fix: restrict platform maintenance and backup visibility to Owner

This commit is contained in:
Lemon-miaow committed 2026-10-07 16:47:57 +08:00
1 parent 285c56955d
commit 07973a4bbd
9 files changed
+67 -54

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+8 -8
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@@ -4603,7 +4603,7 @@ paths:
get:
tags: [admin-updates]
operationId: getUpdateWindow
summary: Read the SysAdmin-set auto-update maintenance window (admin).
summary: Read the Owner-set auto-update maintenance window (Owner).
description: >-
Felis applies no update on its own. `felis update` checks versions and
prints an explicit apply command. `felis update --apply` reads this
@@ -4612,7 +4612,7 @@ paths:
An unreadable window is always a refusal, including with `--now` or
`--force`. An unset window reads back as {start:null,end:null}.
x-felis-face: [external]
x-felis-tier: admin
x-felis-tier: owner
security: [{ sessionCookie: [] }]
responses:
'200':
@@ -4628,7 +4628,7 @@ paths:
put:
tags: [admin-updates]
operationId: setUpdateWindow
summary: Set or clear the SysAdmin auto-update maintenance window (admin).
summary: Set or clear the SysAdmin auto-update maintenance window (Owner).
description: >-
Persist the maintenance window as an absolute [start,end) interval. Both
ends must be set with end strictly after start, or both null to clear the
@@ -4638,7 +4638,7 @@ paths:
setting a window only permits an apply inside it; outside, a Scheduled
component degrades to notify.
x-felis-face: [external]
x-felis-tier: admin
x-felis-tier: owner
security: [{ sessionCookie: [] }]
requestBody:
required: true
@@ -4664,14 +4664,14 @@ paths:
get:
tags: [admin-updates]
operationId: getDBBackup
summary: Freshness of the newest control-plane database backup (admin).
summary: Freshness of the newest control-plane database backup (Owner).
description: >-
What the host's felis-db-backup.timer (or a manual `felis db backup`)
last recorded in platform_settings. last is null before the first
backup; stale is true then, and whenever the newest daily backup
(last.daily_at) is missing or older than max_age_seconds. Read-only: backups run on the host, never through the API.
x-felis-face: [external]
x-felis-tier: admin
x-felis-tier: owner
security: [{ sessionCookie: [] }]
responses:
'200':
@@ -4689,7 +4689,7 @@ paths:
get:
tags: [admin-updates]
operationId: getUpdateReport
summary: The newest recorded version check of every tracked component (admin).
summary: The newest recorded version check of every tracked component (Owner).
description: >-
What `felis update --record` last stored in platform_settings; the
installer's felis-update-check.timer runs it daily on the host, where the
@@ -4697,7 +4697,7 @@ paths:
stale is true then, and whenever the check is older than max_age_seconds.
Read-only: Felis applies no update on its own.
x-felis-face: [external]
x-felis-tier: admin
x-felis-tier: owner
security: [{ sessionCookie: [] }]
responses:
'200':
+8 -8
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@@ -783,16 +783,16 @@ func (a *API) externalAPIRoutes() []apiRoute {
// lives inside it, so approval would otherwise be blind.
{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/submissions/{id}/context", Admin: true, h: a.handleAdminSubmissionContext},
// Auto-update maintenance window (spec §B; decision core internal/updates).
// Admin-tier: it governs whether Felis may apply an update to itself, so setting
// it requires the admin Zero-Trust path, not a mere session. Advisory: `felis
// update` on the host reads it and warns before an apply outside it.
{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/updates/window", Admin: true, h: a.handleGetUpdateWindow},
{Method: "PUT", Pattern: "/api/v1/updates/window", Admin: true, h: a.handleSetUpdateWindow},
// Owner-tier: it governs whether Felis may apply an update to itself, so setting
// it requires Owner access through the operator host. `felis update --apply`
// checks the configured window before backup and installation.
{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/updates/window", Admin: true, Owner: true, h: a.handleGetUpdateWindow},
{Method: "PUT", Pattern: "/api/v1/updates/window", Admin: true, Owner: true, h: a.handleSetUpdateWindow},
// The newest version check felis-update-check.timer recorded on the host.
{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/updates/report", Admin: true, h: a.handleGetUpdateReport},
{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/updates/report", Admin: true, Owner: true, h: a.handleGetUpdateReport},
// Control-plane database backup freshness, as the host's felis-db-backup.timer
// last recorded it. Admin-tier: it names the host backup directory.
{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/platform/db-backup", Admin: true, h: a.handleGetDBBackup},
// last recorded it. Owner-tier: it names the host backup directory.
{Method: "GET", Pattern: "/api/v1/platform/db-backup", Admin: true, Owner: true, h: a.handleGetDBBackup},
// User admin (spec §7, owner-only). Every route gates on the admin Zero-Trust
// path AND the owner role: listing, mutating, disabling, or deleting users is
+13 -22
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@@ -6,24 +6,14 @@ import (
"testing"
)
// Auto-update maintenance-window admin API tests (task #38; decision core
// internal/updates). The load-bearing cases: an unset window and an explicitly
// cleared window both read back as {null,null} (two paths, one shape); a valid
// window round-trips through persistence; a half-set or inverted window is
// rejected fail-closed and never stored; and — the tier boundary — the routes are
// admin-only, gating precisely on IsAdmin() = role==admin AND the admin-access
// path, so neither a role=user nor an admin off the operator host can touch them.
// seedUpdatesAPI returns an API whose external face authenticates every request as
// a full admin (role=admin AND ViaAdminAccess), so the admin-tier routes are
// reachable and the tests exercise the handler logic. Gating tests override
// api.External to vary the principal.
// Platform maintenance handlers require Owner access through the operator host.
// Handler tests use an Owner; boundary tests vary the principal explicitly.
func seedUpdatesAPI(t *testing.T) (*API, *fakeRepo) {
t.Helper()
repo := newFakeRepo()
api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
api.External = staticExternal{p: &Principal{
UserID: "admin1", Email: "admin@" + testRoot, Role: "admin", ViaAdminAccess: true,
UserID: "owner1", Email: "owner@" + testRoot, Role: "owner", ViaAdminAccess: true,
}}
return api, repo
}
@@ -152,17 +142,16 @@ func TestUpdateWindowContentTypeGuard(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestUpdateWindowAdminGating proves the tier boundary discriminates on IsAdmin()
// precisely — role==admin AND the admin-access path — not on accident. A full admin
// reads 200; an admin who did NOT arrive via admin access, and a role=user player,
// are both 403 on both the GET and the mutating PUT.
func TestUpdateWindowAdminGating(t *testing.T) {
// Verify the Owner and operator-host boundaries for reads and writes.
func TestUpdateWindowOwnerGating(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
p *Principal
want int
}{
{"admin via admin-access", &Principal{UserID: "a1", Role: "admin", ViaAdminAccess: true}, http.StatusOK},
{"owner via operator host", &Principal{UserID: "o1", Role: "owner", ViaAdminAccess: true}, http.StatusOK},
{"owner off operator host", &Principal{UserID: "o1", Role: "owner", ViaAdminAccess: false}, http.StatusForbidden},
{"admin via admin-access", &Principal{UserID: "a1", Role: "admin", ViaAdminAccess: true}, http.StatusForbidden},
{"admin off operator host", &Principal{UserID: "a1", Role: "admin", ViaAdminAccess: false}, http.StatusForbidden},
{"role=user player", &Principal{UserID: "u1", Role: "user", ViaAdminAccess: false}, http.StatusForbidden},
} {
@@ -171,11 +160,13 @@ func TestUpdateWindowAdminGating(t *testing.T) {
api := newTestAPI(repo, newFakeCluster())
api.External = staticExternal{p: tc.p}
get := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "GET", "/api/v1/updates/window", "", nil)
for _, path := range []string{"/api/v1/updates/window", "/api/v1/updates/report", "/api/v1/platform/db-backup"} {
get := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "GET", path, "", nil)
if get.Code != tc.want {
t.Fatalf("GET code = %d, want %d (%s)", get.Code, tc.want, get.Body.String())
t.Fatalf("GET %s code = %d, want %d (%s)", path, get.Code, tc.want, get.Body.String())
}
// A valid PUT by a full admin is 200; a non-admin is 403 (adminOnly rejects
}
// A valid PUT by an Owner is 200; other identities are rejected
// before the handler), so the wanted PUT code is the same as the GET's.
put := do(api.ExternalHandler(), "PUT", "/api/v1/updates/window",
`{"start":"2026-08-01T02:00:00Z","end":"2026-08-01T04:00:00Z"}`, jsonHeader)
+8 -8
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@@ -1073,8 +1073,8 @@ async function handleSession(ctx: SessionContext): Promise<boolean> {
sendJSON(ctx.res, 200, { sources: [{ tag: "mojang", prefix: "", lookup_available: true }, ...ctx.state.authSources.sources.filter((source) => source.enabled).map((source) => ({ tag: source.tag, prefix: source.prefix, lookup_available: !!source.api_url || source.url.endsWith("/sessionserver/session/minecraft/hasJoined") }))] });
return true;
case "GET platform/db-backup": {
if (!isAdmin(ctx.account.role)) {
sendError(ctx.res, 403, "forbidden", "admin account required");
if (ctx.account.role !== "owner") {
sendError(ctx.res, 403, "forbidden", "owner account required");
return true;
}
// Yesterday's daily run: fresh, so the card shows its healthy state.
@@ -1097,8 +1097,8 @@ async function handleSession(ctx: SessionContext): Promise<boolean> {
return true;
}
case "GET updates/report": {
if (!isAdmin(ctx.account.role)) {
sendError(ctx.res, 403, "forbidden", "admin account required");
if (ctx.account.role !== "owner") {
sendError(ctx.res, 403, "forbidden", "owner account required");
return true;
}
// Last night's timer run: one update waiting, one feed unreachable, one
@@ -1122,15 +1122,15 @@ async function handleSession(ctx: SessionContext): Promise<boolean> {
return true;
}
case "GET updates/window":
if (!isAdmin(ctx.account.role)) {
sendError(ctx.res, 403, "forbidden", "admin account required");
if (ctx.account.role !== "owner") {
sendError(ctx.res, 403, "forbidden", "owner account required");
return true;
}
sendJSON(ctx.res, 200, ctx.state.updateWindow);
return true;
case "PUT updates/window": {
if (!isAdmin(ctx.account.role)) {
sendError(ctx.res, 403, "forbidden", "admin account required");
if (ctx.account.role !== "owner") {
sendError(ctx.res, 403, "forbidden", "owner account required");
return true;
}
const body = await readJSON<{ start: string | null; end: string | null }>(ctx.req);
+16
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@@ -115,3 +115,19 @@ test("Owner executes node management and receives stage, failure logs and retry"
await expect(page.getByText(t("admin:node_control_state_running"), { exact: true })).toBeVisible();
await expectFitsScreen(page);
});
test("platform backup and version maintenance are Owner-only", async ({ page, signIn }) => {
await signIn("owner");
expect((await page.request.patch("/api/v1/users/user", { data: { role: "admin" } })).ok()).toBe(true);
await signIn("user");
await page.goto("/admin/updates");
await expect(page.getByRole("navigation").getByRole("link", { name: t("navigation:admin_updates"), exact: true })).toHaveCount(0);
await expect(page.getByRole("heading", { name: t("admin:updates_title"), exact: true })).toHaveCount(0);
for (const path of ["updates/window", "updates/report", "platform/db-backup"]) {
expect((await page.request.get(`/api/v1/${path}`)).status()).toBe(403);
}
await signIn("owner");
await page.goto("/admin/updates");
await expect(page.getByRole("heading", { name: t("admin:updates_title"), exact: true })).toBeVisible();
await expect(page.getByRole("navigation").getByRole("link", { name: t("navigation:admin_updates"), exact: true })).toBeVisible();
});
+1 -1
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@@ -130,9 +130,9 @@ export default function App() {
<Route path="images" element={<ImageAdmin />} />
<Route path="builds" element={<ImageBuildPage />} />
<Route path="submissions" element={<SubmissionsPage />} />
<Route path="updates" element={<UpdatesPage />} />
{/* Owner-gated platform settings and user management. */}
<Route element={<RequireOwner />}>
<Route path="updates" element={<UpdatesPage />} />
<Route path="platform" element={<PlatformSettingsPage />} />
<Route path="auth-sources" element={<AuthSourcesPage />} />
<Route path="users" element={<UsersPage />} />
+7
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@@ -24,6 +24,13 @@ describe("visibleSections", () => {
expect(ids).toEqual(["user", "admin"]);
});
it("places platform maintenance exclusively in Owner navigation, before platform settings", () => {
expect(visibleSections(true, false).flatMap((section) => section.items).some((item) => item.to === "/admin/updates")).toBe(false);
const owner = visibleSections(true, true).find((section) => section.id === "owner");
expect(owner?.items.map((item) => item.to)).toContain("/admin/updates");
expect(owner?.items.at(-1)?.to).toBe("/admin/platform");
});
it("keeps the User-Side section ungated so it survives both branches", () => {
const user = NAV_SECTIONS.find((s) => s.id === "user");
expect(user?.adminOnly).toBe(false);
+2 -3
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@@ -18,8 +18,7 @@ import {
// identity see" decision is a pure function (visibleSections) that vitest can pin
// without rendering React. The three sections map onto DESIGN-WEB-3SIDES §2:
// User-Side is always present (app-tier); Admin-Side and SysAdmin-Side are a
// navigational separation of *concern* over the SAME admin tier — both gated by
// the one `is_admin` flag, surfaced as two sections only for admins.
// separation between server administration and Owner-only platform operations.
//
// Hiding a section is UX convenience, NOT a security control: every /admin and
// /ops data call is independently 403-gated server-side (the RequireAdmin route
@@ -68,7 +67,6 @@ export const NAV_SECTIONS: NavSection[] = [
{ to: "/admin/images", key: "admin_images", icon: Boxes },
{ to: "/admin/builds", key: "admin_builds", icon: Cpu },
{ to: "/admin/submissions", key: "admin_submissions", icon: ClipboardCheck },
{ to: "/admin/updates", key: "admin_updates", icon: Clock },
],
},
{
@@ -79,6 +77,7 @@ export const NAV_SECTIONS: NavSection[] = [
items: [
{ to: "/admin/users", key: "admin_users", icon: Users },
{ to: "/admin/auth-sources", key: "auth_sources", icon: ShieldCheck },
{ to: "/admin/updates", key: "admin_updates", icon: Clock },
{ to: "/admin/platform", key: "platform_settings", icon: Settings },
],
},
+4 -4
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@@ -1404,12 +1404,12 @@ export interface paths {
cookie?: never;
};
/**
* Read the SysAdmin-set auto-update maintenance window (admin).
* Read the Owner-set auto-update maintenance window (Owner).
* @description Felis applies no update on its own. `felis update` checks versions and prints an explicit apply command. `felis update --apply` reads this platform-wide [start,end) window before backup and before installation, refusing outside it unless `--now` explicitly starts manual maintenance. An unreadable window is always a refusal, including with `--now` or `--force`. An unset window reads back as {start:null,end:null}.
*/
get: operations["getUpdateWindow"];
/**
* Set or clear the SysAdmin auto-update maintenance window (admin).
* Set or clear the SysAdmin auto-update maintenance window (Owner).
* @description Persist the maintenance window as an absolute [start,end) interval. Both ends must be set with end strictly after start, or both null to clear the window to unset. A half-set (exactly one end) or inverted/empty (end not after start) body is rejected 400, mirroring the decision core's fail-closed Window so a malformed schedule can never be stored. No forced auto-update: setting a window only permits an apply inside it; outside, a Scheduled component degrades to notify.
*/
put: operations["setUpdateWindow"];
@@ -1428,7 +1428,7 @@ export interface paths {
cookie?: never;
};
/**
* Freshness of the newest control-plane database backup (admin).
* Freshness of the newest control-plane database backup (Owner).
* @description What the host's felis-db-backup.timer (or a manual `felis db backup`) last recorded in platform_settings. last is null before the first backup; stale is true then, and whenever the newest daily backup (last.daily_at) is missing or older than max_age_seconds. Read-only: backups run on the host, never through the API.
*/
get: operations["getDBBackup"];
@@ -1448,7 +1448,7 @@ export interface paths {
cookie?: never;
};
/**
* The newest recorded version check of every tracked component (admin).
* The newest recorded version check of every tracked component (Owner).
* @description What `felis update --record` last stored in platform_settings; the installer's felis-update-check.timer runs it daily on the host, where the installed versions are readable. report is null before the first check; stale is true then, and whenever the check is older than max_age_seconds. Read-only: Felis applies no update on its own.
*/
get: operations["getUpdateReport"];