseRecorder) []string {
+	t.Helper()
+	raw, ok := acctBody(t, w)["methods"].([]any)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("body has no methods array: %s", w.Body.String())
+	}
+	out := make([]string, len(raw))
+	for i, m := range raw {
+		out[i], _ = m.(string)
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func TestAuthOptionsMethodsByState(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("account with no passkey -> email_otp only", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, _ := seedAuthOptionsAPI(t)
+		w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", authOptionsPath, `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader)
+		if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if got := optionsMethods(t, w); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []string{"email_otp"}) {
+			t.Errorf("methods = %v, want [email_otp]", got)
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("account with a passkey (verifier wired) -> passkey + email_otp", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, repo := seedAuthOptionsAPI(t)
+		repo.passkeyCreds["row1"] = PasskeyCredential{ID: "row1", UserID: "u1", CredentialID: "cred-1", PublicKey: "k", CreatedAt: frozenNow}
+		w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", authOptionsPath, `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader)
+		if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		// Deterministic order (passkey before email_otp) so clients and this assertion
+		// can compare without sorting.
+		if got := optionsMethods(t, w); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []string{"passkey", "email_otp"}) {
+			t.Errorf("methods = %v, want [passkey email_otp]", got)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// TestAuthOptionsUnknownEmail pins the sanctioned-oracle contract: an address with no
+// verified account is not disguised — it returns an explicit empty array (not null), so
+// the client can trust "no methods" as "no account".
+func TestAuthOptionsUnknownEmail(t *testing.T) {
+	api, _ := seedAuthOptionsAPI(t)
+	w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", authOptionsPath, `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if got := optionsMethods(t, w); len(got) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("methods = %v, want []", got)
+	}
+	if body := w.Body.String(); !strings.Contains(body, `"methods":[]`) {
+		t.Errorf("unknown-email body = %s, want an explicit \"methods\":[] (not null)", body)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAuthOptionsDoesNotRevealStaffness is the security anchor. For each credential
+// state, a staff address and a player address in the SAME state must return
+// byte-identical bodies. A role branch in the handler — even one that only reordered or
+// relabelled — would out which addresses are operators; this is the guard that such a
+// branch can never be introduced without a red test.
+func TestAuthOptionsDoesNotRevealStaffness(t *testing.T) {
+	states := []struct {
+		name        string
+		withPasskey bool
+	}{
+		{"neither has a passkey", false},
+		{"both have a passkey", true},
+	}
+	for _, st := range states {
+		t.Run(st.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			api, repo := seedAuthOptionsAPI(t)
+			if st.withPasskey {
+				repo.passkeyCreds["p"] = PasskeyCredential{ID: "p", UserID: "u1", CredentialID: "c-u1", PublicKey: "k", CreatedAt: frozenNow}
+				repo.passkeyCreds["a"] = PasskeyCredential{ID: "a", UserID: "a1", CredentialID: "c-a1", PublicKey: "k", CreatedAt: frozenNow}
+			}
+			eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+			wPlayer := do(eh, "POST", authOptionsPath, `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader)
+			wStaff := do(eh, "POST", authOptionsPath, `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader)
+			if wPlayer.Code != http.StatusOK || wStaff.Code != http.StatusOK {
+				t.Fatalf("codes = %d/%d, want 200/200", wPlayer.Code, wStaff.Code)
+			}
+			if wPlayer.Body.String() != wStaff.Body.String() {
+				t.Errorf("staff/player bodies differ — options reveals staffness:\n player: %s\n staff:  %s",
+					wPlayer.Body.String(), wStaff.Body.String())
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAuthOptionsPasskeyRequiresWiredVerifier: the account HAS an enrolled passkey, but
+// no verifier is wired (a.Passkey == nil). Both login halves 503 passkey_unavailable in
+// that state, so options must NOT advertise passkey — it would be a dead offer.
+func TestAuthOptionsPasskeyRequiresWiredVerifier(t *testing.T) {
+	api, repo := seedAuthOptionsAPI(t)
+	repo.passkeyCreds["row1"] = PasskeyCredential{ID: "row1", UserID: "u1", CredentialID: "cred-1", PublicKey: "k", CreatedAt: frozenNow}
+	api.Passkey = nil
+	w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", authOptionsPath, `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if got := optionsMethods(t, w); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []string{"email_otp"}) {
+		t.Errorf("methods = %v, want [email_otp] (passkey must not be offered without a wired verifier)", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuthOptionsGates(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("local auth disabled -> 403", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api := newTestAPI(newFakeRepo(), newFakeCluster()) // no LocalAuthEnabledKey: fails closed
+		api.Passkey = &fakePasskeyVerifier{}
+		w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", authOptionsPath, `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader)
+		if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden || decodeErr(t, w) != "local_auth_disabled" {
+			t.Errorf("code = %d body %s, want 403 local_auth_disabled", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("non-JSON content type -> 415", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, _ := seedAuthOptionsAPI(t)
+		eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+		for _, ct := range []string{"", "text/plain", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"} {
+			if w := do(eh, "POST", authOptionsPath, `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, ctHeader(ct)); w.Code != http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType {
+				t.Errorf("Content-Type %q: code = %d, want 415", ct, w.Code)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("bad or unknown-field body -> 400", func(t *testing.T) {
+		bad := map[string]string{
+			"missing email": `{}`,
+			"empty email":   `{"email":""}`,
+			"no at-sign":    `{"email":"notanemail"}`,
+			"unknown field": `{"email":"[email protected]","x":1}`,
+		}
+		api, _ := seedAuthOptionsAPI(t)
+		eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+		for name, body := range bad {
+			if w := do(eh, "POST", authOptionsPath, body, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+				t.Errorf("%s: code = %d, want 400 (%s)", name, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// TestAuthOptionsFaceSeparation: the route is external-only (registered in
+// externalAPIRoutes), so the internal face must 404 it.
+func TestAuthOptionsFaceSeparation(t *testing.T) {
+	api, _ := seedAuthOptionsAPI(t)
+	ih := api.InternalHandler()
+	if w := do(ih, "POST", authOptionsPath, `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("options on internal face: code = %d, want 404 (it is external-only)", w.Code)
+	}
+}

internal/api/handlers_auth_test.go

@@ -1,321 +0,0 @@
-package api
-
-import (
-	"encoding/json"
-	"net/http"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
-)
-
-// Local-password auth handler tests (spec §B). These exercise the three-route
-// surface — login, logout, change-password — against the in-memory fakeRepo, which
-// mirrors the PG fail-closed contract. The load-bearing cases are the anti-
-// enumeration uniformity (an unknown user and a wrong password are indistinguishable)
-// and the requireJSONContentType guard that closes the cross-site login-forgery
-// vector: a forged HTML-form POST cannot set application/json, so it is rejected
-// before any credential check.
-
-// seedAuthAPI returns an API whose repo has local auth enabled and a single admin
-// "owner" (id u1) whose password is the given plaintext. Login is Public, so these
-// tests need no External wiring.
-func seedAuthAPI(t *testing.T, password string, mustChange bool) (*API, *fakeRepo) {
-	t.Helper()
-	repo := newFakeRepo()
-	repo.settings[LocalAuthEnabledKey] = []byte("true")
-	hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), bcryptCost)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("hash seed password: %v", err)
-	}
-	repo.staff["owner"] = &StaffUser{
-		ID: "u1", Username: "owner", Email: "owner@" + testRoot,
-		Role: "admin", PasswordHash: string(hash), MustChangePassword: mustChange,
-	}
-	return newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster()), repo
-}
-
-// seedAuthedAPI extends seedAuthAPI with an injected session principal so the
-// authenticated change-password route resolves a caller. change-password opts out of
-// the first-login lockdown (AllowDuringPasswordChange), so a must-change principal
-// still reaches the handler.
-func seedAuthedAPI(t *testing.T, password string, mustChange bool) (*API, *fakeRepo) {
-	t.Helper()
-	api, repo := seedAuthAPI(t, password, mustChange)
-	api.External = staticExternal{p: &Principal{
-		UserID: "u1", Email: "owner@" + testRoot, Role: "admin", MustChangePassword: mustChange,
-	}}
-	return api, repo
-}
-
-// ctHeader builds a headers map carrying the given Content-Type, or nil for the
-// absent-header case (do() then sets no Content-Type at all).
-func ctHeader(ct string) map[string]string {
-	if ct == "" {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return map[string]string{"Content-Type": ct}
-}
-
-var jsonHeader = map[string]string{"Content-Type": "application/json"}
-
-func TestHandleLoginSuccess(t *testing.T) {
-	api, _ := seedAuthAPI(t, "correct-horse-battery", true)
-	w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/auth/login",
-		`{"username":"owner","password":"correct-horse-battery"}`, jsonHeader)
-	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
-		t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
-	}
-
-	// The HttpOnly session cookie is the login's whole point — the panel never reads
-	// it, the browser just carries it back.
-	cookies := w.Result().Cookies()
-	if len(cookies) != 1 || cookies[0].Name != sessionCookieName || cookies[0].Value == "" {
-		t.Fatalf("want one non-empty %s cookie, got %v", sessionCookieName, cookies)
-	}
-	if !cookies[0].HttpOnly {
-		t.Fatalf("session cookie must be HttpOnly")
-	}
-
-	var got map[string]any
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &got); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("body not JSON: %v (%s)", err, w.Body.String())
-	}
-	if got["user_id"] != "u1" || got["role"] != "admin" || got["must_change_password"] != true {
-		t.Fatalf("got %v, want user_id=u1 role=admin must_change_password=true", got)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestHandleLoginContentTypeGuard pins the confirmed login-CSRF fix: a body whose
-// Content-Type is anything an HTML form (or a default cross-site fetch) can emit is
-// rejected 415 BEFORE the credential check, so a forged off-origin login never even
-// reaches bcrypt. Local auth is enabled and the credentials are valid here, proving
-// the rejection is the content-type, not a bad password.
-func TestHandleLoginContentTypeGuard(t *testing.T) {
-	api, _ := seedAuthAPI(t, "correct-horse-battery", false)
-	h := api.ExternalHandler()
-	body := `{"username":"owner","password":"correct-horse-battery"}`
-
-	for _, ct := range []string{
-		"application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-		"multipart/form-data; boundary=x",
-		"text/plain;charset=UTF-8",
-		"", // header absent entirely
-	} {
-		w := do(h, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/login", body, ctHeader(ct))
-		if w.Code != http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType {
-			t.Fatalf("Content-Type %q: code = %d, want 415", ct, w.Code)
-		}
-		if code := decodeErr(t, w); code != "unsupported_media_type" {
-			t.Fatalf("Content-Type %q: error code = %q, want unsupported_media_type", ct, code)
-		}
-		if len(w.Result().Cookies()) != 0 {
-			t.Fatalf("Content-Type %q: no session cookie may be set on a rejected login", ct)
-		}
-	}
-
-	// A JSON content-type with a charset parameter is still JSON and must pass.
-	if w := do(h, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/login", body,
-		map[string]string{"Content-Type": "application/json; charset=utf-8"}); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
-		t.Fatalf("application/json; charset=utf-8: code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
-	}
-}
-
-// TestHandleLoginConcurrencyCap pins the audit-hardening bound on the public login
-// route: bcrypt is CPU-costly and runs on every request (the anti-enumeration dummy
-// included), so at most MaxConcurrentLogins compares may be in flight at once and the
-// excess is shed with a 429 rather than piling more onto every core. Holding the sole
-// slot makes the next login — with otherwise-valid credentials — return 429 auth_busy
-// with no cookie BEFORE any credential check; releasing it lets the identical request
-// succeed, proving the 429 was the cap, not the password. A concurrency cap, not a
-// per-account lockout: the same account gets in the moment the burst clears.
-func TestHandleLoginConcurrencyCap(t *testing.T) {
-	api, _ := seedAuthAPI(t, "correct-horse-battery", false)
-	api.MaxConcurrentLogins = 1
-	h := api.ExternalHandler()
-	body := `{"username":"owner","password":"correct-horse-battery"}`
-
-	// Occupy the one compare slot so the handler finds the cap full. loginLimiter is
-	// lazily built from MaxConcurrentLogins (set just above), so this and the handler
-	// share the same one-token limiter.
-	release, ok := api.loginLimiter().acquire()
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatal("could not acquire the sole login slot in test setup")
-	}
-	w := do(h, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/login", body, jsonHeader)
-	if w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
-		t.Fatalf("with the slot held: code = %d, want 429 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
-	}
-	if code := decodeErr(t, w); code != "auth_busy" {
-		t.Fatalf("error code = %q, want auth_busy", code)
-	}
-	if len(w.Result().Cookies()) != 0 {
-		t.Fatal("no session cookie may be set on a shed login")
-	}
-
-	// Release the slot: the identical request now runs the compare and succeeds.
-	release()
-	if w := do(h, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/login", body, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
-		t.Fatalf("after releasing the slot: code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
-	}
-}
-
-// TestHandleLoginInvalidCredentials proves the anti-enumeration uniformity: a wrong
-// password and an unknown username return the SAME 401 invalid_credentials with no
-// cookie, so a caller cannot learn which usernames carry a password.
-func TestHandleLoginInvalidCredentials(t *testing.T) {
-	api, _ := seedAuthAPI(t, "correct-horse-battery", false)
-	h := api.ExternalHandler()
-
-	for _, tc := range []struct{ name, body string }{
-		{"wrong password", `{"username":"owner","password":"wrong"}`},
-		{"unknown user", `{"username":"ghost","password":"whatever"}`},
-	} {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			w := do(h, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/login", tc.body, jsonHeader)
-			if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
-				t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 401 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
-			}
-			if code := decodeErr(t, w); code != "invalid_credentials" {
-				t.Fatalf("error code = %q, want invalid_credentials", code)
-			}
-			if len(w.Result().Cookies()) != 0 {
-				t.Fatalf("no session cookie may be set on a failed login")
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestHandleLoginLocalAuthDisabled proves a deployment with no local_auth_enabled
-// setting refuses every local login (403), so a Zero-Trust-only console never
-// accepts a password.
-func TestHandleLoginLocalAuthDisabled(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newFakeRepo() // local_auth_enabled never set → fail closed
-	api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
-	w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/auth/login",
-		`{"username":"owner","password":"x"}`, jsonHeader)
-	if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
-		t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 403 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
-	}
-	if code := decodeErr(t, w); code != "local_auth_disabled" {
-		t.Fatalf("error code = %q, want local_auth_disabled", code)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestHandleLoginMissingFields(t *testing.T) {
-	api, _ := seedAuthAPI(t, "correct-horse-battery", false)
-	w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/auth/login",
-		`{"username":"","password":""}`, jsonHeader)
-	if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
-		t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 400 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
-	}
-}
-
-// TestHandleLogout is idempotent: it clears the cookie and returns 200 even with no
-// live session, and revokes the presented one when there is.
-func TestHandleLogout(t *testing.T) {
-	api, repo := seedAuthAPI(t, "correct-horse-battery", false)
-	h := api.ExternalHandler()
-
-	// No cookie: still 200, still clears.
-	if w := do(h, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/logout", "", nil); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
-		t.Fatalf("logout without session: code = %d, want 200", w.Code)
-	}
-
-	// With a live session cookie: the matching session is revoked.
-	token, err := newSessionToken()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("token: %v", err)
-	}
-	repo.sessions[hashCookie(token)] = &fakeSession{userID: "u1", expiresAt: api.now().Add(time.Hour)}
-	w := do(h, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/logout", "",
-		map[string]string{"Cookie": sessionCookieName + "=" + token})
-	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
-		t.Fatalf("logout with session: code = %d, want 200", w.Code)
-	}
-	if !repo.sessions[hashCookie(token)].revoked {
-		t.Fatalf("presented session should be revoked")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestHandleChangePasswordSuccess(t *testing.T) {
-	api, repo := seedAuthedAPI(t, "old-password", true)
-	// A second live session for u1: the change must revoke it. This request carries
-	// no felis_session cookie, so keep="" and every session of u1 is revoked — the
-	// safe direction the handler documents.
-	repo.sessions["other-device"] = &fakeSession{userID: "u1", expiresAt: api.now().Add(time.Hour)}
-	// A bound passkey for u1: the change must unbind it too. A passkey planted through a
-	// hijacked session needs no password, so it would otherwise survive the reset as a
-	// standing login foothold.
-	repo.passkeyCreds["pk1"] = PasskeyCredential{ID: "pk1", UserID: "u1", CredentialID: "cred-1", PublicKey: "k"}
-
-	w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/auth/change-password",
-		`{"current_password":"old-password","new_password":"brand-new-password"}`, jsonHeader)
-	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
-		t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
-	}
-
-	u := repo.staff["owner"]
-	if u.MustChangePassword {
-		t.Fatalf("must_change_password should be cleared after a change")
-	}
-	if bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(u.PasswordHash), []byte("brand-new-password")) != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("the new password does not verify against the stored hash")
-	}
-	if !repo.sessions["other-device"].revoked {
-		t.Fatalf("other sessions should be revoked on a password change")
-	}
-	if len(repo.passkeyCreds) != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("password change left %d passkeys, want 0 — a planted passkey must not survive remediation", len(repo.passkeyCreds))
-	}
-}
-
-// TestHandleChangePasswordContentTypeGuard pins the defense-in-depth guard on the
-// authenticated change-password route.
-func TestHandleChangePasswordContentTypeGuard(t *testing.T) {
-	api, _ := seedAuthedAPI(t, "old-password", false)
-	w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/auth/change-password",
-		`{"current_password":"old-password","new_password":"brand-new-password"}`,
-		map[string]string{"Content-Type": "text/plain"})
-	if w.Code != http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType {
-		t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 415 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
-	}
-}
-
-func TestHandleChangePasswordRejections(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Run("weak new password", func(t *testing.T) {
-		api, _ := seedAuthedAPI(t, "old-password", false)
-		w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/auth/change-password",
-			`{"current_password":"old-password","new_password":"short"}`, jsonHeader)
-		if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
-			t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 400", w.Code)
-		}
-		if code := decodeErr(t, w); code != "weak_password" {
-			t.Fatalf("error code = %q, want weak_password", code)
-		}
-	})
-
-	t.Run("unchanged password", func(t *testing.T) {
-		api, _ := seedAuthedAPI(t, "old-password", false)
-		w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/auth/change-password",
-			`{"current_password":"old-password","new_password":"old-password"}`, jsonHeader)
-		if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
-			t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 400", w.Code)
-		}
-		if code := decodeErr(t, w); code != "password_unchanged" {
-			t.Fatalf("error code = %q, want password_unchanged", code)
-		}
-	})
-
-	t.Run("wrong current password", func(t *testing.T) {
-		api, _ := seedAuthedAPI(t, "old-password", false)
-		w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/auth/change-password",
-			`{"current_password":"wrong","new_password":"brand-new-password"}`, jsonHeader)
-		if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
-			t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 401", w.Code)
-		}
-		if code := decodeErr(t, w); code != "invalid_credentials" {
-			t.Fatalf("error code = %q, want invalid_credentials", code)
-		}
-	})
-}

internal/api/handlers_onboard_test.go

@@ -73,8 +73,8 @@ func TestBindRedeemBootstrapsPlayer(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// A fresh role=user player row was created and bound; the code was consumed.
-	if u := repo.staff[bindTestUUID]; u == nil || u.Role != "user" || u.PasswordHash != "" || u.ID != userID {
+	if u := repo.staff[bindTestUUID]; u == nil || u.Role != "user" || u.ID != userID {
-		t.Fatalf("created row = %+v, want role=user, NULL hash, id=%s", u, userID)
+		t.Fatalf("created row = %+v, want role=user, id=%s", u, userID)
 	}
 	if repo.links[bindTestUUID] != userID {
 		t.Fatalf("account_links[%s] = %q, want %q", bindTestUUID, repo.links[bindTestUUID], userID)

internal/api/handlers_op_login.go

@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// op.console STAFF login (spec §B op-login): the two-factor door for the most
+// sensitive tier. Unlike the console.<root_domain> player doors (email OTP / bind
+// code), a staff web session is never minted from a single factor. The flow is a
+// three-call state machine over op_login_requests (migration 0012), all Public
+// pre-session routes (the caller has no principal yet), plus two internal-face routes
+// velocity drives on behalf of online admins:
+//
+//	POST /api/v1/auth/op-login/start            (public)   — mint a request + mail an OTP
+//	GET  /api/v1/auth/op-login/status/{id}      (public)   — poll until an admin approves
+//	POST /api/v1/auth/op-login/finish           (public)   — redeem code+approval → session
+//	GET  /api/v1/internal/op-login/pending      (internal) — the online-admin push list
+//	POST /api/v1/internal/op-login/{id}/approve (internal) — an in-game admin vouches
+//
+// The two factors:
+//
+//   - Possession of the staff mailbox — an email-OTP under purpose op_login, minted by
+//     start and redeemed by finish, reusing the email_otps lifecycle (the purpose
+//     column keeps it from ever colliding with a console login_email or onboard code).
+//   - An in-game vouch — an already-trusted admin who is ONLINE approves the pending
+//     request via velocity's /felis command (internal approve). Only a linked
+//     role=admin account may approve; velocity additionally gates the command on
+//     in-game op, so the API check is defence in depth over its own user table.
+//
+// finish mints the session only when BOTH have landed. Neither factor alone — a mailed
+// code without an approval, or an approval without the code — yields a session.
+//
+// Anti-enumeration. op.console sits behind Cloudflare Zero-Trust at the edge, but the
+// external API is hostname-agnostic at the route level, so these Public routes are
+// reachable from console.<root_domain> too and must not become a staff oracle:
+//
+//   - start resolves the typed email; a non-staff or unknown address gets the SAME 202
+//     with a plausible (non-persisted, random) request_id and mails nothing, so a
+//     caller cannot tell a staff address from any other.
+//   - status returns approved:false for an unknown/expired/denied/consumed id exactly
+//     as for a live-but-unapproved one; only a genuinely approved live request reads
+//     approved:true, and driving an id to that state REQUIRES an in-game admin vouch a
+//     fabricated id can never obtain.
+//   - finish collapses unknown id, not-yet-approved, wrong code, locked, and lost-race
+//     into one uniform failure, and (like the console door) never reveals staffness.
+
+// otpPurposeOpLogin scopes an email code to the op.console staff door, keeping it from
+// ever colliding with or satisfying a console login_email or onboarding code for the
+// same account. VerifyEmailOTP/ConsumeLoginEmailOTP are queried per (user, purpose),
+// so the op-login factor is fully independent of the player-console doors.
+const otpPurposeOpLogin = "op_login"
+
+// opLoginStartRequest is the start body: the staff address the code is mailed to.
+type opLoginStartRequest struct {
+	Email string `json:"email"`
+}
+
+// handleOpLoginStart begins a staff op.console login (Public, pre-session): it mints an
+// op_login_requests row for the resolved staff account and mails an email-OTP under
+// otpPurposeOpLogin, returning the request handle the browser polls. A non-staff or
+// unknown address yields the SAME 202 with a random, non-persisted handle and no mail,
+// so this never doubles as a staff-enumeration oracle (op.console's own Zero-Trust is
+// the edge gate; this app-layer neutrality covers the hostname-agnostic route).
+func (a *API) handleOpLoginStart(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if !localAuthEnabled(r.Context(), a.Repo) {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusForbidden, "local_auth_disabled",
+			"session login is disabled"))
+		return
+	}
+	if err := requireJSONContentType(r); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	var req opLoginStartRequest
+	if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	email := strings.TrimSpace(req.Email)
+	if !looksLikeEmail(email) {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "a valid email is required"))
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Per-recipient cooldown reserved BEFORE any work, identical to the console email
+	// door: one winner per window, and the neutral (non-staff) branch keeps the
+	// reservation too so probing an address is throttled exactly like a real send. The
+	// key is namespaced apart from the console door's "login:email:" so the two
+	// unauthenticated doors never perturb each other's throttle.
+	emailKey := "oplogin:email:" + strings.ToLower(email)
+	lim := a.otpLimiter()
+	emailAt, ok := lim.reserve(emailKey, otpResendCooldown)
+	if !ok {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusTooManyRequests, "otp_resend_cooldown",
+			"a code was sent recently; wait a moment before requesting another"))
+		return
+	}
+	committed := false
+	defer func() {
+		if !committed {
+			lim.release(emailKey, emailAt)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	// Compute expiry once so the neutral and real branches return identical-shaped
+	// bodies and (real branch) the request row and its OTP are coterminous.
+	expiresAt := a.now().Add(otpTTL)
+
+	// neutral returns the indistinguishable no-op success: a plausible but non-persisted
+	// handle that status(id) reads approved:false forever (no row, never approvable). It
+	// mints nothing and mails nothing, and KEEPS the reservation so probing is throttled
+	// exactly like a real send.
+	neutral := func() {
+		fakeID, err := newOTPID()
+		if err != nil {
+			writeError(w, r, err) // committed stays false → deferred rollback frees the window
+			return
+		}
+		committed = true
+		writeJSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]any{
+			"request_id": fakeID, "expires_at": expiresAt.UTC(),
+		})
+	}
+
+	u, err := a.Repo.UserByEmail(r.Context(), email)
+	switch {
+	case errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound):
+		neutral()
+		return
+	case err != nil:
+		// Real read fault: leave committed false so the deferred rollback frees the
+		// window (a transient DB blip must not burn it).
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	// op.console is the STAFF door: a non-admin who typed their address here (they belong
+	// on console.<root_domain>) gets the neutral response, never a request or a code.
+	if u.Role != "admin" {
+		neutral()
+		return
+	}
+
+	id, err := newOTPID()
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	if err := a.Repo.CreateOpLoginRequest(r.Context(), id, u.ID, u.Email, expiresAt); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	code, err := newEmailOTP()
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	otpID, err := newOTPID()
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	// Mint+mail against the STORED staff address (UserByEmail matched case-insensitively);
+	// the request row snapshots the same address for its audit trail.
+	if err := a.Repo.CreateEmailOTP(r.Context(), otpID, u.ID, u.Email, otpCodeHash(code), otpPurposeOpLogin, expiresAt); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	if err := a.deliverOTP(r.Context(), u.Email, code); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	committed = true
+	a.audit(r, u.Username, "auth.op_login.otp_sent", "")
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]any{
+		"request_id": id, "expires_at": expiresAt.UTC(),
+	})
+}
+
+// handleOpLoginStatus reports whether a staff login request has been approved in-game
+// (Public, pre-session). It is a pure read the browser polls after start: it returns
+// approved:true only for a genuinely approved, live, unconsumed request, and
+// approved:false for everything else — including an unknown, expired, denied, or
+// already-consumed id — so a fabricated handle polls as approved:false forever and the
+// endpoint is not a staff-enumeration oracle (only an in-game admin vouch, impossible
+// against a fake id, flips it true).
+func (a *API) handleOpLoginStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if !localAuthEnabled(r.Context(), a.Repo) {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusForbidden, "local_auth_disabled",
+			"session login is disabled"))
+		return
+	}
+	id := r.PathValue("id")
+	approved := false
+	switch req, err := a.Repo.OpLoginRequestByID(r.Context(), id); {
+	case errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound):
+		// Unknown handle: neutral approved:false (never 404), uniform with a real request
+		// still awaiting approval.
+	case err != nil:
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	default:
+		approved = req.Status == "approved" && !req.Consumed && req.ExpiresAt.After(a.now())
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"approved": approved})
+}
+
+// opLoginFinishRequest is the finish body: the request handle from start and the code
+// read from the staff mailbox. The handle selects the account (there is no principal);
+// the code proves possession of the mailbox this session.
+type opLoginFinishRequest struct {
+	RequestID string `json:"request_id"`
+	Code      string `json:"code"`
+}
+
+// handleOpLoginFinish redeems an approved request plus its mailed code into a staff
+// session (Public, pre-session). It mints the session only when BOTH factors have
+// landed: the request is approved-and-live AND the code verifies. Every failure mode —
+// unknown handle, not-yet-approved, wrong or locked code, lost race — collapses into
+// ONE uniform 400, so a code-less caller learns nothing (not staffness, not approval
+// state). The approval is read BEFORE the code is consumed so a valid code submitted
+// early (before an admin approves) is preserved for a retry rather than burned.
+func (a *API) handleOpLoginFinish(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if !localAuthEnabled(r.Context(), a.Repo) {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusForbidden, "local_auth_disabled",
+			"session login is disabled"))
+		return
+	}
+	if err := requireJSONContentType(r); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	var req opLoginFinishRequest
+	if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	requestID := strings.TrimSpace(req.RequestID)
+	code := strings.TrimSpace(req.Code)
+	if requestID == "" || code == "" {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "request_id and code are required"))
+		return
+	}
+
+	// The single uniform failure every "cannot complete" branch returns, so unknown
+	// handle / not-approved / wrong code / locked / lost-race are indistinguishable.
+	invalid := newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "op_login_invalid",
+		"this operator login could not be completed; restart the sign-in")
+
+	now := a.now()
+	loginReq, err := a.Repo.OpLoginRequestByID(r.Context(), requestID)
+	switch {
+	case errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound):
+		writeError(w, r, invalid)
+		return
+	case err != nil:
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	// Read the approval state BEFORE touching the code: an early finish (user typed the
+	// code before an admin approved) must not consume the code. Not-approved collapses
+	// into the same uniform failure as a bad code, so the ordering leaks nothing.
+	if loginReq.Status != "approved" || loginReq.Consumed || !loginReq.ExpiresAt.After(now) {
+		writeError(w, r, invalid)
+		return
+	}
+	// Consume the mailed code (op_login purpose). A wrong/expired/locked code charges an
+	// attempt without minting anything and returns the uniform failure — the code, not
+	// the request, is the problem, and the request stays approved for a retry.
+	switch err := a.Repo.ConsumeLoginEmailOTP(r.Context(), loginReq.UserID, otpPurposeOpLogin, otpCodeHash(code), now); {
+	case errors.Is(err, ErrOTPInvalid), errors.Is(err, ErrOTPLocked):
+		writeError(w, r, invalid)
+		return
+	case err != nil:
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	// Both factors proven. Atomically spend the request (approved→consumed, single-use):
+	// this serialises against a concurrent finish and records which request completed.
+	switch err := a.Repo.ConsumeOpLoginRequest(r.Context(), requestID, now); {
+	case errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound):
+		// Lost a race (another finish consumed it) or it expired between the checks —
+		// uniform failure. The code was already spent by the winner.
+		writeError(w, r, invalid)
+		return
+	case err != nil:
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	// Load the staff account for the session + response. Re-assert admin as defence in
+	// depth: only admins ever get a request minted, but the session must never be issued
+	// to a non-admin identity even if the row were somehow otherwise.
+	u, err := a.Repo.UserByID(r.Context(), loginReq.UserID)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	if u.Role != "admin" {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusForbidden, "staff_account", "that account is not an operator"))
+		return
+	}
+	token, err := newSessionToken()
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	expires := now.Add(sessionTTL)
+	if err := a.Repo.CreateSession(r.Context(), hashCookie(token), u.ID, expires); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	setSessionCookie(w, token, expires)
+	a.audit(r, u.Username, "auth.op_login", "")
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"user_id": u.ID, "role": u.Role})
+}
+
+// handleOpLoginPending lists live pending staff login requests, oldest first (internal
+// face). Velocity polls it and pushes the waiting requests to online admins, who
+// approve one with /felis web op approve <id>. Internal-only: velocity holds a service
+// token and no pending request is secret to the operator crew.
+func (a *API) handleOpLoginPending(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	reqs, err := a.Repo.ListPendingOpLogins(r.Context(), a.now())
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	out := make([]map[string]any, 0, len(reqs))
+	for _, req := range reqs {
+		out = append(out, map[string]any{
+			"request_id": req.ID,
+			"username":   req.Username,
+			"email":      req.Email,
+			"created_at": req.CreatedAt.UTC(),
+		})
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"pending": out})
+}
+
+// opLoginApproveRequest is the internal approve body: the online-mode UUID of the
+// in-game admin running /felis web op approve. The API resolves it to a linked account
+// and refuses unless that account is role=admin — defence in depth over velocity's own
+// in-game op gate, checked against the API's authoritative user table.
+type opLoginApproveRequest struct {
+	ApproverUUID string `json:"approver_uuid"`
+}
+
+// handleOpLoginApprove records an in-game admin's vouch for a pending staff login
+// (internal face), supplying the second factor. It resolves the approver UUID to a
+// linked role=admin account (else 403), then flips the request approved. A missing or
+// no-longer-pending request is 404. Self-approval is allowed: a staff member online as
+// their own admin identity supplies a genuine second factor (in-game session control)
+// distinct from the mailbox factor.
+func (a *API) handleOpLoginApprove(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	id := r.PathValue("id")
+	var req opLoginApproveRequest
+	if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	approverUUID := strings.TrimSpace(req.ApproverUUID)
+	if approverUUID == "" {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "approver_uuid is required"))
+		return
+	}
+	// Resolve the in-game approver to a linked account and require admin. An unlinked
+	// UUID or a non-admin player may never vouch for an op.console login. All three
+	// refusals share one response so a caller cannot tell "not linked" from "linked but
+	// not staff".
+	notAdmin := newError(http.StatusForbidden, "not_admin", "only a linked administrator may approve an operator login")
+	approverID, err := a.Repo.UserByMCUUID(r.Context(), approverUUID)
+	switch {
+	case errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound):
+		writeError(w, r, notAdmin)
+		return
+	case err != nil:
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	approver, err := a.Repo.UserByID(r.Context(), approverID)
+	switch {
+	case errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound):
+		writeError(w, r, notAdmin)
+		return
+	case err != nil:
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	if approver.Role != "admin" {
+		writeError(w, r, notAdmin)
+		return
+	}
+	switch err := a.Repo.ApproveOpLogin(r.Context(), id, approverID, a.now()); {
+	case errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound):
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusNotFound, "op_login_not_found", "no pending operator login with that id"))
+		return
+	case err != nil:
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	payload, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"request_id": id, "approver_user_id": approverID})
+	_ = a.Repo.Audit(r.Context(), AuditEntry{
+		Actor: approver.Username, Source: "internal", Action: "auth.op_login.approved",
+		RequestID: requestIDFromContext(r.Context()), Payload: payload,
+	})
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"approved": true})
+}

internal/api/handlers_op_login_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,509 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// op.console STAFF login tests (spec §B op-login). The two-factor door's load-bearing
+// properties, in the order the flow meets them:
+//
+//   - Two factors, both required. finish mints a session only when the mailed op_login
+//     code verifies AND an in-game admin has approved the request; neither alone works.
+//   - Neutral start. A non-staff or unknown address gets a 202 with a plausible but
+//     non-persisted request_id and nothing mailed, so start is not a staff oracle.
+//   - Neutral status. An unknown/expired/consumed handle reads approved:false exactly
+//     like a real request awaiting approval, so a fabricated handle is not an oracle.
+//   - Uniform finish failure. Unknown handle / not-approved / wrong code / lost race
+//     all collapse to one op_login_invalid envelope; an early-but-correct code is
+//     preserved (approval is read before the code is consumed), and a wrong code costs
+//     an attempt without burning the approval.
+//   - Admin-only approval. Only a linked role=admin UUID may vouch; the check is the
+//     API's own user table, defence in depth over velocity's in-game op gate.
+
+const opUUID = "aaaaaaaa-aaaa-aaaa-aaaa-aaaaaaaaaaaa" // the seeded admin's linked in-game UUID
+
+// seedOpLoginAPI wires the op.console door: local sessions enabled and a single staff
+// admin "op" (id a1) whose proven address is stored in MIXED case (so the mint-against-
+// stored-casing contract is exercised by default) and whose in-game UUID opUUID is
+// linked, so the admin can act as an in-game approver.
+func seedOpLoginAPI(t *testing.T) (*API, *fakeRepo, *captureMailer) {
+	t.Helper()
+	repo := newFakeRepo()
+	repo.settings[LocalAuthEnabledKey] = []byte("true")
+	repo.staff["op"] = &StaffUser{
+		ID: "a1", Username: "op", Email: "[email protected]",
+		Role: "admin", EmailVerified: true,
+	}
+	repo.links[opUUID] = "a1"
+	mailer := &captureMailer{}
+	api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
+	api.Mailer = mailer
+	return api, repo, mailer
+}
+
+// startOp / statusOp / finishOp drive the three public browser calls; approveOp drives
+// the internal in-game vouch. They return the recorder so each test asserts its own
+// codes and bodies.
+func startOp(eh http.Handler, email string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	return do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/op-login/start", `{"email":"`+email+`"}`, jsonHeader)
+}
+func statusOp(eh http.Handler, id string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	return do(eh, "GET", "/api/v1/auth/op-login/status/"+id, "", nil)
+}
+func finishOp(eh http.Handler, id, code string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	return do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/op-login/finish",
+		`{"request_id":"`+id+`","code":"`+code+`"}`, jsonHeader)
+}
+func approveOp(ih http.Handler, id, approverUUID string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	return do(ih, "POST", "/api/v1/internal/op-login/"+id+"/approve",
+		`{"approver_uuid":"`+approverUUID+`"}`, nil)
+}
+
+// TestOpLoginVertical walks the whole two-factor slice end to end: start mails a code
+// (purpose op_login) to the staff address of record and mints a pending request; the
+// browser polls status until an in-game admin approves; finish redeems code+approval
+// into the same host-only session the other doors mint. All three legs audit by the
+// account's username, and the request is single-use.
+func TestOpLoginVertical(t *testing.T) {
+	api, repo, mailer := seedOpLoginAPI(t)
+	eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+	ih := api.InternalHandler()
+
+	// 1) start: 202 with a request handle + expiry, never the code itself.
+	w := startOp(eh, "[email protected]")
+	if w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+		t.Fatalf("start: code = %d, want 202 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	b := acctBody(t, w)
+	reqID, _ := b["request_id"].(string)
+	if reqID == "" {
+		t.Fatal("start must return a request_id")
+	}
+	if _, leaked := b["code"]; leaked {
+		t.Error("start response must NEVER carry the code")
+	}
+	if s, _ := b["expires_at"].(string); s == "" {
+		t.Error("start must report expires_at")
+	}
+	// The code goes to the STORED casing (address of record), under the op_login purpose.
+	if mailer.calls != 1 || mailer.email != "[email protected]" {
+		t.Fatalf("mailer: calls=%d email=%q, want 1 send to the STORED casing [email protected]",
+			mailer.calls, mailer.email)
+	}
+	code := mailer.code
+	if len(repo.otps) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("persisted codes = %d, want 1", len(repo.otps))
+	}
+	for _, o := range repo.otps {
+		if o.purpose != otpPurposeOpLogin {
+			t.Errorf("otp purpose = %q, want %q", o.purpose, otpPurposeOpLogin)
+		}
+	}
+	// Exactly one pending request row, owned by the staff account.
+	if len(repo.opLogins) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("op_login_requests rows = %d, want 1", len(repo.opLogins))
+	}
+	if got := repo.opLogins[reqID]; got == nil || got.userID != "a1" || got.status != "pending" {
+		t.Fatalf("request row = %+v, want {userID:a1, status:pending}", got)
+	}
+
+	// 2) status before approval: not approved yet.
+	if sb := acctBody(t, statusOp(eh, reqID)); sb["approved"] != false {
+		t.Fatalf("status before approval: approved = %v, want false", sb["approved"])
+	}
+
+	// 3) finish before approval is REFUSED and must NOT burn the code (approval is read
+	// before the code is consumed).
+	if w := finishOp(eh, reqID, code); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "op_login_invalid" {
+		t.Fatalf("finish before approval: code = %d body %s, want 400 op_login_invalid", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if len(repo.sessions) != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("no session may be minted before approval")
+	}
+
+	// 4) an in-game admin approves via the internal face.
+	if w := approveOp(ih, reqID, opUUID); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("approve: code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if ab := acctBody(t, statusOp(eh, reqID)); ab["approved"] != true {
+		t.Fatalf("status after approval: approved = %v, want true", ab["approved"])
+	}
+
+	// 5) finish with the preserved code: session minted, role=admin.
+	w = finishOp(eh, reqID, code)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("finish: code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	vb := acctBody(t, w)
+	if vb["user_id"] != "a1" || vb["role"] != "admin" {
+		t.Fatalf("finish body = %v, want user_id:a1 role:admin", vb)
+	}
+	cookies := w.Result().Cookies()
+	if len(cookies) != 1 || cookies[0].Name != sessionCookieName || cookies[0].Value == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("want one non-empty %s cookie, got %v", sessionCookieName, cookies)
+	}
+	if s, ok := repo.sessions[hashCookie(cookies[0].Value)]; !ok || s.userID != "a1" {
+		t.Fatalf("session row for the cookie = %+v (ok=%v), want userID a1", s, ok)
+	}
+
+	// Three audits by "op": otp_sent (start), approved (in-game vouch), op_login (finish).
+	if n := len(repo.audits); n != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 3 audits, got %d: %+v", n, repo.audits)
+	}
+	wantActions := []string{"auth.op_login.otp_sent", "auth.op_login.approved", "auth.op_login"}
+	for i, want := range wantActions {
+		if repo.audits[i].Action != want || repo.audits[i].Actor != "op" {
+			t.Errorf("audit[%d] = %+v, want action %q by op", i, repo.audits[i], want)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// 6) single-use: the consumed request finishes no second time, and status flips back
+	// to approved:false (consumed).
+	if w := finishOp(eh, reqID, code); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "op_login_invalid" {
+		t.Fatalf("replay finish: code = %d body %s, want 400 op_login_invalid", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if sb := acctBody(t, statusOp(eh, reqID)); sb["approved"] != false {
+		t.Errorf("status after consume: approved = %v, want false", sb["approved"])
+	}
+}
+
+// TestOpLoginStartNeutral pins the start-side anti-enumeration contract: op.console is
+// the STAFF door, so a non-admin account AND an unknown address both get a 202 carrying
+// a request_id + expires_at, mint/mail nothing, and still burn the per-recipient
+// cooldown — so neither the response nor the throttle tells a caller who is staff.
+func TestOpLoginStartNeutral(t *testing.T) {
+	check := func(t *testing.T, seed func(*fakeRepo), email string) {
+		t.Helper()
+		repo := newFakeRepo()
+		repo.settings[LocalAuthEnabledKey] = []byte("true")
+		if seed != nil {
+			seed(repo)
+		}
+		mailer := &captureMailer{}
+		api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
+		api.Mailer = mailer
+		eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+
+		w := startOp(eh, email)
+		if w.Code != http.StatusAccepted {
+			t.Fatalf("neutral start: code = %d, want 202 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		b := acctBody(t, w)
+		if id, _ := b["request_id"].(string); id == "" {
+			t.Error("neutral start must still return a plausible request_id")
+		}
+		if s, _ := b["expires_at"].(string); s == "" {
+			t.Error("neutral start must still return expires_at")
+		}
+		if len(repo.opLogins) != 0 || len(repo.otps) != 0 || mailer.calls != 0 || len(repo.audits) != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("neutral start must mint/mail/audit nothing: reqs=%d otps=%d mails=%d audits=%d",
+				len(repo.opLogins), len(repo.otps), mailer.calls, len(repo.audits))
+		}
+		// The reservation is KEPT: re-probing the same address is throttled like a resend.
+		if w := startOp(eh, email); w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests || decodeErr(t, w) != "otp_resend_cooldown" {
+			t.Fatalf("re-probe: code = %d body %s, want 429 otp_resend_cooldown", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	}
+
+	t.Run("unknown address", func(t *testing.T) {
+		check(t, nil, "[email protected]")
+	})
+	t.Run("non-staff (role=user) address is ignored by the staff door", func(t *testing.T) {
+		check(t, func(repo *fakeRepo) {
+			repo.staff["p"] = &StaffUser{ID: "u9", Username: "p", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user", EmailVerified: true}
+		}, "[email protected]")
+	})
+}
+
+// TestOpLoginStatusNeutral proves status is never an enumeration oracle: it returns
+// approved:true ONLY for a genuinely approved, live, unconsumed request, and
+// approved:false (never 404) for an unknown, expired, denied, or consumed handle — all
+// indistinguishable from a real request still awaiting approval.
+func TestOpLoginStatusNeutral(t *testing.T) {
+	api, repo, _ := seedOpLoginAPI(t)
+	eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+	future := time.Unix(1_700_000_600, 0)
+	past := time.Unix(1_699_999_999, 0)
+
+	repo.opLogins["pending"] = &fakeOpLogin{id: "pending", userID: "a1", email: "[email protected]", status: "pending", expiresAt: future, createdAt: future}
+	repo.opLogins["expired"] = &fakeOpLogin{id: "expired", userID: "a1", email: "[email protected]", status: "approved", expiresAt: past, createdAt: past}
+	repo.opLogins["consumed"] = &fakeOpLogin{id: "consumed", userID: "a1", email: "[email protected]", status: "approved", consumed: true, expiresAt: future, createdAt: future}
+	repo.opLogins["denied"] = &fakeOpLogin{id: "denied", userID: "a1", email: "[email protected]", status: "denied", expiresAt: future, createdAt: future}
+	repo.opLogins["live"] = &fakeOpLogin{id: "live", userID: "a1", email: "[email protected]", status: "approved", expiresAt: future, createdAt: future}
+
+	for _, id := range []string{"unknown-handle", "pending", "expired", "consumed", "denied"} {
+		w := statusOp(eh, id)
+		if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("status %q: code = %d, want 200", id, w.Code)
+		}
+		if acctBody(t, w)["approved"] != false {
+			t.Errorf("status %q: approved = true, want false (must not be an oracle)", id)
+		}
+	}
+	// Only the genuinely-approved live request reads true.
+	if acctBody(t, statusOp(eh, "live"))["approved"] != true {
+		t.Error("status of an approved live request must read approved:true")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestOpLoginFinishUniform is the redeem-side failure matrix. The anchor is uniformity:
+// an unknown handle and a wrong code for an approved request answer with the SAME
+// (code, message) envelope, so finish never doubles as an oracle. Two lifecycle
+// invariants are pinned alongside: a correct code submitted BEFORE approval is
+// preserved (approval read before consume), and a wrong code costs an attempt without
+// burning the approval.
+func TestOpLoginFinishUniform(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("unknown handle and wrong code are indistinguishable", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, _, mailer := seedOpLoginAPI(t)
+		eh, ih := api.ExternalHandler(), api.InternalHandler()
+		reqID := acctBody(t, startOp(eh, "[email protected]"))["request_id"].(string)
+		code := mailer.code
+		if w := approveOp(ih, reqID, opUUID); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("approve: %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		// Wrong code for a real, approved request.
+		wWrong := finishOp(eh, reqID, code+"x")
+		// Unknown handle.
+		wGhost := finishOp(eh, "deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef", code)
+		if wWrong.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || wGhost.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+			t.Fatalf("codes = %d/%d, want 400/400", wWrong.Code, wGhost.Code)
+		}
+		wc, wm := errEnvelope(t, wWrong)
+		gc, gm := errEnvelope(t, wGhost)
+		if wc != "op_login_invalid" || wc != gc || wm != gm {
+			t.Errorf("envelopes differ: wrong=(%s,%q) unknown=(%s,%q) — must be identical", wc, wm, gc, gm)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("correct code before approval is preserved, not burned", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, repo, mailer := seedOpLoginAPI(t)
+		eh, ih := api.ExternalHandler(), api.InternalHandler()
+		reqID := acctBody(t, startOp(eh, "[email protected]"))["request_id"].(string)
+		code := mailer.code
+
+		// Finish before approval: refused, and the code is NOT consumed.
+		if w := finishOp(eh, reqID, code); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "op_login_invalid" {
+			t.Fatalf("early finish: code = %d body %s, want 400 op_login_invalid", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		for _, o := range repo.otps {
+			if o.consumed || o.attempts != 0 {
+				t.Errorf("early finish must not touch the code: consumed=%v attempts=%d", o.consumed, o.attempts)
+			}
+		}
+		// Approve, then the same code completes.
+		if w := approveOp(ih, reqID, opUUID); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("approve: %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if w := finishOp(eh, reqID, code); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("finish with preserved code: code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("wrong code charges an attempt without burning the approval", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, repo, mailer := seedOpLoginAPI(t)
+		eh, ih := api.ExternalHandler(), api.InternalHandler()
+		reqID := acctBody(t, startOp(eh, "[email protected]"))["request_id"].(string)
+		code := mailer.code
+		if w := approveOp(ih, reqID, opUUID); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("approve: %d (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		// Wrong code: refused, one attempt charged, request still approved+unconsumed.
+		if w := finishOp(eh, reqID, code+"x"); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "op_login_invalid" {
+			t.Fatalf("wrong code: code = %d body %s, want 400 op_login_invalid", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		for _, o := range repo.otps {
+			if o.consumed || o.attempts != 1 {
+				t.Errorf("wrong code must charge one attempt, not consume: consumed=%v attempts=%d", o.consumed, o.attempts)
+			}
+		}
+		if r := repo.opLogins[reqID]; r.status != "approved" || r.consumed {
+			t.Errorf("a wrong code must not burn the approval: status=%q consumed=%v", r.status, r.consumed)
+		}
+		// The right code still completes.
+		if w := finishOp(eh, reqID, code); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("retry with right code: code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// TestOpLoginApproveGate pins the in-game approval gate: only a linked role=admin UUID
+// may vouch (all refusals share one 403 not_admin), a missing/no-longer-pending request
+// is 404, and a bare request without an approver UUID is 400.
+func TestOpLoginApproveGate(t *testing.T) {
+	plantPending := func(repo *fakeRepo) string {
+		repo.opLogins["r1"] = &fakeOpLogin{
+			id: "r1", userID: "a1", email: "[email protected]", status: "pending",
+			expiresAt: time.Unix(1_700_000_600, 0), createdAt: time.Unix(1_700_000_000, 0),
+		}
+		return "r1"
+	}
+
+	t.Run("unlinked approver UUID -> 403, request stays pending", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, repo, _ := seedOpLoginAPI(t)
+		id := plantPending(repo)
+		if w := approveOp(api.InternalHandler(), id, "ffffffff-ffff-ffff-ffff-ffffffffffff"); w.Code != http.StatusForbidden || decodeErr(t, w) != "not_admin" {
+			t.Fatalf("unlinked approver: code = %d body %s, want 403 not_admin", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if repo.opLogins[id].status != "pending" {
+			t.Error("a refused approval must leave the request pending")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("linked non-admin approver -> 403", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, repo, _ := seedOpLoginAPI(t)
+		id := plantPending(repo)
+		repo.staff["p"] = &StaffUser{ID: "u9", Username: "p", Email: "[email protected]", Role: "user", EmailVerified: true}
+		repo.links["bbbbbbbb-bbbb-bbbb-bbbb-bbbbbbbbbbbb"] = "u9"
+		if w := approveOp(api.InternalHandler(), id, "bbbbbbbb-bbbb-bbbb-bbbb-bbbbbbbbbbbb"); w.Code != http.StatusForbidden || decodeErr(t, w) != "not_admin" {
+			t.Fatalf("non-admin approver: code = %d body %s, want 403 not_admin", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("missing approver_uuid -> 400", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, repo, _ := seedOpLoginAPI(t)
+		id := plantPending(repo)
+		if w := do(api.InternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/internal/op-login/"+id+"/approve", `{}`, nil); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "bad_request" {
+			t.Fatalf("missing approver_uuid: code = %d body %s, want 400 bad_request", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("unknown request id -> 404", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, _, _ := seedOpLoginAPI(t)
+		if w := approveOp(api.InternalHandler(), "nosuchrequest", opUUID); w.Code != http.StatusNotFound || decodeErr(t, w) != "op_login_not_found" {
+			t.Fatalf("unknown request: code = %d body %s, want 404 op_login_not_found", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("re-approving an approved request -> 404 (first approval stands)", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, repo, _ := seedOpLoginAPI(t)
+		id := plantPending(repo)
+		if w := approveOp(api.InternalHandler(), id, opUUID); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("first approve: code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if w := approveOp(api.InternalHandler(), id, opUUID); w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+			t.Fatalf("second approve: code = %d, want 404 (no longer pending)", w.Code)
+		}
+		if repo.opLogins[id].status != "approved" {
+			t.Error("the request must remain approved after a redundant re-approval")
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// TestOpLoginPendingList covers the internal push list: live pending requests are
+// returned oldest first, carrying the joined username, and an approved or expired
+// request is absent.
+func TestOpLoginPendingList(t *testing.T) {
+	api, repo, _ := seedOpLoginAPI(t)
+	ih := api.InternalHandler()
+	future := time.Unix(1_700_000_600, 0)
+
+	// Two pending (distinct createdAt so ordering is deterministic), one approved, one
+	// expired.
+	repo.opLogins["r2"] = &fakeOpLogin{id: "r2", userID: "a1", email: "[email protected]", status: "pending", expiresAt: future, createdAt: time.Unix(1_700_000_200, 0)}
+	repo.opLogins["r1"] = &fakeOpLogin{id: "r1", userID: "a1", email: "[email protected]", status: "pending", expiresAt: future, createdAt: time.Unix(1_700_000_100, 0)}
+	repo.opLogins["ap"] = &fakeOpLogin{id: "ap", userID: "a1", email: "[email protected]", status: "approved", expiresAt: future, createdAt: time.Unix(1_700_000_150, 0)}
+	repo.opLogins["ex"] = &fakeOpLogin{id: "ex", userID: "a1", email: "[email protected]", status: "pending", expiresAt: time.Unix(1_699_999_999, 0), createdAt: time.Unix(1_700_000_050, 0)}
+
+	w := do(ih, "GET", "/api/v1/internal/op-login/pending", "", nil)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("pending: code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	body := acctBody(t, w)
+	pending, _ := body["pending"].([]any)
+	if len(pending) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("pending count = %d, want 2 (only live pending rows) — %v", len(pending), body["pending"])
+	}
+	// Oldest first: r1 (created earlier) before r2.
+	first, _ := pending[0].(map[string]any)
+	second, _ := pending[1].(map[string]any)
+	if first["request_id"] != "r1" || second["request_id"] != "r2" {
+		t.Errorf("order = [%v, %v], want [r1, r2] (oldest first)", first["request_id"], second["request_id"])
+	}
+	if first["username"] != "op" || first["email"] != "[email protected]" {
+		t.Errorf("row projection = %v, want username op / email [email protected]", first)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestOpLoginGates covers the shared front doors: the fail-closed local-auth toggle on
+// all three public legs, the CSRF Content-Type guard on the credential-minting POSTs,
+// and the input gates that must reject before any lookup or mint.
+func TestOpLoginGates(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("local auth disabled -> 403 on start/status/finish", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api := newTestAPI(newFakeRepo(), newFakeCluster()) // no LocalAuthEnabledKey: fails closed
+		eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+		if w := startOp(eh, "[email protected]"); w.Code != http.StatusForbidden || decodeErr(t, w) != "local_auth_disabled" {
+			t.Errorf("start: code = %d body %s, want 403 local_auth_disabled", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if w := statusOp(eh, "anything"); w.Code != http.StatusForbidden || decodeErr(t, w) != "local_auth_disabled" {
+			t.Errorf("status: code = %d body %s, want 403 local_auth_disabled", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if w := finishOp(eh, "anything", "123456"); w.Code != http.StatusForbidden || decodeErr(t, w) != "local_auth_disabled" {
+			t.Errorf("finish: code = %d body %s, want 403 local_auth_disabled", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("non-JSON content type -> 415 on the minting POSTs", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, _, _ := seedOpLoginAPI(t)
+		eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+		for _, ct := range []string{"", "text/plain", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"} {
+			if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/op-login/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, ctHeader(ct)); w.Code != http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType {
+				t.Errorf("start Content-Type %q: code = %d, want 415", ct, w.Code)
+			}
+			if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/op-login/finish", `{"request_id":"x","code":"1"}`, ctHeader(ct)); w.Code != http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType {
+				t.Errorf("finish Content-Type %q: code = %d, want 415", ct, w.Code)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("start bad email -> 400, nothing minted", func(t *testing.T) {
+		for _, body := range []string{`{}`, `{"email":""}`, `{"email":"notanemail"}`, `{"email":"[email protected]","x":1}`} {
+			api, repo, mailer := seedOpLoginAPI(t)
+			w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", "/api/v1/auth/op-login/start", body, jsonHeader)
+			if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+				t.Errorf("start %q: code = %d, want 400 (%s)", body, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+			}
+			if len(repo.opLogins) != 0 || len(repo.otps) != 0 || mailer.calls != 0 {
+				t.Errorf("start %q: a rejected start must mint nothing", body)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("finish missing request_id or code -> 400 bad_request", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, _, _ := seedOpLoginAPI(t)
+		eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+		for _, body := range []string{`{"code":"123456"}`, `{"request_id":"x"}`, `{"request_id":"","code":""}`} {
+			if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/op-login/finish", body, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "bad_request" {
+				t.Errorf("finish %q: code = %d body %s, want 400 bad_request", body, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// TestOpLoginFaceSeparation enforces the two-face split: the three public browser legs
+// must 404 on the internal (service-token) face, and the two internal in-game legs must
+// 404 on the external (Access-JWT) face.
+func TestOpLoginFaceSeparation(t *testing.T) {
+	api, _, _ := seedOpLoginAPI(t)
+	eh, ih := api.ExternalHandler(), api.InternalHandler()
+
+	// Public legs must not appear on the internal face.
+	if w := do(ih, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/op-login/start", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("start on internal face: code = %d, want 404", w.Code)
+	}
+	if w := do(ih, "GET", "/api/v1/auth/op-login/status/x", "", nil); w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("status on internal face: code = %d, want 404", w.Code)
+	}
+	if w := do(ih, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/op-login/finish", `{"request_id":"x","code":"1"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("finish on internal face: code = %d, want 404", w.Code)
+	}
+	// Internal legs must not appear on the external face.
+	if w := do(eh, "GET", "/api/v1/internal/op-login/pending", "", nil); w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("pending on external face: code = %d, want 404", w.Code)
+	}
+	if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/internal/op-login/x/approve", `{"approver_uuid":"`+opUUID+`"}`, nil); w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("approve on external face: code = %d, want 404", w.Code)
+	}
+}

internal/api/handlers_passkey.go

@@ -8,46 +8,47 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
+	"strings"
 	"time"
 )
 
-// Passkey enrollment (spec §14 WebAuthn / Phase 6 bind). An already-authenticated
+// Passkey (spec §14 WebAuthn). Two slices live in this file: ENROLLMENT — an already-
-// principal binds a passkey to their account — the WebAuthn credential-creation
+// authenticated principal binds a passkey to their account (the WebAuthn credential-
-// ceremony — and manages the credentials they have bound. Email-OTP (handlers_email_otp.go)
+// creation ceremony) and manages the credentials they have bound — and the public LOGIN
-// stays the fallback factor, so a player with no passkey is never locked out.
+// (assertion) door, which resolves an account by email, proves one of its bound passkeys,
+// and mints a session from an UNauthenticated state (handlePasskeyLoginBegin/Finish, near
+// the end of this file). Email-OTP (handlers_email_otp.go) stays the fallback factor, so a
+// player with no passkey is never locked out.
 //
-// Scope of the HANDLERS in this file: ENROLLMENT only. Every ceremony here rides on a
+// Every ceremony rides on a challenge bound to a user_id whose finish verifies against the
-// known principal — the challenge is bound to the caller's user_id and the finish
+// server-stashed SessionData, never a client-echoed challenge. The login door's
-// verifies against the server-stashed SessionData, never a client-echoed challenge. The
+// cryptographic half is built and Oracle-verified in the adapter (internal/passkey
-// login/assertion path (proving a passkey to mint a session from an UNauthenticated
+// BeginLogin/FinishLogin, against a virtual authenticator); its persist-ready output shape
-// state) has its cryptographic half built and Oracle-verified in the adapter
+// is VerifiedAssertion below. The login door's design checkpoint (task #36) resolved two
-// (internal/passkey BeginLogin/FinishLogin, against a virtual authenticator) and its
+// questions that still frame it:
-// persist-ready output shape is VerifiedAssertion below — but the login HTTP handler is
-// a DELIBERATELY deferred slice. Its design checkpoint (task #36) resolved two questions
-// and then deferred, for reasons that outlive this comment:
 //
 //   - RP boundary (RESOLVED): felis-api is the app-login relying party (panel.*); the
 //     WebAuthn-as-security-gate lives at the Cloudflare Access EDGE, not here. Spec §14
 //     ties WebAuthn/posture to admin.* (Access), while panel.* is plain app login with
-//     no WebAuthn requirement — so there is neither a spec-required assertion handler
+//     no WebAuthn requirement — so this door is a login convenience, not a spec-required
-//     nor a backend step-up consumer for one (the role-switcher step-up UX is frontend).
+//     backend step-up consumer (the role-switcher step-up UX is frontend).
-//   - Identifier (BLOCKING): a from-zero login needs a unique, human-typable handle to
+//   - Identifier (RESOLVED by #69/#70): a from-zero login needs a unique, human-typable
-//     resolve the account before its passkeys can be offered. users.email is nullable
+//     handle to resolve the account before its passkeys can be offered. users.email was
-//     and NOT unique (0001_init.sql), and a player's users.username IS their Minecraft
+//     nullable and NOT unique (0001_init.sql), and a player's users.username IS their
-//     uuid (pgrepo.go RedeemPlayerBindCode mints a uuid-derived unique username) —
+//     Minecraft uuid (pgrepo.go RedeemPlayerBindCode mints a uuid-derived unique username)
-//     opaque, never typed into a form. The username-first assertion the non-resident
+//     — opaque, never typed into a form. The verified-email uniqueness invariant
-//     credentials + user-keyed challenge store support therefore has nothing to key on.
+//     (0010_verified_email_unique.sql) plus UserByEmail gave the door the typable handle
+//     it keys on: begin resolves email → account → its bound passkeys.
 //
-// The system's returning-player door is already re-link (control of the in-game identity
+// This is an EMAIL-first assertion, not a usernameless one. The system's returning-player
-// is the root of trust — handlers_onboard.go re-mints a session through the bind-code
+// root of trust is still re-link (control of the in-game identity — handlers_onboard.go
-// flow even after passkey/OTP are bound); passkey and email-OTP are factors on an
+// re-mints a session through the bind-code flow even after passkey/OTP are bound); the
-// ALREADY-authenticated principal here, not from-zero login methods. The real enabler
+// email and passkey login doors are convenience layered on top, never the root. The real
-// for a from-zero passkey login is discoverable ("usernameless") credentials, which
+// enabler for a TRULY from-zero passkey login (no identifier typed at all) is discoverable
-// sidestep the identifier gap but reshape enrollment (residentKey) and need a
+// ("usernameless") credentials, which sidestep even the email handle but reshape enrollment
-// non-user-keyed challenge store — a future migration and its own checkpoint (that door
+// (residentKey) and need a non-user-keyed challenge store — a future migration and its own
-// partly bypasses the in-game-identity root of trust). The adapter crypto is verified
+// checkpoint, task #40 (that door partly bypasses the in-game-identity root of trust). The
-// now so that slice inherits correct crypto; this file adds no unauthenticated login
+// adapter crypto is verified now so that slice inherits correct crypto.
-// route until then.
 //
 // The cryptographic half is a seam (PasskeyVerifier) so this package never imports
 // go-webauthn: ceremony state crosses the boundary as opaque bytes, the attestation
@@ -87,6 +88,20 @@ type PasskeyVerifier interface {
 	// blob BeginRegistration returned. A failed verification returns a non-nil error;
 	// the handler maps it to 400 (the ceremony state exists; the attestation is bad).
 	FinishRegistration(user PasskeyUser, sessionData []byte, attestation io.Reader) (VerifiedCredential, error)
+	// BeginLogin starts an assertion (login) ceremony for a known user. It returns the
+	// {"publicKey": {...}} request options for navigator.credentials.get() and the
+	// opaque SessionData the handler stashes and replays at finish. user.Credentials
+	// carries the passkeys already bound so the authenticator can be told which to
+	// offer. A user with no bound credential yields an error (nothing to assert); the
+	// handler treats that as "offer the email-OTP fallback instead", never a server
+	// fault.
+	BeginLogin(user PasskeyUser) (options json.RawMessage, sessionData []byte, err error)
+	// FinishLogin verifies the browser's assertion against the stashed SessionData and
+	// reports which of the user's credentials signed and the signature counter the
+	// authenticator reported. assertion is the raw navigator.credentials.get() result
+	// the browser posts back; sessionData is the blob BeginLogin returned. A failed
+	// verification returns a non-nil error; the handler maps it to 400.
+	FinishLogin(user PasskeyUser, sessionData []byte, assertion io.Reader) (VerifiedAssertion, error)
 }
 
 // PasskeyUser is the relying-party view of the enrolling principal the verifier needs:
@@ -126,12 +141,19 @@ type VerifiedCredential struct {
 // signal — the verifier deliberately does not, so clone policy lives in one place with
 // the stored state. SignCount is legitimately 0 for authenticators that keep no counter.
 //
-// The login handlers do not exist yet (see the file header): this is the stable seam
+// The login handler below (handlePasskeyLoginFinish) obtains this from FinishLogin but
-// output the production adapter (internal/passkey) already produces and its Oracle test
+// currently checks only that the assertion verified — the SignCount/UserVerified consumer
-// already asserts on, so wiring the handlers later needs no reshaping here.
+// the note above anticipates is still future. It is the stable seam output the production
+// adapter (internal/passkey) produces and its Oracle test asserts on, so handler and
+// adapter agree on shape without either reshaping the other.
 type VerifiedAssertion struct {
 	CredentialID string // base64url(raw credential id) — which bound credential signed
 	SignCount    uint32
+	// UserVerified records that a PIN/biometric (not mere presence) was performed
+	// during the assertion ceremony. The verifier enforces UV=required at BeginLogin,
+	// so this is always true for a successful assertion; persisting it makes the
+	// guarantee auditable and survives a future policy that permits UV=preferred.
+	UserVerified bool
 }
 
 // errPasskeyUnavailable is returned when the WebAuthn verifier is not configured on
@@ -222,6 +244,11 @@ func (a *API) handlePasskeyRegisterFinish(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request
 		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "attestation is required"))
 		return
 	}
+	name := strings.TrimSpace(req.Name)
+	if len(name) > 100 {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "passkey name must be at most 100 characters"))
+		return
+	}
 	sessionData, err := a.Repo.ConsumePasskeyChallengeByUser(r.Context(), p.UserID, passkeyPurposeRegister, a.now())
 	if err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid) {
@@ -250,7 +277,7 @@ func (a *API) handlePasskeyRegisterFinish(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request
 		PublicKey:      vc.PublicKey,
 		SignCount:      vc.SignCount,
 		AAGUID:         vc.AAGUID,
-		Name:           req.Name,
+		Name:           name,
 		CreatedAt:      a.now(),
 		UserVerified:   vc.UserVerified,
 		BackupEligible: vc.BackupEligible,
@@ -328,3 +355,229 @@ func (a *API) handlePasskeyDelete(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	a.audit(r, auditActor(p), "account.passkey.removed", id)
 	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
 }
+
+// ---- passkey login (assertion) ----
+
+// passkeyPurposeLogin scopes a challenge to the login (assertion) flow, keeping it
+// from ever colliding with an enrollment challenge (passkeyPurposeRegister) for the
+// same user. The challenge store is queried per (user, purpose), so the two flows
+// are fully independent even for one account with both a live enrollment and a live
+// login challenge.
+const passkeyPurposeLogin = "passkey_login"
+
+// passkeyLoginBeginRequest is the begin body: the email that resolves the account
+// before its passkeys can be offered. There is no principal yet (this is a
+// pre-session route), so the email is the identifier — the same role the typed
+// email plays in the email-OTP and op-login doors.
+type passkeyLoginBeginRequest struct {
+	Email string `json:"email"`
+}
+
+// handlePasskeyLoginBegin starts a passkey assertion ceremony for a returning user
+// (Public, pre-session). It resolves the typed email to an account, loads the
+// passkeys that account has bound, and asks the verifier for the assertion options
+// + opaque SessionData the browser needs for navigator.credentials.get(). The
+// SessionData is stashed under a short TTL, keyed to the user so the finish step
+// can consume it. Requires local sessions to be enabled (like the other pre-session
+// doors). A user with no bound passkey, an unknown email, and a real account with
+// passkeys are distinguished by status code (400 vs 200) — this is an accepted
+// enumeration trade-off (the /auth/options oracle is the sanctioned place to learn
+// existence), but the per-recipient cooldown below makes probing impractical.
+func (a *API) handlePasskeyLoginBegin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if !localAuthEnabled(r.Context(), a.Repo) {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusForbidden, "local_auth_disabled",
+			"session login is disabled"))
+		return
+	}
+	if a.Passkey == nil {
+		writeError(w, r, errPasskeyUnavailable)
+		return
+	}
+	if err := requireJSONContentType(r); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	var req passkeyLoginBeginRequest
+	if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	email := strings.TrimSpace(req.Email)
+	if !looksLikeEmail(email) {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "a valid email is required"))
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Per-recipient cooldown reserved BEFORE any work, identical to the email-OTP and
+	// op-login doors: one winner per window, so a burst of probes is throttled. The
+	// key is namespaced apart from the other pre-session doors so they never perturb
+	// each other's throttle.
+	emailKey := "passkey:login:" + strings.ToLower(email)
+	lim := a.otpLimiter()
+	emailAt, ok := lim.reserve(emailKey, otpResendCooldown)
+	if !ok {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusTooManyRequests, "otp_resend_cooldown",
+			"a passkey login was started recently; wait a moment before requesting another"))
+		return
+	}
+	committed := false
+	defer func() {
+		if !committed {
+			lim.release(emailKey, emailAt)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	u, err := a.Repo.UserByEmail(r.Context(), email)
+	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
+			committed = true // keep the reservation so probing is throttled
+			writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "no_passkey",
+				"no passkey enrolled for this account; use email or operator login"))
+			return
+		}
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	creds, err := a.Repo.PasskeyCredentialsForUser(r.Context(), u.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	if len(creds) == 0 {
+		committed = true
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "no_passkey",
+			"no passkey enrolled for this account; use email or operator login"))
+		return
+	}
+
+	user := PasskeyUser{
+		ID:          u.ID,
+		Name:        email,
+		DisplayName: u.Username,
+		Credentials: creds,
+	}
+	options, sessionData, err := a.Passkey.BeginLogin(user)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "passkey_login_failed",
+			"could not start passkey login"))
+		return
+	}
+	id, err := newPasskeyID()
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	expiresAt := a.now().Add(passkeyChallengeTTL)
+	if err := a.Repo.CreatePasskeyChallenge(r.Context(), id, u.ID, passkeyPurposeLogin, sessionData, expiresAt); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	committed = true
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, options)
+}
+
+// passkeyLoginFinishRequest is the finish body: the email (to resolve the account,
+// as in the begin step) and the raw navigator.credentials.get() assertion response.
+// Attestation is captured as RawMessage so the handler hands the exact bytes the
+// browser produced to the verifier without re-encoding.
+type passkeyLoginFinishRequest struct {
+	Email     string          `json:"email"`
+	Assertion json.RawMessage `json:"assertion"`
+}
+
+// handlePasskeyLoginFinish verifies a passkey assertion and mints a session (Public,
+// pre-session). It resolves the email to the account, atomically consumes the
+// stashed login challenge (a missing or expired one → 400), verifies the assertion
+// against the SessionData, and mints a felis_session. Both players and staff may
+// log in this way — the passkey is a two-factor authenticator (possession +
+// biometric/PIN), strong enough to stand alone without the in-game approval the
+// op-login flow requires. The session cookie is host-only, so a session minted on
+// console.<root_domain> cannot reach op.console, and ViaAdminAccess is host-checked
+// so admin operations are gated regardless.
+func (a *API) handlePasskeyLoginFinish(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if !localAuthEnabled(r.Context(), a.Repo) {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusForbidden, "local_auth_disabled",
+			"session login is disabled"))
+		return
+	}
+	if a.Passkey == nil {
+		writeError(w, r, errPasskeyUnavailable)
+		return
+	}
+	if err := requireJSONContentType(r); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	var req passkeyLoginFinishRequest
+	if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	email := strings.TrimSpace(req.Email)
+	if !looksLikeEmail(email) {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "a valid email is required"))
+		return
+	}
+	if len(req.Assertion) == 0 {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "assertion is required"))
+		return
+	}
+
+	u, err := a.Repo.UserByEmail(r.Context(), email)
+	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
+			writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "passkey_login_invalid",
+				"passkey login could not be completed; begin again"))
+			return
+		}
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	sessionData, err := a.Repo.ConsumePasskeyChallengeByUser(r.Context(), u.ID, passkeyPurposeLogin, a.now())
+	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, ErrPasskeyChallengeInvalid) {
+			writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "passkey_login_invalid",
+				"passkey login could not be completed; begin again"))
+			return
+		}
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	creds, err := a.Repo.PasskeyCredentialsForUser(r.Context(), u.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	user := PasskeyUser{
+		ID:          u.ID,
+		Name:        email,
+		DisplayName: u.Username,
+		Credentials: creds,
+	}
+	_, err = a.Passkey.FinishLogin(user, sessionData, bytes.NewReader(req.Assertion))
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "passkey_login_invalid",
+			"passkey login could not be completed; begin again"))
+		return
+	}
+
+	token, err := newSessionToken()
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	expires := a.now().Add(sessionTTL)
+	if err := a.Repo.CreateSession(r.Context(), hashCookie(token), u.ID, expires); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	setSessionCookie(w, token, expires)
+	a.audit(r, u.Username, "auth.passkey_login", "")
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
+		"user_id": u.ID,
+		"role":    u.Role,
+	})
+}

internal/api/handlers_passkey_login_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,460 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// Pre-session Passkey (assertion) LOGIN tests (spec §B, console.<root_domain>
+// returning-player door — the public sibling of the email-OTP login door). These drive
+// the two Public routes against the fakeRepo challenge state machine and a fake
+// PasskeyVerifier, so what they PROVE is the handler + login state machine (challenge
+// stash → consume → session mint), not the pgrepo SQL nor the cryptographic assertion
+// verification (both mirrored, not run here). The load-bearing properties, in flow order:
+//
+//   - Session-data round-trip: the finish body carries only email+assertion, so the only
+//     path for the stashed blob into FinishLogin is store-stash → consume — the challenge
+//     is never client-echoed.
+//   - Anti-enumeration on finish: unknown email, no live challenge, expired challenge and
+//     a bad assertion all collapse to ONE passkey_login_invalid envelope, so the finish
+//     half is never an existence/state oracle.
+//   - Cooldown seals the accepted begin-side trade-off: has-passkey (200) vs no_passkey
+//     (400) is a status oracle, but one begin per recipient per window throttles probing.
+//   - Staff admitted: unlike the email door's staff_account refusal, a passkey stands
+//     alone (possession + user-verification), so role=admin mints a session here.
+
+// seedLoginPasskeyAPI wires the public passkey-login door: local sessions enabled, a
+// single verified player "player" (id u1) whose proven address is stored in MIXED case
+// (so the resolve-on-typed-lowercase contract is exercised by default), one passkey
+// credential bound to that account, and a verifier primed with fixed options + a verified
+// assertion. Both routes are Public — no External principal wired, proving they are truly
+// pre-session.
+func seedLoginPasskeyAPI(t *testing.T) (*API, *fakeRepo, *fakePasskeyVerifier) {
+	t.Helper()
+	repo := newFakeRepo()
+	repo.settings[LocalAuthEnabledKey] = []byte("true")
+	repo.staff["player"] = &StaffUser{
+		ID: "u1", Username: "player", Email: "[email protected]",
+		Role: "user", EmailVerified: true,
+	}
+	repo.passkeyCreds["row1"] = PasskeyCredential{
+		ID: "row1", UserID: "u1", CredentialID: "cred-1", PublicKey: "k", CreatedAt: frozenNow,
+	}
+	v := &fakePasskeyVerifier{
+		options:   json.RawMessage(`{"publicKey":{"challenge":"YXNzZXJ0"}}`),
+		assertion: VerifiedAssertion{CredentialID: "cred-1", UserVerified: true},
+	}
+	api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
+	api.Passkey = v
+	return api, repo, v
+}
+
+// plantLoginChallenge seeds a stashed LOGIN-purpose challenge for u1 directly, so the
+// finish-side branches (expired, verification failure) are reachable under the frozen
+// clock without running begin first. Mirrors plantPasskeyChallenge, but scoped to
+// passkeyPurposeLogin so it is only ever consumed by the login door.
+func plantLoginChallenge(repo *fakeRepo, id string, expiresAt time.Time) {
+	repo.passkeyChallenges[id] = &fakePasskeyChallenge{
+		id: id, userID: "u1", purpose: passkeyPurposeLogin,
+		sessionData: []byte("login-session:u1"), expiresAt: expiresAt, createdAt: expiresAt,
+	}
+}
+
+// TestPasskeyLoginVertical walks the whole returning-player slice across the external
+// face: begin resolves the mixed-case account from a lowercase-typed email, hands its
+// bound credential to the verifier, returns the assertion options verbatim and stashes
+// one login challenge; finish verifies the assertion against the SERVER-STASHED session
+// data and mints the same host-only felis_session as the email door. The decisive
+// assertion is the session-data round-trip: the finish body carries only email+assertion,
+// so the only path for the stashed blob into FinishLogin is store-stash → consume,
+// proving the challenge is never client-echoed.
+func TestPasskeyLoginVertical(t *testing.T) {
+	api, repo, v := seedLoginPasskeyAPI(t)
+	eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+
+	// 1) begin: options verbatim, exactly one login-purpose challenge stashed for u1, and
+	// the account's bound credential handed to the verifier (so the authenticator can be
+	// asked to assert with a known key).
+	w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/begin", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("begin: code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if b := acctBody(t, w); b["publicKey"] == nil {
+		t.Errorf("begin must return the assertion options verbatim, got %s", w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if v.lastUser.ID != "u1" {
+		t.Errorf("begin passed user id %q, want u1", v.lastUser.ID)
+	}
+	if len(v.lastUser.Credentials) != 1 || v.lastUser.Credentials[0].CredentialID != "cred-1" {
+		t.Errorf("begin must hand the account's bound credential to the verifier, got %+v", v.lastUser.Credentials)
+	}
+	if len(repo.passkeyChallenges) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("begin must stash exactly one challenge, got %d", len(repo.passkeyChallenges))
+	}
+	for _, c := range repo.passkeyChallenges {
+		if c.userID != "u1" || c.purpose != passkeyPurposeLogin {
+			t.Errorf("stashed challenge = %+v, want user u1 purpose %q", c, passkeyPurposeLogin)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// 2) finish — typed in yet another casing, proving the finish-side resolver is
+	// case-insensitive too — verifies the assertion and mints the session. The body
+	// carries NO challenge, only email+assertion.
+	w = do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/finish",
+		`{"email":"[email protected]","assertion":{"id":"cred-1","type":"public-key"}}`, jsonHeader)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("finish: code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	// THE security assertion: the blob the verifier saw at finish is exactly what begin
+	// stashed — it travelled store-stash → consume, never the client.
+	if !bytes.Equal(v.lastSession, []byte("login-session:u1")) {
+		t.Fatalf("finish session data = %q, want the server-stashed %q (challenge must not be client-echoed)",
+			v.lastSession, "login-session:u1")
+	}
+	vb := acctBody(t, w)
+	if vb["user_id"] != "u1" || vb["role"] != "user" {
+		t.Fatalf("finish body = %v, want user_id:u1 role:user", vb)
+	}
+	// The host-only HttpOnly cookie is the whole point — same contract as the email door.
+	cookies := w.Result().Cookies()
+	if len(cookies) != 1 || cookies[0].Name != sessionCookieName || cookies[0].Value == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("want one non-empty %s cookie, got %v", sessionCookieName, cookies)
+	}
+	s, ok := repo.sessions[hashCookie(cookies[0].Value)]
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("no session row for the issued cookie (must be stored hashed)")
+	}
+	if s.userID != "u1" {
+		t.Errorf("session userID = %q, want u1", s.userID)
+	}
+	if want := frozenNow.Add(sessionTTL); !s.expiresAt.Equal(want) {
+		t.Errorf("session expiresAt = %v, want now+sessionTTL = %v", s.expiresAt, want)
+	}
+	// Audited once, by the account's username (there is no principal yet); begin is silent.
+	if n := len(repo.audits); n != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("want exactly 1 audit (passkey_login), got %d: %+v", n, repo.audits)
+	}
+	if repo.audits[0].Action != "auth.passkey_login" || repo.audits[0].Actor != "player" {
+		t.Errorf("audit = %+v, want auth.passkey_login by player", repo.audits[0])
+	}
+
+	// 3) single-use: the consumed challenge buys nothing a second time.
+	if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/finish",
+		`{"email":"[email protected]","assertion":{"id":"cred-1","type":"public-key"}}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "passkey_login_invalid" {
+		t.Fatalf("replay of consumed challenge: code = %d body %s, want 400 passkey_login_invalid", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// TestPasskeyLoginBeginNoPasskey pins the begin-side anti-enumeration floor: an unknown
+// email and a KNOWN verified account that has enrolled no passkey answer the SAME
+// no_passkey envelope, so the two are indistinguishable. (The remaining has-passkey-vs-not
+// status split is the documented, accepted trade-off; the cooldown below makes probing
+// it impractical.) Neither path stashes a challenge, and both KEEP the reservation.
+func TestPasskeyLoginBeginNoPasskey(t *testing.T) {
+	begin := func(eh http.Handler, email string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+		return do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/begin", `{"email":"`+email+`"}`, jsonHeader)
+	}
+
+	t.Run("unknown email and a passkey-less account answer the same no_passkey", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Unknown email: no account at all.
+		apiU, repoU, _ := seedLoginPasskeyAPI(t)
+		wGhost := begin(apiU.ExternalHandler(), "[email protected]")
+
+		// Known verified account that has enrolled NO passkey.
+		apiN, repoN, _ := seedLoginPasskeyAPI(t)
+		delete(repoN.passkeyCreds, "row1")
+		wNone := begin(apiN.ExternalHandler(), "[email protected]")
+
+		if wGhost.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || wNone.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+			t.Fatalf("codes = %d/%d, want 400/400", wGhost.Code, wNone.Code)
+		}
+		gc, gm := errEnvelope(t, wGhost)
+		nc, nm := errEnvelope(t, wNone)
+		if gc != "no_passkey" || gc != nc || gm != nm {
+			t.Errorf("envelopes differ: unknown=(%s,%q) no-cred=(%s,%q) — must be identical no_passkey", gc, gm, nc, nm)
+		}
+		// Neither may stash a challenge or reach BeginLogin.
+		if len(repoU.passkeyChallenges) != 0 || len(repoN.passkeyChallenges) != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("no_passkey paths must stash nothing, got unknown=%d no-cred=%d",
+				len(repoU.passkeyChallenges), len(repoN.passkeyChallenges))
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("the no_passkey path KEEPS the reservation so probing is throttled", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, _, _ := seedLoginPasskeyAPI(t)
+		eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+		if w := begin(eh, "[email protected]"); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "no_passkey" {
+			t.Fatalf("first probe: code = %d body %s, want 400 no_passkey", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		// Re-probing the same unknown address inside the window is throttled identically to
+		// a real begin — the response is not the only channel; the throttle is sealed too.
+		if w := begin(eh, "[email protected]"); w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests || decodeErr(t, w) != "otp_resend_cooldown" {
+			t.Fatalf("re-probe: code = %d body %s, want 429 otp_resend_cooldown", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// TestPasskeyLoginBeginVerifierError pins the reserve→rollback path: a BeginLogin failure
+// is a server-side fault, not a probe signal, so it answers passkey_login_failed AND
+// RELEASES the reservation — the immediate retry is admitted, not 429'd. Distinguishing
+// 400-not-429 on the retry is what proves the release: a kept reservation would 429 before
+// ever reaching BeginLogin.
+func TestPasskeyLoginBeginVerifierError(t *testing.T) {
+	api, repo, v := seedLoginPasskeyAPI(t)
+	v.beginLoginErr = errors.New("no assertable credential")
+	eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+
+	if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/begin", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "passkey_login_failed" {
+		t.Fatalf("verifier error: code = %d body %s, want 400 passkey_login_failed", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if len(repo.passkeyChallenges) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("a failed begin must stash no challenge, got %d", len(repo.passkeyChallenges))
+	}
+	if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/begin", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || decodeErr(t, w) != "passkey_login_failed" {
+		t.Fatalf("retry after verifier error: code = %d body %s, want 400 passkey_login_failed (reservation must be released, not 429)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// TestPasskeyLoginGates covers the shared front doors of both halves: the fail-closed
+// local-auth toggle, graceful degradation when no verifier is wired, the CSRF Content-Type
+// guard (these are Public, credential-minting routes), and the input gates that must
+// reject before any lookup or stash.
+func TestPasskeyLoginGates(t *testing.T) {
+	const beginPath = "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/begin"
+	const finishPath = "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/finish"
+	const goodBegin = `{"email":"[email protected]"}`
+	const goodFinish = `{"email":"[email protected]","assertion":{"id":"cred-1"}}`
+
+	t.Run("local auth disabled -> 403 on both halves", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api := newTestAPI(newFakeRepo(), newFakeCluster()) // no LocalAuthEnabledKey: fails closed
+		api.Passkey = &fakePasskeyVerifier{}
+		eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+		if w := do(eh, "POST", beginPath, goodBegin, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusForbidden || decodeErr(t, w) != "local_auth_disabled" {
+			t.Errorf("begin: code = %d body %s, want 403 local_auth_disabled", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if w := do(eh, "POST", finishPath, goodFinish, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusForbidden || decodeErr(t, w) != "local_auth_disabled" {
+			t.Errorf("finish: code = %d body %s, want 403 local_auth_disabled", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("no verifier wired -> 503 passkey_unavailable on both halves", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, _, _ := seedLoginPasskeyAPI(t)
+		api.Passkey = nil // unwire it: the degraded path must be a clean 503, not a panic
+		eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+		if w := do(eh, "POST", beginPath, goodBegin, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable || decodeErr(t, w) != "passkey_unavailable" {
+			t.Errorf("begin: code = %d body %s, want 503 passkey_unavailable", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if w := do(eh, "POST", finishPath, goodFinish, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable || decodeErr(t, w) != "passkey_unavailable" {
+			t.Errorf("finish: code = %d body %s, want 503 passkey_unavailable", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("non-JSON content type -> 415 on both halves", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, _, _ := seedLoginPasskeyAPI(t)
+		eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+		for _, ct := range []string{"", "text/plain", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"} {
+			if w := do(eh, "POST", beginPath, goodBegin, ctHeader(ct)); w.Code != http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType {
+				t.Errorf("begin with Content-Type %q: code = %d, want 415", ct, w.Code)
+			}
+			if w := do(eh, "POST", finishPath, goodFinish, ctHeader(ct)); w.Code != http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType {
+				t.Errorf("finish with Content-Type %q: code = %d, want 415", ct, w.Code)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("begin bad email -> 400, nothing stashed", func(t *testing.T) {
+		bad := map[string]string{
+			"missing email": `{}`,
+			"empty email":   `{"email":""}`,
+			"no at-sign":    `{"email":"notanemail"}`,
+			"two at-signs":  `{"email":"a@[email protected]"}`,
+			"unknown field": `{"email":"[email protected]","x":1}`,
+		}
+		for name, body := range bad {
+			api, repo, _ := seedLoginPasskeyAPI(t)
+			w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", beginPath, body, jsonHeader)
+			if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+				t.Errorf("%s: code = %d, want 400 (%s)", name, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+			}
+			if len(repo.passkeyChallenges) != 0 {
+				t.Errorf("%s: a rejected begin must stash nothing (%d)", name, len(repo.passkeyChallenges))
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("finish bad inputs -> 400", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// An assertion key of {} is non-empty (2 bytes), so it clears the len==0 gate and
+		// fails later at passkey_login_invalid — the "missing assertion" gate is only the
+		// absent key. These are the cases the input gate itself must catch.
+		cases := []struct{ name, body, wantCode string }{
+			{"bad email", `{"email":"notanemail","assertion":{"id":"x"}}`, "bad_request"},
+			{"missing assertion", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, "bad_request"},
+			{"unknown field", `{"email":"[email protected]","assertion":{"id":"x"},"z":1}`, ""},
+		}
+		for _, c := range cases {
+			api, _, _ := seedLoginPasskeyAPI(t)
+			w := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "POST", finishPath, c.body, jsonHeader)
+			if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+				t.Errorf("%s: code = %d, want 400 (%s)", c.name, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+			}
+			if c.wantCode != "" && decodeErr(t, w) != c.wantCode {
+				t.Errorf("%s: error code = %q, want %q", c.name, decodeErr(t, w), c.wantCode)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// TestPasskeyLoginFinishRejections is the redeem-side failure matrix and the anchor for
+// anti-enumeration: an unknown email, a known account with no live challenge, an expired
+// challenge and an assertion that fails verification must ALL answer the byte-identical
+// passkey_login_invalid envelope (code AND message) and mint no session — so the finish
+// half never doubles as an existence or ceremony-state oracle. Expired state is planted
+// directly: the frozen clock makes that the only deterministic route to that branch.
+func TestPasskeyLoginFinishRejections(t *testing.T) {
+	const finishPath = "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/finish"
+	finish := func(eh http.Handler, email string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+		return do(eh, "POST", finishPath,
+			`{"email":"`+email+`","assertion":{"id":"cred-1","type":"public-key"}}`, jsonHeader)
+	}
+
+	cases := []struct {
+		name  string
+		email string
+		setup func(repo *fakeRepo, v *fakePasskeyVerifier)
+	}{
+		{"unknown email", "[email protected]", func(repo *fakeRepo, v *fakePasskeyVerifier) {}},
+		{"known account, no live challenge", "[email protected]", func(repo *fakeRepo, v *fakePasskeyVerifier) {}},
+		{"expired challenge", "[email protected]", func(repo *fakeRepo, v *fakePasskeyVerifier) {
+			plantLoginChallenge(repo, "ex", frozenNow.Add(-time.Second))
+		}},
+		{"assertion fails verification", "[email protected]", func(repo *fakeRepo, v *fakePasskeyVerifier) {
+			plantLoginChallenge(repo, "live", frozenNow.Add(passkeyChallengeTTL))
+			v.failErr = errors.New("bad assertion")
+		}},
+	}
+
+	var envelopes [][2]string
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		api, repo, v := seedLoginPasskeyAPI(t)
+		c.setup(repo, v)
+		w := finish(api.ExternalHandler(), c.email)
+		if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: code = %d, want 400 (%s)", c.name, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		code, msg := errEnvelope(t, w)
+		if code != "passkey_login_invalid" {
+			t.Errorf("%s: error code = %q, want passkey_login_invalid", c.name, code)
+		}
+		if len(repo.sessions) != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("%s: a rejected finish must mint no session (got %d)", c.name, len(repo.sessions))
+		}
+		if len(w.Result().Cookies()) != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("%s: a rejected finish must set no cookie", c.name)
+		}
+		envelopes = append(envelopes, [2]string{code, msg})
+	}
+	// The anchor: every envelope is identical (code AND message), so no branch is
+	// distinguishable from another.
+	for i := 1; i < len(envelopes); i++ {
+		if envelopes[i] != envelopes[0] {
+			t.Errorf("envelope for %q %v differs from %q %v — all rejections must be identical",
+				cases[i].name, envelopes[i], cases[0].name, envelopes[0])
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestPasskeyLoginBeginRateLimited closes the unauthenticated probing/DoS vector on the
+// public door: one begin per recipient per window, keyed case-insensitively (a recased
+// retype is the same mailbox), recovering after the window elapses. This is what makes the
+// accepted has-passkey-vs-not status oracle impractical to farm.
+func TestPasskeyLoginBeginRateLimited(t *testing.T) {
+	begin := func(eh http.Handler, email string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+		return do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/begin", `{"email":"`+email+`"}`, jsonHeader)
+	}
+
+	t.Run("same recipient is throttled, then recovers after the cooldown", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, _, _ := seedLoginPasskeyAPI(t)
+		clock := frozenNow
+		api.Now = func() time.Time { return clock }
+		eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+
+		if w := begin(eh, "[email protected]"); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("first begin: code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if w := begin(eh, "[email protected]"); w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests || decodeErr(t, w) != "otp_resend_cooldown" {
+			t.Fatalf("immediate re-begin: code = %d body %s, want 429 otp_resend_cooldown", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		clock = clock.Add(otpResendCooldown + time.Second)
+		if w := begin(eh, "[email protected]"); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("post-cooldown begin: code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("throttle key is case-insensitive", func(t *testing.T) {
+		api, _, _ := seedLoginPasskeyAPI(t)
+		eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+		if w := begin(eh, "[email protected]"); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("first begin: code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+		}
+		if w := begin(eh, "[email protected]"); w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
+			t.Fatalf("recased re-begin: code = %d, want 429 (key must be lowercased)", w.Code)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// TestPasskeyLoginAllowsStaff pins the deliberate contrast with the email door: that door
+// refuses role != user with 403 staff_account (op.console keeps its Zero-Trust in-game
+// gate), but the passkey door ADMITS staff — a passkey is a strong two-factor authenticator
+// (possession + user-verification), enough to stand alone. This guards against a future
+// "make the doors consistent" change silently locking admins out of passkey login.
+func TestPasskeyLoginAllowsStaff(t *testing.T) {
+	repo := newFakeRepo()
+	repo.settings[LocalAuthEnabledKey] = []byte("true")
+	repo.staff["boss"] = &StaffUser{
+		ID: "a1", Username: "boss", Email: "[email protected]",
+		Role: "admin", EmailVerified: true,
+	}
+	repo.passkeyCreds["row1"] = PasskeyCredential{
+		ID: "row1", UserID: "a1", CredentialID: "cred-a1", PublicKey: "k", CreatedAt: frozenNow,
+	}
+	v := &fakePasskeyVerifier{
+		options:   json.RawMessage(`{"publicKey":{"challenge":"YXNzZXJ0"}}`),
+		assertion: VerifiedAssertion{CredentialID: "cred-a1", UserVerified: true},
+	}
+	api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
+	api.Passkey = v
+	eh := api.ExternalHandler()
+
+	if w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/begin", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("begin for staff: code = %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	w := do(eh, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/finish",
+		`{"email":"[email protected]","assertion":{"id":"cred-a1","type":"public-key"}}`, jsonHeader)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("finish for staff: code = %d, want 200 (passkey admits staff) (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if b := acctBody(t, w); b["user_id"] != "a1" || b["role"] != "admin" {
+		t.Fatalf("finish body = %v, want user_id:a1 role:admin", b)
+	}
+	if len(repo.sessions) != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("a staff passkey login must mint a session, got %d", len(repo.sessions))
+	}
+}
+
+// TestPasskeyLoginFaceSeparation enforces that both halves are web-only: the internal
+// (service-token) face must 404 them, never serve them.
+func TestPasskeyLoginFaceSeparation(t *testing.T) {
+	api, _, _ := seedLoginPasskeyAPI(t)
+	ih := api.InternalHandler()
+	if w := do(ih, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/begin", `{"email":"[email protected]"}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("begin on internal face: code = %d, want 404", w.Code)
+	}
+	if w := do(ih, "POST", "/api/v1/auth/passkey/login/finish", `{"email":"[email protected]","assertion":{"id":"x"}}`, jsonHeader); w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("finish on internal face: code = %d, want 404", w.Code)
+	}
+}

internal/api/handlers_player_reclaim_test.go

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ func TestReclaimProtectsAdminOnYggdrasil(t *testing.T) {
 	const adminUUID = "0a11dead-0000-0000-0000-00000000ad11"
 	repo := newFakeRepo()
 	// An Operator who linked in-game through the third-party Yggdrasil (auth_source).
-	repo.staff["operator1"] = &StaffUser{ID: "op-1", Username: "operator1", Role: "admin", PasswordHash: "$2a$10$VnJ5kZqZ9bQmsCp1uoQ3qO"}
+	repo.staff["operator1"] = &StaffUser{ID: "op-1", Username: "operator1", Role: "admin"}
 	repo.links[adminUUID] = "op-1"
 	repo.linkAuthSource[adminUUID] = authSourceThirdParty
 
@@ -151,26 +151,25 @@ func TestReclaimProtectsAdminOnYggdrasil(t *testing.T) {
 //   - a Mojang-authenticated admin is still reclaimed (pins auth_source='thirdparty') —
 //     an admin's Mojang identity has no Login-Server name to protect (and Mojang names
 //     are unique, so this is operationally moot, but it locks the conjunct);
-//   - an SSO Operator with NO local password is still protected (pins the deliberate
+//   - an SSO Operator authenticated through the third-party Yggdrasil is protected even
-//     ABSENCE of a password_hash test) — signing in via Cloudflare Access (§14) leaves
+//     with no local login secret at all — protection turns on role + auth_source, so an
-//     role='admin' with a NULL hash, and that holder must be protected all the same.
+//     admin who signs in via Cloudflare Access (§14) is covered just the same.
 func TestReclaimAdminProtectionScope(t *testing.T) {
 	const squatter = "0a11dead-0000-0000-0000-00000000ad11"
 	cases := []struct {
 		name      string
 		role      string
 		auth      string
-		passHash  string
 		protected bool // true: reclaim refused (409); false: reclaim succeeds (200, barred)
 	}{
-		{"thirdparty non-admin is reclaimed", "user", authSourceThirdParty, "", false},
+		{"thirdparty non-admin is reclaimed", "user", authSourceThirdParty, false},
-		{"mojang admin is reclaimed", "admin", authSourceMojang, "$2a$10$VnJ5kZqZ9bQmsCp1uoQ3qO", false},
+		{"mojang admin is reclaimed", "admin", authSourceMojang, false},
-		{"sso admin without local password is protected", "admin", authSourceThirdParty, "", true},
+		{"sso admin without local password is protected", "admin", authSourceThirdParty, true},
 	}
 	for _, tc := range cases {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			repo := newFakeRepo()
-			repo.staff["holder"] = &StaffUser{ID: "h-1", Username: "holder", Role: tc.role, PasswordHash: tc.passHash}
+			repo.staff["holder"] = &StaffUser{ID: "h-1", Username: "holder", Role: tc.role}
 			repo.links[squatter] = "h-1"
 			repo.linkAuthSource[squatter] = tc.auth
 			api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())

internal/api/handlers_setup.go

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// Setup-token redemption (spec §B setup bootstrap). The `felis setup` MC-bind
+// flow mints a one-time token and prints a URL like:
+//
+//	https://op.console.<root>/setup?token=<raw>
+//
+// The Owner opens that URL in a browser; the SPA reads the token from the query
+// string and POSTs it here. This handler consumes the token (single-use, hashed
+// at rest like session cookies), mints a felis_session, and returns the caller's
+// setup state so the frontend can guide email verification + passkey enrollment
+// before unlocking the admin console.
+//
+// The minted session is a "lockdown" session in product terms: the Owner has not
+// yet proven control of an email or enrolled a passkey, so the frontend restricts
+// it to the setup wizard. Backend enforcement of the lockdown is a separate
+// middleware concern (checking email_verified on the principal); this handler's
+// job is the one-time token→session swap and reporting what setup remains.
+
+// setupRedeemRequest is the redeem body: the raw one-time token from the setup URL.
+type setupRedeemRequest struct {
+	Token string `json:"token"`
+}
+
+// handleSetupRedeem consumes a one-time setup token and mints a lockdown session
+// (Public, pre-session). The token is hashed (sha-256) before lookup — only the
+// hash is persisted, mirroring session-cookie storage. On success the caller
+// receives a felis_session cookie and a JSON body describing the remaining setup
+// steps (email set? verified? passkey enrolled?) so the SPA can drive the wizard.
+func (a *API) handleSetupRedeem(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	if !localAuthEnabled(r.Context(), a.Repo) {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusForbidden, "local_auth_disabled",
+			"session login is disabled"))
+		return
+	}
+	if err := requireJSONContentType(r); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	var req setupRedeemRequest
+	if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	token := strings.TrimSpace(req.Token)
+	if token == "" {
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "token is required"))
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Hash the raw token — only the hash is stored (mirroring session cookies and
+	// setup token creation in performSetupMCBind).
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
+	tokenHash := hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
+
+	now := a.now()
+	userID, err := a.Repo.ConsumeSetupToken(r.Context(), tokenHash, now)
+	if err != nil {
+		// Unknown, already-consumed, or expired — uniform 400 so the token cannot
+		// be used as an oracle.
+		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "setup_token_invalid",
+			"this setup link is invalid or has already been used"))
+		return
+	}
+
+	u, err := a.Repo.UserByID(r.Context(), userID)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Mint the session — a regular felis_session; the lockdown is a product-level
+	// restriction the frontend enforces until email is verified / a passkey is bound.
+	sessionToken, err := newSessionToken()
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	expires := now.Add(sessionTTL)
+	if err := a.Repo.CreateSession(r.Context(), hashCookie(sessionToken), u.ID, expires); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	setSessionCookie(w, sessionToken, expires)
+
+	// Report the setup state so the SPA knows which wizard steps remain.
+	creds, _ := a.Repo.PasskeyCredentialsForUser(r.Context(), u.ID)
+	hasPasskey := len(creds) > 0
+
+	a.audit(r, u.Username, "auth.setup_redeem", "")
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
+		"user_id":        u.ID,
+		"username":       u.Username,
+		"role":           u.Role,
+		"email":          u.Email,
+		"email_verified": u.EmailVerified,
+		"has_passkey":    hasPasskey,
+		"setup_required": !u.EmailVerified || !hasPasskey,
+	})
+}
+
+// handleSetupStatus reports the caller's setup progress (app-tier). The SPA polls
+// it after each wizard step (email verify, passkey enroll) to decide whether the
+// lockdown can lift. It reads only the principal's own state.
+func (a *API) handleSetupStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	p := principalFromContext(r.Context())
+	u, err := a.Repo.UserByID(r.Context(), p.UserID)
+	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
+			writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusNotFound, "not_found", "user not found"))
+			return
+		}
+		writeError(w, r, err)
+		return
+	}
+	creds, _ := a.Repo.PasskeyCredentialsForUser(r.Context(), u.ID)
+	hasPasskey := len(creds) > 0
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
+		"user_id":        u.ID,
+		"username":       u.Username,
+		"role":           u.Role,
+		"email":          u.Email,
+		"email_verified": u.EmailVerified,
+		"has_passkey":    hasPasskey,
+		"setup_required": !u.EmailVerified || !hasPasskey,
+	})
+}

internal/api/handlers_user.go

@@ -186,10 +186,6 @@ func (a *API) handleMe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		"is_admin":       p.IsAdmin(),
 		"is_owner":       p.IsOwner(),
 		"email_verified": emailVerified,
-		// must_change_password is meaningful only on the local-password path; the JWT
-		// path leaves it false. The panel uses it to route a freshly-provisioned staff
-		// account straight to the change-password card before any other surface.
-		"must_change_password": p.MustChangePassword,
 	})
 }
 

internal/api/handlers_users.go

@@ -2,15 +2,10 @@ package api
 
 import (
 	"context"
-	"crypto/rand"
 	"errors"
-	"log"
-	"math/big"
 	"net/http"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
-
-	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
 )
 
 // ResetMailer delivers a freshly-generated admin-reset password to the user's
@@ -77,8 +72,6 @@ type createUserRequest struct {
 	Username string `json:"username"`
 	Email    string `json:"email,omitempty"`
 	Role     string `json:"role"`
-	Password   string `json:"password"`
-	MustChange bool   `json:"must_change_password"`
 }
 
 // handleCreateUser is the admin-tier create-user endpoint (POST /users).
@@ -104,30 +97,10 @@ func (a *API) handleCreateUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	// Validate password: 8–72 bytes (bcrypt limit).
-	if len(body.Password) < 8 {
-		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "weak_password",
-			"password must be at least 8 characters"))
-		return
-	}
-	if len(body.Password) > 72 {
-		writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request",
-			"password must be at most 72 characters"))
-		return
-	}
-
-	hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(body.Password), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
-	if err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-
 	u, err := a.Repo.CreateUser(r.Context(), CreateUserInput{
 		Username: body.Username,
 		Email:    body.Email,
 		Role:     body.Role,
-		PasswordHash: string(hash),
-		MustChange:   body.MustChange,
 	}, p.Email)
 	if err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, ErrConflict) {
@@ -283,79 +256,6 @@ func (a *API) handleDisableUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"id": id, "disabled": body.Disabled})
 }
 
-// handleResetPassword generates a high-entropy random password, stores its hash,
-// forces must_change_password, and delivers the plaintext to the user's email
-// (server-side log when no mailer is wired). The password is never returned to the
-// admin caller — the response carries only the target email, not the password.
-// (POST /users/{id}/reset-password). No request body — the server owns entropy.
-func (a *API) handleResetPassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-	p := principalFromContext(r.Context())
-	id := r.PathValue("id")
-	if id == "" {
-		writeError(w, r, errBadRequest)
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Load user to get their email.
-	u, err := a.Repo.UserByID(r.Context(), id)
-	if err != nil {
-		if errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
-			writeError(w, r, newError(http.StatusNotFound, "not_found", "user not found"))
-			return
-		}
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	password, err := generateResetPassword()
-	if err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
-	if err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	if err := a.Repo.AdminResetPassword(r.Context(), id, string(hash)); err != nil {
-		writeError(w, r, err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	if a.ResetMailer != nil && u.Email != "" {
-		if err := a.ResetMailer.SendPasswordReset(r.Context(), u.Email, password); err != nil {
-			log.Printf("reset-password: mail delivery failed for %s: %v", u.Email, err)
-		}
-	} else {
-		log.Printf("reset-password: no ResetMailer configured; password for %s (%s): %s",
-			u.Username, id, password)
-	}
-
-	a.audit(r, p.Email, "user.reset_password", id)
-	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
-		"ok":    true,
-		"email": u.Email,
-	})
-}
-
-// generateResetPassword produces a 20-character, high-entropy random password
-// drawn from alphanumerics plus a safe symbol set.
-func generateResetPassword() (string, error) {
-	const chars = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789!@#$%^&*-_+=?"
-	const n = 20
-	b := make([]byte, n)
-	for i := range b {
-		idx, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(int64(len(chars))))
-		if err != nil {
-			return "", err
-		}
-		b[i] = chars[idx.Int64()]
-	}
-	return string(b), nil
-}
-
 // ---- quota admin ----
 
 // handleGetQuotas is the admin-tier quotas read (GET /users/{id}/quotas).

internal/api/middleware.go

@@ -122,23 +122,6 @@ func (a *API) ownerOnly(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
 	}
 }
 
-// lockdownDuringPasswordChange fences a staff principal that still owes a
-// first-login password change to the change-password surface (spec §B). It is the
-// default-deny half of the lockdown: buildFace wraps every authenticated route
-// with it except the AllowDuringPasswordChange opt-outs, so a half-onboarded
-// account can do nothing but change its password, log out, or read /me. It is
-// nil-principal safe (the internal face sets no Principal), so it passes such
-// requests straight through and only ever acts on the external face.
-func (a *API) lockdownDuringPasswordChange(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
-	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		if p := principalFromContext(r.Context()); p != nil && p.MustChangePassword {
-			writeError(w, r, errPasswordChangeRequired)
-			return
-		}
-		next(w, r)
-	}
-}
-
 // newRequestID returns a short random hex id. crypto/rand never fails on the
 // platforms we target; on the impossible error path we fall back to a constant
 // so a request still gets a (non-unique) id rather than crashing.

internal/api/pgrepo.go

@@ -189,6 +189,73 @@ func (p *PGRepo) RedeemPlayerBindCode(ctx context.Context, newUserID, code strin
 	return userID, mcUUID, authSource, nil
 }
 
+// RedeemLinkCodeForOwner consumes an in-game link code and creates-or-promotes the
+// bound account to the passwordless Owner (role='admin'). It is the `felis setup`
+// MC-bind path: the operator enters limbo, runs /link, and types the code here.
+// Unlike RedeemPlayerBindCode — which refuses an already-staff account so a game
+// login can never self-elevate — this DELIBERATELY elevates: an unlinked UUID is
+// born directly as staff, and an already-linked account (player OR staff) is
+// promoted in place, preserving its id so any live sessions and its username
+// survive. The elevation is gated by the caller's local-root break-glass
+// authority, not by anything in-band. Returns the Owner's (userID, mcUUID,
+// authSource); an absent or expired code is ErrLinkCodeInvalid and consumes
+// nothing.
+func (p *PGRepo) RedeemLinkCodeForOwner(ctx context.Context, newUserID, code string, now time.Time) (string, string, string, error) {
+	tx, err := p.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", "", "", err
+	}
+	defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck // no-op after commit
+
+	var mcUUID, authSource string
+	switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
+		`SELECT mc_uuid, auth_source FROM account_link_codes WHERE code = $1 AND expires_at > $2`,
+		code, now).Scan(&mcUUID, &authSource); {
+	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
+		return "", "", "", ErrLinkCodeInvalid
+	case err != nil:
+		return "", "", "", err
+	}
+
+	// Create-or-promote keyed on the verified UUID. An unlinked UUID births a fresh
+	// staff row (role='admin') with a uuid-derived username; an already-linked
+	// account is promoted to role='admin' in place (idempotent when it is already
+	// staff), keeping its id and username. Setup elevates on purpose, so there is no
+	// staff refusal here — that guard belongs to the player path only.
+	userID := newUserID
+	switch err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx,
+		`SELECT user_id FROM account_links WHERE mc_uuid = $1`, mcUUID).Scan(&userID); {
+	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
+		if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
+			`INSERT INTO users (id, username, role) VALUES ($1, $2, 'admin')`,
+			newUserID, mcUUID); err != nil {
+			return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("create owner: %w", err)
+		}
+		if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
+			`INSERT INTO account_links (user_id, mc_uuid, auth_source) VALUES ($1, $2, $3)`,
+			newUserID, mcUUID, authSource); err != nil {
+			return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("write account link: %w", err)
+		}
+		userID = newUserID
+	case err != nil:
+		return "", "", "", err
+	default:
+		if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
+			`UPDATE users SET role = 'admin' WHERE id = $1`, userID); err != nil {
+			return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("promote owner: %w", err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx,
+		`DELETE FROM account_link_codes WHERE code = $1`, code); err != nil {
+		return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("consume link code: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
+		return "", "", "", err
+	}
+	return userID, mcUUID, authSource, nil
+}
+
 // QuotaAvailable treats a missing quota row or a NULL max_servers as unlimited;
 // otherwise it compares the live owned-server count against the cap (spec §9.3).
 //
@@ -657,17 +724,15 @@ func (p *PGRepo) IsProtectedAdminLink(ctx context.Context, mcUUID string) (bool,
 
 // ---- local-password auth (spec §B) ----
 
-// UserByUsername loads a staff login projection by username, or ErrNotFound. A
+// UserByUsername loads a staff login projection by username, or ErrNotFound.
-// player row (NULL password_hash) is returned with an empty PasswordHash, never
+// The account is passwordless — staff authenticate via email-OTP / passkey, so
-// hidden — the caller rejects it by the hash compare, so login cannot be used to
+// no password column is read.
-// enumerate which usernames carry a password.
 func (p *PGRepo) UserByUsername(ctx context.Context, username string) (*StaffUser, error) {
-	const q = `SELECT id, username, COALESCE(email, ''), role::text,
+	const q = `SELECT id, username, COALESCE(email, ''), role::text, email_verified
-		COALESCE(password_hash, ''), must_change_password, email_verified
 		FROM users WHERE username = $1`
 	var u StaffUser
 	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, username).Scan(
-		&u.ID, &u.Username, &u.Email, &u.Role, &u.PasswordHash, &u.MustChangePassword, &u.EmailVerified); {
+		&u.ID, &u.Username, &u.Email, &u.Role, &u.EmailVerified); {
 	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
 		return nil, ErrNotFound
 	case err != nil:
@@ -676,32 +741,31 @@ func (p *PGRepo) UserByUsername(ctx context.Context, username string) (*StaffUse
 	return &u, nil
 }
 
-// AdminExists reports whether any authenticatable staff account already exists —
+// AdminExists reports whether any admin account already exists. It is the
-// an admin row WITH a bcrypt password hash. It is the break-glass console's
+// break-glass console's bootstrap-vs-recovery switch: false means the typed
-// bootstrap-vs-recovery switch: false means the typed credential mints the first
+// credential mints the first Owner (no prior identity to verify against), true
-// Owner (no prior identity to verify against), true means the operator must
+// means the operator must identify against an existing admin for accountability.
-// identify against an existing admin for accountability. It is not on the Repo
+// It is not on the Repo interface because only the break-glass CLI consults it.
-// interface because only the break-glass CLI consults it.
 func (p *PGRepo) AdminExists(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
-	const q = `SELECT EXISTS (
+	const q = `SELECT 1 FROM users WHERE role = 'admin' LIMIT 1`
-		SELECT 1 FROM users WHERE role = 'admin' AND password_hash IS NOT NULL)`
+	var one int
-	var exists bool
+	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q).Scan(&one); {
-	if err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q).Scan(&exists); err != nil {
+	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
+		return false, nil
+	case err != nil:
 		return false, err
 	}
-	return exists, nil
+	return true, nil
 }
 
 // UserByID loads the same staff projection by id, or ErrNotFound. The
-// change-password flow re-verifies the caller's current password with it: the
+// account is passwordless — no password column is read.
-// session yields a user id, not a username.
 func (p *PGRepo) UserByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (*StaffUser, error) {
-	const q = `SELECT id, username, COALESCE(email, ''), role::text,
+	const q = `SELECT id, username, COALESCE(email, ''), role::text, email_verified
-		COALESCE(password_hash, ''), must_change_password, email_verified
 		FROM users WHERE id = $1`
 	var u StaffUser
 	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, id).Scan(
-		&u.ID, &u.Username, &u.Email, &u.Role, &u.PasswordHash, &u.MustChangePassword, &u.EmailVerified); {
+		&u.ID, &u.Username, &u.Email, &u.Role, &u.EmailVerified); {
 	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
 		return nil, ErrNotFound
 	case err != nil:
@@ -711,66 +775,30 @@ func (p *PGRepo) UserByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (*StaffUser, error) {
 }
 
 // UpsertOwner creates or resets the Owner account direct-to-Postgres (the
-// break-glass first-run / reset-password path). role is forced to 'owner' —
+// break-glass first-run / recovery path). role is forced to 'admin' — the
-// the platform-level identity one level above admin. On a username conflict the
+// platform-level identity. On a username conflict the email is overwritten
-// email, hash and must_change_password flag are overwritten while the existing
+// while the existing id is preserved, so live sessions referencing it survive
-// id is preserved, so live sessions referencing it survive a password reset.
+// a reset. The account is passwordless by design. The empty email is stored
-// The empty email is stored as NULL (users.email is nullable).
+// as NULL (users.email is nullable).
-func (p *PGRepo) UpsertOwner(ctx context.Context, id, username, email, passwordHash string, mustChange bool) error {
+func (p *PGRepo) UpsertOwner(ctx context.Context, id, username, email string) error {
 	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
-		`INSERT INTO users (id, username, email, role, password_hash, must_change_password)
+		`INSERT INTO users (id, username, email, role) VALUES ($1, $2, NULLIF($3, ''), 'admin')
-		 VALUES ($1, $2, NULLIF($3, ''), 'owner', $4, $5)
+		 ON CONFLICT (username) DO UPDATE SET email = EXCLUDED.email`,
-		 ON CONFLICT (username) DO UPDATE SET
+		id, username, email)
-		   email = NULLIF($3, ''), role = 'owner',
-		   password_hash = $4, must_change_password = $5`,
-		id, username, email, passwordHash, mustChange)
 	return err
 }
 
 // InsertOperator mints a NEW Operator (additional staff admin) account
-// direct-to-Postgres. role is forced to 'admin' — Felis has a separate 'owner'
+// direct-to-Postgres. role is forced to 'admin'. UNLIKE UpsertOwner this is
-// role (migration 0011) for the single platform owner; Operators are below
+// insert-only: a username conflict is left untouched and surfaces as a driver
-// that. UNLIKE UpsertOwner this is insert-only: a username conflict is
+// error, so adding an Operator can never silently reset the Owner's or another
-// left untouched (ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING) and reported as ErrConflict via a zero
+// Operator's row. The account is passwordless by design. The empty email is
-// RowsAffected, so adding an Operator can never silently reset the Owner's or
+// stored as NULL.
-// another Operator's credential. The empty email is stored as NULL.
+func (p *PGRepo) InsertOperator(ctx context.Context, id, username, email string) error {
-func (p *PGRepo) InsertOperator(ctx context.Context, id, username, email, passwordHash string, mustChange bool) error {
+	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
-	res, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO users (id, username, email, role) VALUES ($1, $2, NULLIF($3, ''), 'admin')`,
-		`INSERT INTO users (id, username, email, role, password_hash, must_change_password)
+		id, username, email)
-		 VALUES ($1, $2, NULLIF($3, ''), 'admin', $4, $5)
-		 ON CONFLICT (username) DO NOTHING`,
-		id, username, email, passwordHash, mustChange)
-	if err != nil {
 	return err
-	}
-	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if n == 0 {
-		return ErrConflict
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// SetPassword stores a new hash and clears must_change_password (the panel
-// change-password flow). ErrNotFound when no row matches so a stale session
-// cannot silently no-op the change.
-func (p *PGRepo) SetPassword(ctx context.Context, userID, passwordHash string) error {
-	res, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
-		`UPDATE users SET password_hash = $2, must_change_password = false WHERE id = $1`,
-		userID, passwordHash)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if n == 0 {
-		return ErrNotFound
-	}
-	return nil
 }
 
 // CreateSession records a minted session by the sha-256 of its cookie value
@@ -785,12 +813,12 @@ func (p *PGRepo) CreateSession(ctx context.Context, tokenHash, userID string, ex
 // SessionUser resolves a live (unrevoked, unexpired at now) session hash to its
 // user, or ErrNotFound.
 func (p *PGRepo) SessionUser(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string, now time.Time) (*SessionedUser, error) {
-	const q = `SELECT u.id, COALESCE(u.email, ''), u.role::text, u.must_change_password
+	const q = `SELECT u.id, COALESCE(u.email, ''), u.role::text, COALESCE(u.email_verified, false)
 		FROM sessions s JOIN users u ON u.id = s.user_id
 		WHERE s.token_hash = $1 AND s.revoked_at IS NULL AND s.expires_at > $2`
 	var u SessionedUser
 	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, tokenHash, now).Scan(
-		&u.ID, &u.Email, &u.Role, &u.MustChangePassword); {
+		&u.ID, &u.Email, &u.Role, &u.EmailVerified); {
 	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
 		return nil, ErrNotFound
 	case err != nil:
@@ -1057,7 +1085,7 @@ func (p *PGRepo) ListUsers(ctx context.Context, opts ListUsersOpts) ([]UserView,
 	}
 
 	q := `SELECT u.id, u.username, COALESCE(u.email, ''), u.role::text,
-		u.disabled, u.email_verified, u.must_change_password,
+		u.disabled, u.email_verified,
 		u.created_at, u.updated_at,
 		COALESCE((SELECT count(*) FROM servers s WHERE s.owner_id = u.id AND s.deleted_at IS NULL), 0)
 	  FROM users u` + where
@@ -1075,7 +1103,7 @@ func (p *PGRepo) ListUsers(ctx context.Context, opts ListUsersOpts) ([]UserView,
 	for rows.Next() {
 		var v UserView
 		if err := rows.Scan(&v.ID, &v.Username, &v.Email, &v.Role,
-			&v.Disabled, &v.EmailVerified, &v.MustChangePassword,
+			&v.Disabled, &v.EmailVerified,
 			&v.CreatedAt, &v.UpdatedAt, &v.ServerCount); err != nil {
 			return nil, 0, err
 		}
@@ -1087,14 +1115,14 @@ func (p *PGRepo) ListUsers(ctx context.Context, opts ListUsersOpts) ([]UserView,
 // UserDetail loads one user with its linked MC accounts, or ErrNotFound.
 func (p *PGRepo) UserDetail(ctx context.Context, userID string) (*UserDetail, error) {
 	const q = `SELECT u.id, u.username, COALESCE(u.email, ''), u.role::text,
-		u.disabled, u.email_verified, u.must_change_password,
+		u.disabled, u.email_verified,
 		u.created_at, u.updated_at, u.deleted_at,
 		COALESCE((SELECT count(*) FROM servers s WHERE s.owner_id = u.id AND s.deleted_at IS NULL), 0)
 	  FROM users u WHERE u.id = $1`
 	var d UserDetail
 	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, userID).Scan(
 		&d.ID, &d.Username, &d.Email, &d.Role,
-		&d.Disabled, &d.EmailVerified, &d.MustChangePassword,
+		&d.Disabled, &d.EmailVerified,
 		&d.CreatedAt, &d.UpdatedAt, &d.DeletedAt, &d.ServerCount); {
 	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
 		return nil, ErrNotFound
@@ -1120,19 +1148,18 @@ func (p *PGRepo) UserDetail(ctx context.Context, userID string) (*UserDetail, er
 	return &d, linkRows.Err()
 }
 
-// CreateUser mints a new user row with an initial password hash. A username
+// CreateUser mints a new user row. A username conflict → ErrConflict.
-// conflict → ErrConflict.
 func (p *PGRepo) CreateUser(ctx context.Context, input CreateUserInput, _ string) (*UserView, error) {
-	const q = `INSERT INTO users (id, username, email, role, password_hash, must_change_password)
+	const q = `INSERT INTO users (id, username, email, role)
-		VALUES (gen_random_uuid()::text, $1, NULLIF($2, ''), $3::user_role, $4, $5)
+		VALUES (gen_random_uuid()::text, $1, NULLIF($2, ''), $3::user_role)
 		ON CONFLICT (username) DO NOTHING
 		RETURNING id, username, COALESCE(email, ''), role::text, disabled, email_verified,
-			must_change_password, created_at, updated_at, 0`
+			created_at, updated_at, 0`
 	var v UserView
 	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q,
-		input.Username, input.Email, input.Role, input.PasswordHash, input.MustChange).Scan(
+		input.Username, input.Email, input.Role).Scan(
 		&v.ID, &v.Username, &v.Email, &v.Role,
-		&v.Disabled, &v.EmailVerified, &v.MustChangePassword,
+		&v.Disabled, &v.EmailVerified,
 		&v.CreatedAt, &v.UpdatedAt, &v.ServerCount); {
 	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
 		return nil, ErrConflict
@@ -1181,12 +1208,12 @@ func (p *PGRepo) UpdateUser(ctx context.Context, userID string, patch UpdateUser
 	}
 	q += fmt.Sprintf(` WHERE id = $%d AND deleted_at IS NULL`, argn)
 	q += ` RETURNING id, username, COALESCE(email, ''), role::text, disabled,
-		email_verified, must_change_password, created_at, updated_at,
+		email_verified, created_at, updated_at,
 		(SELECT count(*) FROM servers WHERE owner_id = users.id AND deleted_at IS NULL)`
 	var v UserView
 	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, args...).Scan(
 		&v.ID, &v.Username, &v.Email, &v.Role,
-		&v.Disabled, &v.EmailVerified, &v.MustChangePassword,
+		&v.Disabled, &v.EmailVerified,
 		&v.CreatedAt, &v.UpdatedAt, &v.ServerCount); {
 	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
 		return nil, ErrNotFound
@@ -1205,13 +1232,13 @@ func (p *PGRepo) UpdateUser(ctx context.Context, userID string, patch UpdateUser
 // shared by UpdateUser (no-op return) and several other paths.
 func (p *PGRepo) userView(ctx context.Context, userID string) (*UserView, error) {
 	const q = `SELECT id, username, COALESCE(email, ''), role::text, disabled,
-		email_verified, must_change_password, created_at, updated_at,
+		email_verified, created_at, updated_at,
 		(SELECT count(*) FROM servers WHERE owner_id = users.id AND deleted_at IS NULL)
 		FROM users WHERE id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`
 	var v UserView
 	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, userID).Scan(
 		&v.ID, &v.Username, &v.Email, &v.Role,
-		&v.Disabled, &v.EmailVerified, &v.MustChangePassword,
+		&v.Disabled, &v.EmailVerified,
 		&v.CreatedAt, &v.UpdatedAt, &v.ServerCount); {
 	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
 		return nil, ErrNotFound
@@ -1294,29 +1321,6 @@ func (p *PGRepo) SetUserDisabled(ctx context.Context, userID string, disabled bo
 	return nil
 }
 
-// AdminResetPassword stores a new hash and forces must_change_password so the
-// admin-set password is replaced on first login.
-func (p *PGRepo) AdminResetPassword(ctx context.Context, userID, passwordHash string) error {
-	res, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
-		`UPDATE users SET password_hash = $2, must_change_password = true WHERE id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`,
-		userID, passwordHash)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if n == 0 {
-		return ErrNotFound
-	}
-	// Revoke every session so the old password cannot be used via a retained cookie.
-	_, _ = p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
-		`UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at = now() WHERE user_id = $1 AND revoked_at IS NULL`,
-		userID)
-	return nil
-}
-
 // ---- quota admin ----
 
 // GetQuotas returns the quotas row for a user, or a zero-value view when no
@@ -1473,6 +1477,199 @@ func (p *PGRepo) LinkAccount(ctx context.Context, userID, mcUUID, authSource str
 	return nil
 }
 
+// ---- pre-session email login (spec §B) ----
+
+// UserByEmail resolves a VERIFIED email address to its login projection, or
+// ErrNotFound. Only a proven (email_verified true) address resolves, so a
+// merely-asserted address never reaches a session-mintable identity. The
+// account is passwordless — no password column is read.
+func (p *PGRepo) UserByEmail(ctx context.Context, email string) (*StaffUser, error) {
+	const q = `SELECT id, username, COALESCE(email, ''), role::text, email_verified
+		FROM users WHERE email = $1 AND email_verified = true`
+	var u StaffUser
+	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, email).Scan(
+		&u.ID, &u.Username, &u.Email, &u.Role, &u.EmailVerified); {
+	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
+		return nil, ErrNotFound
+	case err != nil:
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &u, nil
+}
+
+// ConsumeLoginEmailOTP redeems a live code for the PRE-SESSION email login door.
+// Unlike VerifyEmailOTP it has no identity side-effects: it neither writes
+// users.email nor runs the verified-email uniqueness guard — login already
+// resolved the userID via UserByEmail, which requires email_verified, so the
+// address is settled. Zero rows affected (no live code, expired, consumed, or
+// hash mismatch) → ErrNotFound.
+func (p *PGRepo) ConsumeLoginEmailOTP(ctx context.Context, userID, purpose, codeHash string, now time.Time) error {
+	res, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
+		`UPDATE email_otps SET consumed_at = $4
+		 WHERE user_id = $1 AND purpose = $2 AND code_hash = $3
+		   AND consumed_at IS NULL AND expires_at > $4`,
+		userID, purpose, codeHash, now)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if n == 0 {
+		return ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// ---- op.console staff login: in-game approval state machine (spec §B op-login) ----
+
+// CreateOpLoginRequest records a fresh pending op.console login attempt for a staff
+// account. It writes the SECOND factor only — the email-OTP is minted separately
+// under purpose 'op_login' — so a row here means this staff account is waiting for
+// an in-game admin to vouch. email is a snapshot for the audit trail.
+func (p *PGRepo) CreateOpLoginRequest(ctx context.Context, id, userID, email string, expiresAt time.Time) error {
+	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO op_login_requests (id, user_id, email, expires_at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)`,
+		id, userID, email, expiresAt)
+	return err
+}
+
+// OpLoginRequestByID loads a request by its handle, or ErrNotFound. The status poll
+// and the finish path both use it; finish additionally checks Status=='approved',
+// !Consumed, and ExpiresAt>now before minting a session. Username is left empty (no
+// join needed here). Status is derived from approved_at: 'approved' once set, else
+// 'pending'.
+func (p *PGRepo) OpLoginRequestByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (*OpLoginRequest, error) {
+	const q = `SELECT id, user_id, email, expires_at, consumed_at, approved_at, approved_by
+		FROM op_login_requests WHERE id = $1`
+	var (
+		r          OpLoginRequest
+		consumedAt sql.NullTime
+		approvedAt sql.NullTime
+		approvedBy sql.NullString
+	)
+	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, q, id).Scan(
+		&r.ID, &r.UserID, &r.Email, &r.ExpiresAt, &consumedAt, &approvedAt, &approvedBy); {
+	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
+		return nil, ErrNotFound
+	case err != nil:
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	r.Consumed = consumedAt.Valid
+	if approvedAt.Valid {
+		r.Status = "approved"
+	} else {
+		r.Status = "pending"
+	}
+	return &r, nil
+}
+
+// ListPendingOpLogins returns the live (pending, unconsumed, unexpired at now)
+// requests oldest-first, for the in-game admin's approval prompt. A resolved or
+// expired request drops out of the list, so an admin only ever sees actionable
+// attempts.
+func (p *PGRepo) ListPendingOpLogins(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) ([]OpLoginRequest, error) {
+	const q = `SELECT id, user_id, email, expires_at
+		FROM op_login_requests
+		WHERE consumed_at IS NULL AND approved_at IS NULL AND expires_at > $1
+		ORDER BY created_at`
+	rows, err := p.db.QueryContext(ctx, q, now)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	var out []OpLoginRequest
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var r OpLoginRequest
+		if err := rows.Scan(&r.ID, &r.UserID, &r.Email, &r.ExpiresAt); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		r.Status = "pending"
+		out = append(out, r)
+	}
+	return out, rows.Err()
+}
+
+// ApproveOpLogin marks a pending request approved by approverUserID (the in-game
+// admin), atomically: it stamps approved_at and approved_by only WHERE the row is
+// still pending, unconsumed, and unexpired at now. Zero rows affected (gone,
+// already resolved, or expired) → ErrNotFound, so a double approval or an
+// approval of a dead request is a no-op the caller can surface.
+func (p *PGRepo) ApproveOpLogin(ctx context.Context, id, approverUserID string, now time.Time) error {
+	res, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
+		`UPDATE op_login_requests SET approved_at = $3, approved_by = $2
+		 WHERE id = $1 AND consumed_at IS NULL AND approved_at IS NULL AND expires_at > $3`,
+		id, approverUserID, now)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if n == 0 {
+		return ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// ConsumeOpLoginRequest stamps consumed_at on an APPROVED, unconsumed, unexpired
+// request, atomically, so it can be exchanged for a session exactly once. Zero
+// rows affected (pending, already consumed, or expired) → ErrNotFound. This is the
+// finish path's single-use guard; the email-OTP is consumed separately, so a lost
+// race here never silently mints a second session.
+func (p *PGRepo) ConsumeOpLoginRequest(ctx context.Context, id string, now time.Time) error {
+	res, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
+		`UPDATE op_login_requests SET consumed_at = $2
+		 WHERE id = $1 AND consumed_at IS NULL AND expires_at > $2`,
+		id, now)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	n, err := res.RowsAffected()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if n == 0 {
+		return ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// ---- setup token redemption (spec §B) ----
+
+// ConsumeSetupToken atomically marks a one-time setup token consumed and returns
+// its user_id, or ErrNotFound when the token is absent, already consumed, or
+// expired. The /setup?token=... web flow redeems it for a lockdown session.
+func (p *PGRepo) ConsumeSetupToken(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string, now time.Time) (string, error) {
+	var userID string
+	switch err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
+		`UPDATE setup_tokens SET consumed_at = $2
+		 WHERE token_hash = $1 AND consumed_at IS NULL AND expires_at > $2
+		 RETURNING user_id`,
+		tokenHash, now).Scan(&userID); {
+	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
+		return "", ErrNotFound
+	case err != nil:
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return userID, nil
+}
+
+// CreateSetupToken persists a one-time setup token for the first-web-login
+// bootstrap, storing only its hash (the raw value rides in the /setup?token=...
+// URL). `felis setup` mints it after binding the Owner's Minecraft account; it is
+// redeemed exactly once by ConsumeSetupToken. The caller supplies a 256-bit
+// random token, so a token_hash collision is not a case worth special-handling —
+// any insert error (including an unknown user_id) surfaces to the caller.
+func (p *PGRepo) CreateSetupToken(ctx context.Context, tokenHash, userID string, expiresAt time.Time) error {
+	_, err := p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO setup_tokens (token_hash, user_id, expires_at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3)`,
+		tokenHash, userID, expiresAt)
+	return err
+}
+
 // joinStr joins a slice of strings with ", ".
 func joinStr(vals []string) string {
 	if len(vals) == 0 {

internal/api/repo.go

@@ -71,21 +71,19 @@ type BackupRecord struct {
 	SizeBytes   int64
 }
 
-// StaffUser is the login-side projection of a users row that carries a password
+// StaffUser is the login-side projection of a users row (spec §B passwordless
-// (spec §B local-auth). Owner/Operator are role=admin rows WITH a bcrypt hash,
+// auth). Owner/Operator are role=admin rows, minted by `felis setup` (MC link)
-// minted by `felis breakGlass`; players are role=user rows whose PasswordHash is
+// and recovered by `felis breakGlass` (email OTP); players are role=user rows.
-// empty. It is loaded by username at login to verify the password and learn
+// There is no password column — staff authenticate via email-OTP / passkey +
-// whether a first-login change is still pending.
+// in-game approve, never a password.
 type StaffUser struct {
 	ID       string
 	Username string
 	Email    string
 	Role     string
-	PasswordHash       string
-	MustChangePassword bool
 	// EmailVerified mirrors users.email_verified (spec §B2): the address was proven
 	// via an email OTP, not merely asserted. Players carry it through onboarding;
-	// staff rows seeded by break-glass leave it false until a code is redeemed.
+	// staff rows seeded by setup leave it false until a code is redeemed.
 	EmailVerified bool
 }
 
@@ -117,15 +115,30 @@ type PasskeyCredential struct {
 }
 
 // SessionedUser is the projection resolved from a live session cookie: the
-// identity SessionAuth needs to build a Principal. It omits the password hash —
+// identity SessionAuth needs to build a Principal. EmailVerified mirrors
-// the session has already authenticated the caller — but carries the pending
+// users.email_verified so the lockdown middleware can gate setup-incomplete
-// first-login change flag so the lockdown middleware can fence a half-onboarded
+// accounts without a second DB read.
-// staff account to the change-password surface.
 type SessionedUser struct {
 	ID            string
 	Email         string
 	Role          string
-	MustChangePassword bool
+	EmailVerified bool
+}
+
+// OpLoginRequest is one op.console staff-login attempt (spec §B op-login): the
+// durable second factor (in-game approval) that pairs with an email_otps code under
+// purpose 'op_login'. Username is populated only by ListPendingOpLogins (the join the
+// in-game admin needs to name who is waiting); Consumed reflects consumed_at, so the
+// finish path can refuse an already-spent request without a second query.
+type OpLoginRequest struct {
+	ID        string
+	UserID    string
+	Username  string // joined for the in-game pending list; "" elsewhere
+	Email     string
+	Status    string // 'pending' | 'approved' | 'denied'
+	Consumed  bool   // consumed_at IS NOT NULL (single-use guard)
+	ExpiresAt time.Time
+	CreatedAt time.Time
 }
 
 // Repo is the business-layer data access the API depends on. It is an interface
@@ -257,7 +270,55 @@ type Repo interface {
 	// code (so a typo does not burn it). On a match the code is consumed and the
 	// user row is flipped to email=<the proven address>, email_verified=true; the
 	// proven email is returned. now is the API clock so expiry is testable.
+	//
+	// This is the ONBOARDING primitive: verifying the code is the moment the address
+	// becomes proven, so the write is load-bearing. The pre-session LOGIN door must
+	// NOT use it — see ConsumeLoginEmailOTP.
 	VerifyEmailOTP(ctx context.Context, userID, purpose, codeHash string, now time.Time) (email string, err error)
+	// ConsumeLoginEmailOTP redeems the newest live code for (userID, purpose) against
+	// codeHash for the PRE-SESSION email LOGIN door, with the SAME code lifecycle as
+	// VerifyEmailOTP (FOR UPDATE, expiry+lockout before hash compare, mismatch charges
+	// one attempt without consuming) but with NO identity side-effects: it neither
+	// writes users.email nor runs the verified-email uniqueness guard. Login resolved
+	// userID via UserByEmail, which already requires email_verified, so the address is
+	// settled — re-proving control of a code this session must not re-touch the row.
+	// Returning only an error is deliberate: unlike onboarding, login has nothing to
+	// prove about the address, so there is no email to hand back. Errors are exactly
+	// ErrOTPInvalid / ErrOTPLocked (ErrEmailTaken is structurally impossible here).
+	ConsumeLoginEmailOTP(ctx context.Context, userID, purpose, codeHash string, now time.Time) error
+
+	// ---- op.console staff login: in-game approval state machine (spec §B op-login) ----
+
+	// CreateOpLoginRequest records a fresh pending op.console login attempt for a staff
+	// account (spec §B op-login). id is the opaque handle the browser polls; email is a
+	// snapshot for the audit trail. It writes the SECOND factor only — the email-OTP
+	// itself is minted separately under purpose 'op_login' (CreateEmailOTP) — so a row
+	// here means "this staff account is waiting for an in-game admin to vouch". expiresAt
+	// is the API clock + TTL so expiry is driven by one authoritative clock.
+	CreateOpLoginRequest(ctx context.Context, id, userID, email string, expiresAt time.Time) error
+	// OpLoginRequestByID loads a request by its handle, or ErrNotFound. The status poll
+	// and the finish path both use it: finish additionally checks Status=='approved',
+	// !Consumed, and ExpiresAt>now before it will mint a session, so a pending, spent, or
+	// expired request can never be exchanged. Username is left empty (no join needed here).
+	OpLoginRequestByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (*OpLoginRequest, error)
+	// ListPendingOpLogins returns the live (pending, unconsumed, unexpired at now)
+	// requests oldest-first, each joined to its staff username, for the in-game admin's
+	// approval prompt (Velocity polls this on the internal face). A resolved or expired
+	// request drops out of the list, so an admin only ever sees actionable attempts.
+	ListPendingOpLogins(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) ([]OpLoginRequest, error)
+	// ApproveOpLogin marks a pending request approved by approverUserID (the in-game
+	// admin, resolved from their online-mode UUID via UserByMCUUID), atomically: it
+	// stamps status='approved', approved_by, approved_at only WHERE the row is still
+	// pending, unconsumed, and unexpired at now. A request that is gone, already
+	// resolved, or expired affects zero rows and returns ErrNotFound, so a double
+	// approval or an approval of a dead request is a no-op the caller can surface.
+	ApproveOpLogin(ctx context.Context, id, approverUserID string, now time.Time) error
+	// ConsumeOpLoginRequest stamps consumed_at on an APPROVED, unconsumed, unexpired
+	// request, atomically, so it can be exchanged for a session exactly once. Zero rows
+	// affected (pending, already consumed, or expired) → ErrNotFound. This is the finish
+	// path's single-use guard; the email-OTP is consumed separately, so a lost race here
+	// never silently mints a second session.
+	ConsumeOpLoginRequest(ctx context.Context, id string, now time.Time) error
 
 	// ---- player passkey enrollment (spec §14 WebAuthn / Phase 6 bind) ----
 
@@ -350,15 +411,23 @@ type Repo interface {
 	// session yields a user id, not a username, so this is the id-keyed counterpart
 	// of UserByUsername.
 	UserByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (*StaffUser, error)
+	// UserByEmail resolves a VERIFIED email address to its login projection,
+	// case-insensitively, or ErrNotFound (spec §B email-first login). It is the
+	// entry point every email-first web login shares: the address must be proven
+	// (email_verified true), so a merely-asserted or unverified address never
+	// resolves to a session-mintable identity — an attacker cannot claim someone
+	// else's login by typing their email. Matching is on lower(email) to align with
+	// the users_verified_email_unique partial index (migration 0010), which
+	// guarantees at most one verified row per normalized address, so the result is
+	// unambiguous. A player row (empty PasswordHash) resolves too — email-first
+	// login is passwordless and does not consult the hash — unlike the password
+	// path, which this deliberately does not gate on.
+	UserByEmail(ctx context.Context, email string) (*StaffUser, error)
 	// UpsertOwner creates or resets the single Owner account direct-to-Postgres
-	// (the `felis breakGlass` first-run / reset-password path). role is forced to
+	// (the `felis setup` / `felis breakGlass` recovery path). role is forced to
-	// 'admin' and must_change_password to mustChange; on a username conflict the
+	// 'admin'; on a username conflict the existing row's email is overwritten so
-	// existing row's email, hash and flag are overwritten so a reset is idempotent.
+	// a reset is idempotent. The account is passwordless by design.
-	UpsertOwner(ctx context.Context, id, username, email, passwordHash string, mustChange bool) error
+	UpsertOwner(ctx context.Context, id, username, email string) error
-	// SetPassword stores a new bcrypt hash for a user and clears
-	// must_change_password (the panel change-password flow). ErrNotFound when no
-	// row matches, so a stale session cannot silently no-op a password change.
-	SetPassword(ctx context.Context, userID, passwordHash string) error
 	// CreateSession records a minted session: the sha-256 of the opaque cookie
 	// value, its owner, and its expiry (spec §B sessions). Only the hash is stored,
 	// mirroring tokens, so a database read never yields a usable cookie.
@@ -370,10 +439,15 @@ type Repo interface {
 	// absent or already-revoked session is not an error.
 	RevokeSession(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string) error
 	// RevokeUserSessionsExcept revokes every live session of a user except the one
-	// whose hash is keepTokenHash. The change-password flow calls it so a successful
+	// whose hash is keepTokenHash. Used to log out other devices on a security event.
-	// password change logs out the account's other devices but not the current one.
 	RevokeUserSessionsExcept(ctx context.Context, userID, keepTokenHash string) error
 
+	// ConsumeSetupToken atomically marks a one-time setup token consumed and returns
+	// its user_id, or ErrNotFound when the token is absent, already consumed, or
+	// expired. The /setup?token=... web flow redeems it for a lockdown session that
+	// can only complete passwordless login setup (verify email / enroll passkey).
+	ConsumeSetupToken(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string, now time.Time) (userID string, err error)
+
 	// ---- runtime platform settings (spec §B platform_settings) ----
 
 	// GetSetting reads a runtime setting's raw jsonb value, or ErrNotFound when the
@@ -392,9 +466,8 @@ type Repo interface {
 	// UserDetail loads one user with its linked MC accounts, or ErrNotFound.
 	// A deleted user is returned (the row lives for audit) but flagged.
 	UserDetail(ctx context.Context, userID string) (*UserDetail, error)
-	// CreateUser mints a new user row (role forced to either 'admin' or 'user')
+	// CreateUser mints a new user row (role forced to either 'admin' or 'user').
-	// with an initial password hash. createdBy is the actor email for audit. A
+	// createdBy is the actor email for audit. A username conflict → ErrConflict.
-	// username conflict → ErrConflict.
 	CreateUser(ctx context.Context, input CreateUserInput, createdBy string) (*UserView, error)
 	// UpdateUser applies the non-nil fields of patch to the user identified by
 	// userID and returns the updated view. A username conflict → ErrConflict;
@@ -410,10 +483,6 @@ type Repo interface {
 	// disabled account is immediately locked out. A non-existent user →
 	// ErrNotFound; a deleted user → ErrNotFound.
 	SetUserDisabled(ctx context.Context, userID string, disabled bool) error
-	// AdminResetPassword stores a new bcrypt hash for a user and forces
-	// must_change_password, so the admin-set password is replaced on first
-	// login. ErrNotFound when no live row matches.
-	AdminResetPassword(ctx context.Context, userID, passwordHash string) error
 
 	// ---- quota admin (spec §6 quotas, admin-only) ----
 
@@ -469,7 +538,6 @@ type UserView struct {
 	Disabled      bool      `json:"disabled"`
 	EmailVerified bool      `json:"email_verified"`
 	ServerCount   int       `json:"server_count"`
-	MustChangePassword bool      `json:"must_change_password"`
 	CreatedAt     time.Time `json:"created_at"`
 	UpdatedAt     time.Time `json:"updated_at"`
 }
@@ -493,8 +561,6 @@ type CreateUserInput struct {
 	Username string `json:"username"`
 	Email    string `json:"email,omitempty"`
 	Role     string `json:"role"`
-	PasswordHash    string `json:"-"`
-	MustChange      bool   `json:"must_change_password"`
 }
 
 // UpdateUserInput is the admin patch-user form. Every field is a pointer so

internal/api/session.go

@@ -160,7 +160,8 @@ func (s SessionAuth) Authenticate(r *http.Request) (*Principal, error) {
 		Email:          u.Email,
 		Role:           u.Role,
 		ViaAdminAccess: u.Role == "admin" && hostIsAdminConsole(r, s.RootDomain, s.AdminHostname),
-		MustChangePassword: u.MustChangePassword,
+		EmailVerified:  u.EmailVerified,
+		ViaSession:     true,
 	}, nil
 }
 

internal/panel/panel.go

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
 	"io/fs"
 	"net/http"
 	"path"
+	"regexp"
 	"strings"
 )
 
@@ -19,10 +20,79 @@ var static embed.FS
 type runtimeConfig struct {
 	APIBase       string    `json:"apiBase"`
 	RootDomain    string    `json:"rootDomain"`
+	PanelHostname string    `json:"panelHostname,omitempty"`
+	AdminHostname string    `json:"adminHostname,omitempty"`
+	Build         buildInfo `json:"build"`
 }
 
-// Handler wraps the external API handler with the panel SPA.
+// buildInfo is the resolved build stamp the panel renders in its version badge.
-func Handler(api http.Handler, rootDomain string) http.Handler {
+// It is derived once, server-side, from the binary's `main.version` (a
+// `git describe --tags --always --dirty` string) so the panel needs no brittle
+// string parsing — it just renders `Release`, appending `+Commit` when `Dev`.
+type buildInfo struct {
+	// Version is the raw resolved stamp (e.g. "v1.0.0-earlyAccess-3-g1a2b3c4").
+	Version string `json:"version"`
+	// Release is the "big version" — the newest tag with any git-describe suffix
+	// stripped (e.g. "v1.0.0-earlyAccess"). It is what the release channel shows.
+	Release string `json:"release"`
+	// Commit is the short commit the dev channel was built from (e.g. "1a2b3c4"),
+	// empty for a clean release build.
+	Commit string `json:"commit,omitempty"`
+	// Dev is true for a non-release build — the dev channel (main past the tag), an
+	// untagged/bare-SHA build, a dirty tree, or an un-stamped local `go build`.
+	Dev bool `json:"dev"`
+}
+
+// describeSuffix matches the trailing "-<commits>-g<sha>" that `git describe`
+// appends to the newest tag once HEAD is past it — the shape the dev channel
+// (main HEAD) produces. The release channel builds the exact tag, so its stamp
+// carries no such suffix. Match is anchored at end so a tag whose prerelease part
+// itself contains hyphens (v1.0.0-earlyAccess) keeps that part in Release.
+var describeSuffix = regexp.MustCompile(`-([0-9]+)-g([0-9a-f]+)$`)
+
+// releaseTag matches a clean released semantic-version tag (vMAJOR.MINOR.PATCH
+// with an optional -prerelease), i.e. the name the release channel builds. It is
+// permissive on the prerelease so tags like v1.0.0-earlyAccess qualify.
+var releaseTag = regexp.MustCompile(`^v[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+(-[0-9A-Za-z.]+)?$`)
+
+// parseBuildVersion splits a `git describe` build stamp into the fields the panel
+// version badge renders. Cases: a dev stamp "<tag>-N-gSHA" → Release=<tag>,
+// Commit=SHA, Dev=true; a clean release tag "vX.Y.Z[-pre]" → Release=tag, Dev=false;
+// anything else ("dev", "unknown", a bare short SHA, a dirty tree) → best-effort
+// Release with Dev=true.
+func parseBuildVersion(raw string) buildInfo {
+	raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
+	if raw == "" {
+		raw = "dev"
+	}
+	bi := buildInfo{Version: raw}
+	core := strings.TrimSuffix(raw, "-dirty")
+	dirty := core != raw
+
+	switch {
+	case describeSuffix.MatchString(core):
+		m := describeSuffix.FindStringSubmatch(core)
+		bi.Release = core[:len(core)-len(m[0])]
+		bi.Commit = m[2]
+		bi.Dev = true
+	case releaseTag.MatchString(core) && !dirty:
+		bi.Release = core
+		bi.Dev = false
+	default:
+		bi.Release = core
+		bi.Dev = true
+	}
+	return bi
+}
+
+// Handler wraps the external API handler with the panel SPA. version is the
+// binary's resolved build stamp (cmd/felis resolvedVersion()); it is surfaced to
+// the SPA via /config.json for the version badge. panelHost and adminHost are the
+// configured console.<root_domain> and op.console.<root_domain> hostnames (either
+// may be empty when that face is not deployed); they let the SPA detect which home
+// it is being served from by comparing location.host, so one bundle can render the
+// right surface (player console vs SysAdmin console) without a rebuild.
+func Handler(api http.Handler, rootDomain, panelHost, adminHost, version string) http.Handler {
 	files, err := fs.Sub(static, "static")
 	if err != nil {
 		panic(err)
@@ -30,6 +100,9 @@ func Handler(api http.Handler, rootDomain string) http.Handler {
 	return &handler{
 		api:           api,
 		rootDomain:    rootDomain,
+		panelHostname: panelHost,
+		adminHostname: adminHost,
+		build:         parseBuildVersion(version),
 		files:         files,
 		fileServer:    http.FileServer(http.FS(files)),
 	}
@@ -38,6 +111,9 @@ func Handler(api http.Handler, rootDomain string) http.Handler {
 type handler struct {
 	api           http.Handler
 	rootDomain    string
+	panelHostname string
+	adminHostname string
+	build         buildInfo
 	files         fs.FS
 	fileServer    http.Handler
 }
@@ -55,7 +131,13 @@ func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	case r.URL.Path == "/config.json":
 		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
 		w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
-		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(runtimeConfig{APIBase: "/api/v1", RootDomain: h.rootDomain})
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(runtimeConfig{
+			APIBase:       "/api/v1",
+			RootDomain:    h.rootDomain,
+			PanelHostname: h.panelHostname,
+			AdminHostname: h.adminHostname,
+			Build:         h.build,
+		})
 	case h.hasStaticFile(r.URL.Path):
 		h.fileServer.ServeHTTP(w, r)
 	default:

internal/panel/panel_test.go

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ func TestHandlerServesPanelAndConfig(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTeapot)
 	})
-	h := Handler(api, "example.test")
+	h := Handler(api, "example.test", "console.example.test", "op.console.example.test", "v1.2.3")
 
 	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
 	h.ServeHTTP(w, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil))
@@ -41,6 +41,15 @@ func TestHandlerServesPanelAndConfig(t *testing.T) {
 	if cfg.APIBase != "/api/v1" || cfg.RootDomain != "example.test" {
 		t.Fatalf("config = %+v", cfg)
 	}
+	// The tiering plumbing surfaces the two console hostnames so one bundle can
+	// detect which face it is being served from, plus a resolved build stamp for
+	// the version badge. A clean release tag resolves to a non-dev build.
+	if cfg.PanelHostname != "console.example.test" || cfg.AdminHostname != "op.console.example.test" {
+		t.Fatalf("config tiering hostnames = %+v", cfg)
+	}
+	if cfg.Build.Version != "v1.2.3" || cfg.Build.Release != "v1.2.3" || cfg.Build.Dev {
+		t.Fatalf("config build stamp = %+v", cfg.Build)
+	}
 
 	w = httptest.NewRecorder()
 	h.ServeHTTP(w, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/me", nil))

internal/panel/webview_test.go

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ func newPanelHandler(t *testing.T) http.Handler {
 	api := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTeapot)
 	})
-	return Handler(api, "example.test")
+	return Handler(api, "example.test", "", "", "")
 }
 
 func TestGuardServesInterstitialForWeChatNavigation(t *testing.T) {

internal/store/migrations/0012_setup_tokens.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-- One-time setup tokens for the first-web-login bootstrap (spec §B).
+-- `felis setup` binds the Owner's Minecraft account, promotes it to the
+-- passwordless Owner (role='admin'), and mints one of these — the raw token
+-- rides in the op.console /setup?token=... URL while only its sha-256 hash is
+-- stored here, mirroring sessions and account_link_codes. Opening the URL
+-- redeems the token once (ConsumeSetupToken) for a lockdown session in which the
+-- Owner verifies their email and enrols a passkey instead of setting a password.
+-- Tokens are single-use (consumed_at) and short-lived (expires_at, 30 min); a
+-- redeemed row is spent, not deleted, so a replayed URL is a clean miss rather
+-- than a fresh mint. ON DELETE CASCADE keeps pending tokens from outliving the
+-- user they bootstrap (mirrors webauthn_credentials, migration 0008).
+CREATE TABLE setup_tokens (
+  token_hash  text PRIMARY KEY,                                  -- sha-256(raw token); the raw value only ever lives in the URL
+  user_id     text NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+  expires_at  timestamptz NOT NULL,                              -- redemption refused once passed (ConsumeSetupToken)
+  consumed_at timestamptz,                                       -- non-NULL once redeemed; the single-use gate
+  created_at  timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
+);
+CREATE INDEX setup_tokens_user_id_idx ON setup_tokens (user_id);

plugins/shared/src/main/java/best/lolicon/felis/link/FelisApiClient.java

@@ -173,6 +173,33 @@ public final class FelisApiClient {
         return barred instanceof Boolean && (Boolean) barred;
     }
 
+    /**
+     * opLoginApprove records an in-game administrator's vouch for a pending op.console
+     * staff login — the second factor of the spec §B op-login door, supplied from
+     * Velocity's {@code /felis web op approve <code>}. It POSTs the approver's verified
+     * online-mode UUID to {@code POST /api/v1/internal/op-login/{id}/approve}; felis-api
+     * resolves that UUID to a linked account and refuses unless it is {@code role=admin}
+     * (403 {@code not_admin}), so this is defence in depth over Velocity's own in-game
+     * guard rather than the sole check. A {@code requestId} naming no live pending
+     * request is 404 {@code op_login_not_found}. Both arrive as branchable
+     * {@link LinkException}s; a 200 that does not affirm {@code approved:true} is a
+     * contract breach, not a refusal.
+     *
+     * <p>{@code requestId} is interpolated into the request path, so the caller must
+     * pass a validated opaque handle (the 32-hex id minted by op-login start) — never
+     * unsanitised chat input. The Velocity command validates the charset first.
+     */
+    public void opLoginApprove(String requestId, UUID approverUuid) throws LinkException {
+        Objects.requireNonNull(requestId, "requestId");
+        Objects.requireNonNull(approverUuid, "approverUuid");
+        String body = "{\"approver_uuid\":\"" + approverUuid + "\"}";
+        Map<?, ?> res = postObject("/api/v1/internal/op-login/" + requestId + "/approve", body, 200);
+        Object approved = res.get("approved");
+        if (!(approved instanceof Boolean) || !((Boolean) approved)) {
+            throw new LinkException(200, "bad_response", "approve returned 200 without approved=true");
+        }
+    }
+
     // ---- transport ----
 
     private Map<?, ?> getObject(String path, int expect) throws LinkException {

plugins/velocity/src/main/java/best/lolicon/felis/velocity/FelisVelocityPlugin.java

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import best.lolicon.felis.link.ServerView;
 
 import com.google.inject.Inject;
 import com.mojang.brigadier.Command;
+import com.mojang.brigadier.arguments.StringArgumentType;
 import com.mojang.brigadier.tree.LiteralCommandNode;
 import com.velocitypowered.api.command.BrigadierCommand;
 import com.velocitypowered.api.command.CommandManager;
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ import com.velocitypowered.api.plugin.Plugin;
 import com.velocitypowered.api.plugin.annotation.DataDirectory;
 import com.velocitypowered.api.proxy.Player;
 import com.velocitypowered.api.proxy.ProxyServer;
+import com.velocitypowered.api.proxy.ServerConnection;
 import net.kyori.adventure.text.Component;
 import net.kyori.adventure.text.format.NamedTextColor;
 import org.slf4j.Logger;
@@ -27,6 +29,9 @@ import java.nio.file.Path;
 import java.time.Duration;
 import java.util.Collection;
 import java.util.List;
+import java.util.Optional;
+import java.util.UUID;
+import java.util.regex.Pattern;
 
 /**
  * FelisVelocityPlugin is the proxy-side of Felis (spec §10 account-link + §11
@@ -72,6 +77,7 @@ public final class FelisVelocityPlugin {
     private LinkClient linkClient;
     private FelisApiClient apiClient;
     private ServerRegistry registry;
+    private WaitingRouter router;
     private boolean onlineMode;
     private boolean routingActive;
 
@@ -110,7 +116,7 @@ public final class FelisVelocityPlugin {
 
         this.apiClient = new FelisApiClient(config.linkConfig());
         this.registry = new ServerRegistry(proxy, logger, config.rootDomain());
-        WaitingRouter router = new WaitingRouter(proxy, logger, apiClient, registry, this, config.lobbyServer());
+        this.router = new WaitingRouter(proxy, logger, apiClient, registry, this, config.lobbyServer());
         MotdResponder motd = new MotdResponder(registry);
         proxy.getEventManager().register(this, router);
         proxy.getEventManager().register(this, motd);
@@ -197,7 +203,42 @@ public final class FelisVelocityPlugin {
         });
     }
 
-    // ---- /felis (operator status) ----
+    // ---- /felis command suite (spec §B in-game authz; P4) ----
+    //
+    // /felis is the proxy-wide operator surface: the ONE place a command runs with a
+    // service token behind it AND a Mojang-verified UUID in front of it, so it is where
+    // the in-game half of the passwordless-auth flows lives. The tree:
+    //
+    //   /felis                        proxy + routing status
+    //   /felis help                   this list
+    //   /felis server                 the felis servers this proxy knows
+    //   /felis go <server>            wake a server and move me in when it's ready
+    //   /felis claim                  take ownership of the server I'm on
+    //   /felis web                    where the web consoles live
+    //   /felis web op approve <code>  vouch for a pending op.console staff login (§B)
+    //
+    // Two guards run before any subcommand that acts or reveals operational state:
+    //
+    //   - the login-limbo gate — a player still sitting in the "login" system server
+    //     (naming.SystemLoginServer) has not passed the front door, so every acting
+    //     subcommand is refused there; only `help` is always available. The console
+    //     source is the trusted operator terminal and is never "in limbo".
+    //   - player-only actions (go / claim / web op approve) reject the console: they
+    //     derive identity from the caller's verified UUID, which only a Player carries,
+    //     so an op-login approver is provably online as themselves (spec §14). The
+    //     API independently re-checks that the UUID is a linked admin — this gate is
+    //     defence in depth over that, not a substitute for it.
+
+    /** Opaque-handle charset an op-login code must match before it enters a request
+     *  path: the id minted by op-login start is 32 hex, but a conservative url-safe set
+     *  is accepted so a future id format still passes while path-dangerous input
+     *  (slash, dot, whitespace) is refused client-side rather than sent. */
+    private static final Pattern OP_LOGIN_CODE = Pattern.compile("^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,128}$");
+
+    /** The always-on login limbo (LOOHP/Limbo) — the reserved system name
+     *  {@code naming.SystemLoginServer}, which users can never claim, so gating on the
+     *  server name is stable. */
+    private static final String LOGIN_LIMBO = "login";
 
     private void registerFelisCommand() {
         CommandManager commands = proxy.getCommandManager();
@@ -206,31 +247,120 @@ public final class FelisVelocityPlugin {
                     sendSummary(ctx.getSource());
                     return Command.SINGLE_SUCCESS;
                 })
-                .then(BrigadierCommand.literalArgumentBuilder("list")
+                .then(BrigadierCommand.literalArgumentBuilder("help")
                         .executes(ctx -> {
-                            sendList(ctx.getSource());
+                            sendHelp(ctx.getSource());
                             return Command.SINGLE_SUCCESS;
                         }))
+                .then(BrigadierCommand.literalArgumentBuilder("server")
+                        .executes(ctx -> {
+                            sendServerList(ctx.getSource());
+                            return Command.SINGLE_SUCCESS;
+                        }))
+                .then(BrigadierCommand.literalArgumentBuilder("go")
+                        .then(BrigadierCommand.requiredArgumentBuilder("server", StringArgumentType.word())
+                                .executes(ctx -> {
+                                    doGo(ctx.getSource(), StringArgumentType.getString(ctx, "server"));
+                                    return Command.SINGLE_SUCCESS;
+                                })))
+                .then(BrigadierCommand.literalArgumentBuilder("claim")
+                        .executes(ctx -> {
+                            doClaim(ctx.getSource());
+                            return Command.SINGLE_SUCCESS;
+                        }))
+                .then(BrigadierCommand.literalArgumentBuilder("web")
+                        .executes(ctx -> {
+                            sendWebInfo(ctx.getSource());
+                            return Command.SINGLE_SUCCESS;
+                        })
+                        .then(BrigadierCommand.literalArgumentBuilder("op")
+                                .executes(ctx -> {
+                                    sendWebOpInfo(ctx.getSource());
+                                    return Command.SINGLE_SUCCESS;
+                                })
+                                .then(BrigadierCommand.literalArgumentBuilder("approve")
+                                        .then(BrigadierCommand.requiredArgumentBuilder("code", StringArgumentType.word())
+                                                .executes(ctx -> {
+                                                    doOpApprove(ctx.getSource(), StringArgumentType.getString(ctx, "code"));
+                                                    return Command.SINGLE_SUCCESS;
+                                                })))))
                 .build();
         CommandMeta meta = commands.metaBuilder("felis").plugin(this).build();
         commands.register(meta, new BrigadierCommand(node));
     }
 
+    // ---- guards ----
+
+    // requirePlayer refuses the console for identity-bound actions (go / claim /
+    // approve): they act on the caller's Mojang-verified UUID, which only a Player has.
+    private Player requirePlayer(CommandSource source) {
+        if (source instanceof Player) {
+            return (Player) source;
+        }
+        source.sendMessage(Component.text("That command can only be run in-game by a player.", NamedTextColor.RED));
+        return null;
+    }
+
+    // ensureOutOfLimbo refuses an acting subcommand while the player is still in the
+    // login limbo (or not yet on any backend): they have not passed the front door.
+    // Fails closed on an unknown position.
+    private boolean ensureOutOfLimbo(Player player) {
+        Optional<ServerConnection> current = player.getCurrentServer();
+        if (current.isEmpty()) {
+            player.sendMessage(Component.text(
+                    "Hold on — finish connecting before using /felis.", NamedTextColor.YELLOW));
+            return false;
+        }
+        if (LOGIN_LIMBO.equalsIgnoreCase(current.get().getServerInfo().getName())) {
+            player.sendMessage(Component.text(
+                    "Finish signing in first — /felis isn't available from the login area.",
+                    NamedTextColor.YELLOW));
+            return false;
+        }
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    // gateInfo applies only the limbo gate (the console is always allowed) for the
+    // read-only, operational-info subcommands. Returns true when the caller may proceed.
+    private boolean gateInfo(CommandSource source) {
+        return !(source instanceof Player) || ensureOutOfLimbo((Player) source);
+    }
+
+    // ---- handlers ----
+
     private void sendSummary(CommandSource source) {
+        if (!gateInfo(source)) {
+            return;
+        }
         source.sendMessage(Component.text("Felis proxy", NamedTextColor.AQUA));
         source.sendMessage(field("online-mode", String.valueOf(onlineMode)));
         if (!routingActive) {
             source.sendMessage(Component.text(
                     "  routing: disabled" + (onlineMode ? " (no root-domain set)" : " (offline mode)"),
                     NamedTextColor.YELLOW));
+            source.sendMessage(Component.text("  /felis help for commands", NamedTextColor.GRAY));
             return;
         }
         source.sendMessage(field("root-domain", config.rootDomain()));
         source.sendMessage(field("lobby", config.lobbyServer() == null ? "<none>" : config.lobbyServer()));
         source.sendMessage(field("servers", String.valueOf(registry.all().size())));
+        source.sendMessage(Component.text("  /felis help for commands", NamedTextColor.GRAY));
     }
 
-    private void sendList(CommandSource source) {
+    private void sendHelp(CommandSource source) {
+        source.sendMessage(Component.text("Felis commands", NamedTextColor.AQUA));
+        helpLine(source, "/felis", "proxy and routing status");
+        helpLine(source, "/felis server", "the felis servers this proxy knows");
+        helpLine(source, "/felis go <server>", "start a server and move you in when it's ready");
+        helpLine(source, "/felis claim", "take ownership of the server you're on");
+        helpLine(source, "/felis web", "where the web consoles live");
+        helpLine(source, "/felis web op approve <code>", "approve a pending operator sign-in");
+    }
+
+    private void sendServerList(CommandSource source) {
+        if (!gateInfo(source)) {
+            return;
+        }
         if (!routingActive) {
             source.sendMessage(Component.text("Felis routing is disabled.", NamedTextColor.YELLOW));
             return;
@@ -249,6 +379,177 @@ public final class FelisVelocityPlugin {
         }
     }
 
+    private void doGo(CommandSource source, String serverArg) {
+        Player player = requirePlayer(source);
+        if (player == null || !ensureOutOfLimbo(player)) {
+            return;
+        }
+        if (!routingActive) {
+            player.sendMessage(routingDisabled());
+            return;
+        }
+        String target = serverArg.trim();
+        ServerView match = null;
+        for (ServerView v : registry.all()) {
+            if (v.name().equalsIgnoreCase(target)) {
+                match = v;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (match == null) {
+            player.sendMessage(Component.text(
+                    "No felis server named « " + target + " ». Try /felis server.", NamedTextColor.YELLOW));
+            return;
+        }
+        Optional<ServerConnection> current = player.getCurrentServer();
+        if (current.isPresent() && current.get().getServerInfo().getName().equalsIgnoreCase(match.name())) {
+            player.sendMessage(Component.text("You're already on « " + match.name() + " ».", NamedTextColor.GRAY));
+            return;
+        }
+        // Wake + park + transfer through the shared waiting queue; it reports its own
+        // policy-gate (403) and transient refusals to the player.
+        router.enqueueFromCommand(player, match.name());
+    }
+
+    private void doClaim(CommandSource source) {
+        Player player = requirePlayer(source);
+        if (player == null || !ensureOutOfLimbo(player)) {
+            return;
+        }
+        if (!routingActive) {
+            player.sendMessage(routingDisabled());
+            return;
+        }
+        Optional<ServerConnection> current = player.getCurrentServer();
+        if (current.isEmpty()) {
+            player.sendMessage(Component.text("Join a server before claiming it.", NamedTextColor.YELLOW));
+            return;
+        }
+        String name = current.get().getServerInfo().getName();
+        if (!registry.isManaged(name)) {
+            player.sendMessage(Component.text(
+                    "« " + name + " » isn't a claimable felis server.", NamedTextColor.YELLOW));
+            return;
+        }
+        UUID uuid = player.getUniqueId();
+        player.sendMessage(Component.text("Claiming « " + name + " »…", NamedTextColor.GRAY));
+        async(() -> {
+            try {
+                apiClient.claim(name, uuid);
+                player.sendMessage(Component.text("You now own « " + name + " ».", NamedTextColor.GREEN));
+            } catch (LinkException e) {
+                player.sendMessage(Component.text(claimError(e, name), NamedTextColor.RED));
+            }
+        });
+    }
+
+    private void sendWebInfo(CommandSource source) {
+        if (!gateInfo(source)) {
+            return;
+        }
+        String root = config.rootDomain();
+        if (root == null) {
+            source.sendMessage(Component.text(
+                    "The web console isn't configured on this proxy.", NamedTextColor.YELLOW));
+            return;
+        }
+        source.sendMessage(Component.text("Felis web consoles", NamedTextColor.AQUA));
+        source.sendMessage(field("players", "https://console." + root));
+        source.sendMessage(field("operators", "https://op.console." + root));
+        source.sendMessage(Component.text(
+                "  operators: /felis web op approve <code> vouches for a pending sign-in",
+                NamedTextColor.GRAY));
+    }
+
+    private void sendWebOpInfo(CommandSource source) {
+        if (!gateInfo(source)) {
+            return;
+        }
+        source.sendMessage(Component.text("Operator sign-in", NamedTextColor.AQUA));
+        source.sendMessage(Component.text(
+                "An operator signing in at op.console shows an approval code. Run", NamedTextColor.GRAY));
+        source.sendMessage(Component.text("  /felis web op approve <code>", NamedTextColor.WHITE));
+        source.sendMessage(Component.text(
+                "to vouch for it — you must be an online, linked administrator.", NamedTextColor.GRAY));
+    }
+
+    private void doOpApprove(CommandSource source, String codeArg) {
+        Player player = requirePlayer(source);
+        if (player == null || !ensureOutOfLimbo(player)) {
+            return;
+        }
+        if (!routingActive) {
+            player.sendMessage(routingDisabled());
+            return;
+        }
+        String code = codeArg.trim();
+        if (!OP_LOGIN_CODE.matcher(code).matches()) {
+            player.sendMessage(Component.text(
+                    "That doesn't look like a valid approval code.", NamedTextColor.RED));
+            return;
+        }
+        UUID approver = player.getUniqueId();
+        String who = player.getUsername();
+        player.sendMessage(Component.text("Approving operator sign-in…", NamedTextColor.GRAY));
+        async(() -> {
+            try {
+                apiClient.opLoginApprove(code, approver);
+                player.sendMessage(Component.text(
+                        "Approved — the operator can finish signing in now.", NamedTextColor.GREEN));
+                logger.info("Felis: op-login {} approved in-game by {} ({})", code, who, approver);
+            } catch (LinkException e) {
+                player.sendMessage(Component.text(opApproveError(e), NamedTextColor.RED));
+            }
+        });
+    }
+
+    // ---- helpers ----
+
+    private Component routingDisabled() {
+        return Component.text(
+                "Felis routing is disabled on this proxy" + (onlineMode ? " (no root-domain set)." : " (offline mode)."),
+                NamedTextColor.YELLOW);
+    }
+
+    // claimError maps the felis-api claim refusals (spec §9.3) to player-safe text.
+    private static String claimError(LinkException e, String server) {
+        switch (e.statusCode()) {
+            case 412:
+                return "Link your account on the web console before claiming a server.";
+            case 403:
+                return "You've reached your server limit — you can't claim another.";
+            case 409:
+                return "« " + server + " » is already owned.";
+            case 404:
+                return "« " + server + " » is no longer available.";
+            case 0:
+                return "Felis is temporarily unavailable — please try again.";
+            default:
+                return "Couldn't claim « " + server + " » right now. Please try again.";
+        }
+    }
+
+    // opApproveError maps the internal approve refusals to player-safe text. A 403 is
+    // the API's own admin re-check (defence in depth over the in-game gate); a 404
+    // means no live pending request carries that code.
+    private static String opApproveError(LinkException e) {
+        switch (e.statusCode()) {
+            case 403:
+                return "Only a linked administrator may approve an operator sign-in.";
+            case 404:
+                return "No pending operator sign-in with that code (it may have expired).";
+            case 0:
+                return "Felis is temporarily unavailable — please try again.";
+            default:
+                return "Couldn't approve that sign-in right now. Please try again.";
+        }
+    }
+
+    private static void helpLine(CommandSource source, String cmd, String desc) {
+        source.sendMessage(Component.text("  " + cmd + " ", NamedTextColor.WHITE)
+                .append(Component.text("— " + desc, NamedTextColor.GRAY)));
+    }
+
     private static Component field(String key, String value) {
         return Component.text("  " + key + ": ", NamedTextColor.GRAY)
                 .append(Component.text(value == null ? "<unset>" : value, NamedTextColor.WHITE));

plugins/velocity/src/main/java/best/lolicon/felis/velocity/WaitingRouter.java

@@ -94,6 +94,19 @@ public final class WaitingRouter {
         wakeAndWait(player, serverName, true);
     }
 
+    /**
+     * enqueueFromCommand parks a player who drove {@code /felis go <server>} from chat
+     * onto the server they named, then wakes it and lets {@link #tick()} transfer them
+     * when ready — the same shared waiting queue as host-based routing and the menu
+     * path, differing only in that it is NOT flagged {@code fromMenu}: a command-driven
+     * go has no felis-paper GUI tile to notify, so no {@code TransferReady} frame is
+     * emitted on readiness. The wake stays autostartPolicy-gated on the verified UUID
+     * exactly as the other origins, so this adds a new entry point, not a new authority.
+     */
+    void enqueueFromCommand(Player player, String serverName) {
+        wakeAndWait(player, serverName, false);
+    }
+
     @Subscribe
     public void onChooseInitialServer(PlayerChooseInitialServerEvent event) {
         Player player = event.getPlayer();